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Abstract
My work is built around the application of formal methods in philosophy. The
idea that formal tools, logic in particular, could help advance the philosophic
endeavor is not new. It dates back to antiquity. However, it is only recently
that this idea has gained new momentum. By now, the use of formal methods
in philosophy is not restricted to logic anymore, but includes a large variety
of dierent methods and techniques. In this thesis, I concentrate on three
of these: logical and statistical methods and computer simulations. In doing
so, I follow two main goals. The rst is to study these frameworks abstractly
in order to get a better understanding of their qualities and drawbacks. The
second goal then is to apply these tools to particular issues in philosophy.
Here, I mainly focus on applications in epistemology and political philosophy.
This thesis consists of ve chapters, each of which constitutes an au-
tonomous scientic paper. The rst chapter contains a logical framework for
modeling the beliefs in interactive game situations and the dynamics thereof.
In the second, I compare dierent logical frameworks with respect to two
criteria relevant for choosing between dierent modeling tools. The third
chapter contains a statistical model on group decision making. I present a
model for aggregating individual judgments that is sensitive to dierences
in competence between the dierent agents. The fourth chapter contains
a mathematical model on voting behavior and opinion dynamics, based on
the idea that voters interests are driven by an underlying agenda of topics.
Finally, in the fth and last chapter, I present a simulation model on the
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The use of formal tools is a recent and quickly spreading phenomenon in
philosophy and some of its neighboring elds. Formal methods appear in the
names of mathematical philosophy and formal epistemology, two recent
subelds of philosophy, but also in the wide spread application of game theory
or computer simulations in philosophy, sociology or political science. But
what is it that people hope to gain from using formal tools? And how are
these methods applied exactly? As it turns out, there is no unique answer to
either of these questions. Just to the contrary, there is a wide variety of formal
approaches diering, for instance, in the tools they employ, the situation they
address or the goals they pursue. In this thesis, I will present ve applications
of formal tools that illustrate the wide range of formal methods in present day
philosophy. But before going into detail, let's have a slightly more systematic
look at some aspects in which formal approaches can dier. In the following,
we introduce four such aspects: the formal methods used, the target system
of the model, the way in which the model relates to that target system and,
nally, the precise goals pursued by a formalization.
The rst aspect is the particular framework used for a formal model.
Current literature produced a plethora of dierent modeling frameworks:
Quantitative methods, qualitative methods, logic, probabilistic approaches,
mathematical models, game theory, rational choice theory, Bayesianism, net-
work theory and computer simulations to name but a few. Notably, these
dierent frameworks can be related in various possible ways. They could be
incompatible with each other, they could be combinable with each other or
some framework could be a specication or subeld of another. Qualitative
and quantitative models, for instance, are incompatible, describing mutually
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exclusive ways of addressing some target system. Game theory, on the other
hand, is a general framework for representing interactive strategic situations
that is compatible with dierent formal frameworks, using probabilistic or
logical methods. In the extreme case, the exact relationship between two
frameworks depends on the standpoint of the observer. Seen from a taxon-
omy of scientic elds, logic would be classied as a subeld of mathematics,
while sociologically these are two dierent elds. Logicians work in dierent
institutes than mathematicians, label themselves dierently, apply dierent
methods and, sometimes even have a dierent way of thinking about abstract
systems.
The second aspect we introduce is the target system of a formal model.
Each formalization or formal model relates to some target system. These tar-
get systems could, in principle, be about anything, a philosophic argument,
a formal or informal theory, a concrete social situation, a particular concept,
a piece of data, a social practice, or even another formal model. Moreover,
a formalization may relate to various such target systems at once, or even
remain intentionally opaque about the intended target system. For instance,
a formalization of some philosophic theory about the nature of knowledge
may be treated as a representation of that theory and, at the same time,
as a formal model for the practice of knowledge. In both roles, the formal
framework can be praised or criticized for a more or less of accuracy, it can be
compared to other models, subjected to criticism, tested in various ways and
so on. And of course, what is faithful to the underlying theory need not be
very accurate in tracking the phenomenon of knowledge and vice versa, thus
the dierent possible target systems might trigger contradictory evaluations
of the same formal model.
Thirdly, dierent formalizations do not only dier in the nature of their
target systems, but also in how they relate to them. Some formalizations
aim to represent some phenomenon in its entirety, others only aim at par-
ticular aspects that, in reality, never appear in isolation. On a related note,
some formalizations aim at being mere abstractions, in principal adequate
representations of a target system, that merely abstract away from some
complicating factors. Others are idealizations, intentionally omitting or mis-
representing relevant aspects of their target system. In the extreme case,
some might want to argue, certain formal studies may be mere parabolas,
instructive stories that are meant to suggest some moral about an informal
system.
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And, as a fourth and last aspect, the function served by a formal model
can vary. For instance, one function of a formal model can be to clarify
certain properties of a target system. Having a representation in an adequate,
well dened formal framework can help to discern certain properties of the
target system, such as, for instance, the logical structure of an argument.
In a second step, formal frameworks may then be applied for a verifying or
controlling purpose, checking whether some informally given argument is in
fact conclusive or whether some mechanism produces the results it is believed
to produce. And, as a third and last aspect, formal representation can help to
explore the properties of some target systems, for instance by using computers
to replicate some dynamical processes under controlled input parameters or
by applying a highly developed mathematical apparatus.
In this thesis, we will present ve applications of formal tools, diering
in the four aspects we have just presented: their formal frameworks, their
target systems, their relations to the respective target system and their mod-
eling goals. These applications will be put forward in the next ve chapters.
Taken together, they give a snapshot on the wide range of formal models in
contemporary philosophy. Each application covers a dierent area of inter-
est, thus the individual chapters can be accessed independently of each other.
In principal, this thesis is intended to be self contained, although some pas-
sages, especially the proof sections, may assume some familiarity with the
underlying formal frameworks of epistemic and doxastic logic (chapter 2 and
3), probability theory (chapter 4), basic linear algebra (chapters 4 and 5),
computer simulations (6) and game theory (chapters 2 and 6). In the con-
cluding chapter 7, nally, we will oer some general remarks about the use
of formal tools in philosophy and their potential roles and purposes. For a
start, we present an outline of the dierent chapters.
In the rst chapter 2, we assume a logical perspective on epistemic game
theory. Traditionally, game theory aims to identify the strategic structure
of social situations, which agent has which strategies, how these strategies
relate to each other and so forth. However, knowledge of the underlying
game structure might not always be sucient for predicting the behavior
of dierent agents, or advising some player on how ideally to move next.
The optimal behavior in many situations, be they cooperative or competi-
tive, depends on what the other player thinks, wants or does. Therefore, so
the starting idea of epistemic game theory, it is not enough to learn about
the game structure, but any successful strategic analysis needs to take the
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opponents' moves and strategies into account. However, there is a certain
complication hidden in this picture. We could expect a rational opponent to
adopt a similar strategy, making her moves depend on what she expects us to
do. Thus, in order to anticipate her behavior, we need to go second order and
incorporate her potential beliefs about us in the analysis, that is, we need
to form beliefs about her beliefs. Anticipating the opponent to do likewise
again leads us to third, fourth and higher levels of knowledge. In the limit,
these chains of reasoning about each others' beliefs easily lead to innite lev-
els of mutual beliefs ascriptions, that can be represented with probabilistic
[73] or logical [52] methods. Taking this perspective of epistemic game the-
ory as a starting point, we want to add a further perspective to the analysis
of games. Classically, epistemic game theory assumes the players' beliefs to
be externally given and static. But this, of course, is an idealization. The
players' beliefs have emerged through some dynamic epistemic progress, and
they might well continue to change during the game. Of course, the players'
beliefs will change as the game goes on. Each move made by one of the player
is a new piece of information inuencing the beliefs of all other players. But
also events external to the actual game can impact the players beliefs and
expectations. For instance, some accidental side comment, dropped volun-
tarily or involuntarily by one of the players, may change the way in which
other players perceive the game. Consequentially, so the starting assumption
of our model, we need a logic of change, a formal framework to incorporate
external informational events into epistemic game theory. In chapter 2 we de-
velop exactly that. Starting from a logical model of higher order information,
we develop a mechanism for incorporating new informational events into the
players' epistemic states. This mechanism is based on product updates, a
tool from epistemic logic developed for incorporating external informational
events into Kripke Models. On a more conceptual level, our model thus
broadens the target system of epistemic game theory by incorporating the
agents' belief dynamics into the game model.
In our second chapter 3, we explore various formal frameworks for multi
agent information, referring again to rst and higher order levels of informa-
tion. Social situations such as arranging a dinner with friends will crucially
depend on the information available to the dierent agents. To successfully
arrange a joint dinner, all guests, of course, need to know about the time and
place of the convention. But this rst order information will, in general, not
suce to make people actually show up at a dinner. The dierent invitees
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may want to make sure that they are not the only ones coming. That is, they
want to have the higher order information that also the other guests know
about the proposed date and time and are also planning to come. Thus, a
formal representation of the relevant informational attitudes for social inter-
action needs to incorporate rst and higher order informational settings. In
chapter 3, we explore dierent formal frameworks for representing the in-
formational states in such interactive situations, all based on epistemic and
doxastic logic.
Notably, dierent social events will call for dierent formal frameworks.
For instance, in the above case of friends coordinating for dinner, more infor-
mation is always better, thus a suitable formal framework can concentrate on
acquiring new information. Other situations might also be sensitive towards
restricting the access to information. As an example, consider situations of
secure communication. In communicating with our banks, one of the central
concerns is that some third party, trying to eavesdrop cannot learn about
the content of our messages. That is, we want to restrict the access to the
available information. A corresponding formal framework thus needs to keep
track of which information the agents can and cannot acquire. Generally
speaking, the decision of which framework is best suited for a given situation
will depend upon some characteristics of the target system, but also on the
taste and the goals of the modeler.
In chapter 3, we identify two criteria relevant in choosing formal modeling
tools, and use these criteria to compare dierent logical frameworks. The rst
criterion, expressive power, states that some framework is ne enough for a
given target system, allowing to represent all features relevant for subsequent
analysis. The second criterion, realizability, expresses that a framework is not
too ne, for instance by making too subtle distinctions or allowing for lengthy,
overly complex constructions that do not mirror any observable properties.
Obviously, these two criteria drag in opposite directions. In choosing some
formal framework for a particular situation, the ideal balance between these
two depends, for instance, on the exact properties of the target system or
the goals pursued by the modeler. Some situations require a ner formal
language to be represented adequately than others. Equally, some modeling
purposes are more sensitive towards dierences in complexity than others.
Our main aim in this chapter is to clarify the relation between these two
properties, expressive power and realizability, and to relate them to some
prominent representational frameworks.
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The next chapter 4, deals with the problem of judgment aggregation.
When confronted with major decisions, political authorities, economic boards
or NGOs will often refer to external expertise about, for instance, future
population growth, the expected sales of a product or the likelihood of some
major ecological disaster. Usually, this external expertise is provided by a
board of experts, appointed especially for that purpose. However, the dif-
ferent experts will, almost inevitably, disagree about the value in question,
thus the decision maker faces the problem of how to combine the individual
assessments. One of her central questions is: Should she take dierences in
competence between the various experts into account. In this chapter, we
propose a mathematical model for judgment aggregation, sensitive to dier-
ences in competence between experts. As it turns out, the practical problem
of identifying expertise is extremely hard. In particular, a vast body of
empirical research shows that properties such as status, reputation or self
assessment are, at best, unrelated to the actual quality of some individual's
judgments. With other words, the actual distribution of competence present
in some given expert panel might be extremely dicult to determine. There-
fore, we are not so much concerned with identifying the ideal weights for
any particular expert panel, but in devising a model that stably outperforms
non-dierential methods, even under the presence of various complicating
factors.
In judging a particular expert panel, the decision maker will face some
uncertainty about the degrees of expertise, but also about the existence of
biases or correlations between the dierent members. Taking this uncertainty
about the target system into account, we primarily aim to identify a large
parameter range where our framework fares better than non-dierential rules.
Ideally, this range covers all of the decision maker's uncertainty about the
target system, such that she can rely on our method performing suciently
well, even without having access to the precise characteristics of the target
system.
The following chapter 5 focuses on voting behavior in political elections.
We present a mathematical model of individual voters and how they choose
between candidates in a major political election. While the idea of describing
voters as boundedly rational actors aiming to maximize their own returns is
as old as Schumpeter's [141], it is yet debated how to adequately represent
the motivations of voters. Notably, there are two competing accounts in
making sense of voters as rational actors, instrumental and expressive vot-
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ing. The rst of these, instrumental voting, sees voters as interested in the
outcome of an election, deriving their utility from future political decisions.
On the other hand, expressive voting holds that voters already obtain their
gratication from voting from their preferred party or siding with some camp
they support. Both of these approaches are well supported by theoretical and
empirical arguments, yet both sides have their respective weak spots, certain
prominent phenomena they cannot explain. There are several arguments,
however, that actual voting behavior can best be explained by a superposi-
tion of instrumental and expressive voting, that is, voters caring about the
attributes and values of some party as well as the resulting outcomes of an
election. The relative weights attached to both modes, expressive and instru-
mental, vary with, for instance, the exact policy at stake or how close the
election is expected to be. Thus, in order to understand complex voting sit-
uations, it is best to rst analyze these from both perspectives individually,
in order to later combine the insights obtained. In chapter 5, we assume an
expressive perspective on voting in elections where all voters and candidates
are interested in a particular agenda of topics.
In the rst part of this chapter, we use our framework to compare dier-
ent voting systems such as plurality vote or approval voting. In particular,
we are interested in how good the dierent voting systems are in fostering a
high electoral turnout. That is, we are interested in the number or probabil-
ity of abstentions under the dierent voting systems. In the second part of
the chapter, we then add a dynamic module to our framework. The beliefs
and preferences of voters, just as the beliefs in games studied in chapter 2,
are not xed once and for all. Just on the contrary, these preferences de-
velop gradually, reacting to various pieces of information the voter obtains.
In particular, recent political news, but also electoral campaigns or private
discussions can change the voters' beliefs about the best course of action.
We outline a particular formal tool, focus changing matrices, that integrates
these various elements of opinion change into our discussion of voting be-
havior. In this part, we also show how a related logical model relates to our
mathematical model, thus giving an example for the interaction of dierent
formal frameworks.
Finally, in chapter 6 we present a computer simulation on the dynamics of
generalized trust. Generalized trust, the belief that strangers we have never
met before will act cooperatively in complex, interactive situations, is a ma-
jor determinant for the success of modern societies. A high level of trust is
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relevant for the performance of political institutions and the economic capac-
ities of states, but also for individual benets such as health or the quality of
life. Consequentially, recent years have seen an increased research interest in
the architecture and determinants of trust. In chapter 6, we present an agent
based computer simulation on the dynamics of trust, based on factors and
mechanisms identied in previous empirical and theoretical research. The
aims of our model are twofold. First, the simulation should help to obtain
new insights in how dierent mechanisms relevant for the emergence of trust
interact with each other. Here, our model will build on various factors and
mechanisms identied in the theoretical and empirical literature on trust,
but also on insights from experimental psychology and game theory. Second,
our simulation should help to evaluate various claims from the theoretical
literature. Is some proclaimed mechanism strong enough to explain dier-
ences in trust? Does a certain parameter, say the mobility within a society,
have the impact it is believed to have? These questions can be settled by
implementing said mechanisms in a computer simulation in order to replicate
the underlying dynamic system. In particular, our simulational model will
relate to two dierent target systems. First, our simulations are targeted at
the actual phenomenon of generalized trust in larger societies. In order to
validate our simulation, we need to show that it tracks particular aspects
of generalized trust suciently well. In a second step, we then shift target
systems and use our simulations to test various theoretical predictions from
the literature.
In chapter 7, nally, we conclude. We do so by oering some general
remarks about the use of formal tools in philosophy. This chapter is primarily
meant to provide some framing for the work presented in chapters 2 to 6 and
to help the reader put this work into context. In our discussion, we return
to the four aspects mentioned above: the modeling techniques available, the
dierent possible target systems, the various ways in which a model could
relate to such target systems and, fourth, the goals and motivations pursued
by a formal model. We will further address the possible relationships between
the various formal frameworks and discuss a variety of ways in which formal
tools can relate to dynamic patterns. Finally, we will also mention some
practical factors guiding the choice between dierent formal frameworks.
Most of the points we mention in this conclusion will likely be old news to
people working with formal tools. They are, however, usually little addressed
in the respective formal communities, making it unnecessarily dicult for
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interested outsiders to assess the exact scope, goals or motivation behind
some formal models. We hope that the discussion we oer remedies this fact
and thereby helps to assess some of the work presented in this thesis.
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Chapter 2
Changing Types: Information
Dynamics for Qualitative Type
Spaces
2.1 Introduction
The central thesis of the epistemic program in game theory is that the basic
mathematical model of a game situation should include an explicit parame-
ter describing the players' informational attitudes.1 See [28] for the relevant
references and a discussion of the key results, and [131] for an introduction to
this literature. Games are played in specic informational contexts, in which
players have specic knowledge and beliefs about each other.2 Many dierent
formal models have been used to represent such informational contexts of a
game (see [23, 156, 157], and references therein, for a discussion). In this
chapter, we are not only interested in structures that describe the informa-
tional context of a game, but how these structures can change in response to
This chapter is based on joint work with E. Pacuit. It is an extended version of [91].
1This is, of course, something of a truism regarding games of incomplete or imperfect
information. But the thesis is intended to apply to all game situations. See [29, Section
5] for a precise description about the crucial dierences between an epistemic model of a
game and a Bayesian game.
2This is nicely explained by Adam Brandenburger and Amanda Friedenberg ([30, pg.
801]): In any particular structure, certain beliefs, beliefs about beliefs, . . . , will be present
and others won't be. So, there is an important implicit assumption behind the choice of
a structure. This is that it is transparent to the players that the beliefs in the [type]
structure  and only those beliefs  are possible. . . . The idea is that there is a `context'
to the strategic situation (e.g., history, conventions, etc.) and this `context' causes the
players to rule out certain beliefs.
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the players' observations, communicatory acts or other dynamic operations
of information change (cf. [154]).
We focus our attention on the players' hard information about the game
(which we refer to as knowledge following standard terminology in the game
theory and epistemic logic literature) and its dynamics. Broadly speaking,
there are two dierent types of models that have been used to describe the
players' knowledge (and beliefs) in a game situation. Both types of models
include a nonempty set S of states of nature (elements of S are intended to
represent possible outcomes of a game situation).3 The rst type of models
are the so-called Aumann- or Kripke-structures [9, 53]. These structures
describe the players' knowledge in terms of an epistemic indistinguishability
relation over a (nite) set of states W . The second type of models are
the knowledge structures of [52, 54], which are non-probabilistic variants of
Harsanyi type spaces [73].4 The key concept here is a type which describes
the players' innite hierarchy of knowledge (i.e., what the players know about
the ground facts, what the players know about each others' knowledge of the
ground facts, what players know about what the others know about each
others' knowledge of the ground facts, and so on). The precise relationship
between these two types of models was claried in [52, 54].
Our goal in this chapter is to show how to adapt recent work modeling
information change on Kripke structures as a product update with an event
model [160] to the more general setting where the players' knowledge is rep-
resented using knowledge structures. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the rst attempt to develop a theory of information change for knowledge
structures in the style of recent work on dynamic epistemic logic. Our main
result (Theorem 2.25) characterizes precisely when a type in a xed knowl-
edge structure can be transformed into another type in that structure using
the product update operation.
There are two main motivations for this technical study. The rst is to
explore generalizations of the product update operation. This is done in
Section 2.3.1 where we also generalize a result of [158] characterizing when
a Kripke structure can be transformed into another Kripke structure by a
product update. The second motivation for this work is to initiate a study
3Often, it is assumed that the elements of S can be described by some logical language
(for example, propositional logic), but this is not crucial for us in this chapter.
4See [145] for a modern introduction to type spaces as models of beliefs and [120] for a
discussion of Harsanyi's classic paper.
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of information dynamics for epistemic models of games. Each player of a
game can obtain new information about the game. Before the game, for
instance, some player might gradually learn about the informational states
of her opponents, their mutual relationships and what they think about the
game. Also, that player might acquire some new factual information, for
instance about some face-down cards on the table. All these informational
events may, of course, be relevant for her choosing a strategy. The player can
only reasonably decide on which strategy to play after having incorporated all
available information in her beliefs. Similarly, our player might also acquire
new information during the play of an extended game. For instance, some
opponent might accidentally drop her hand or a gust of wind may allow
a subset of the players to see certain cards. Of course, also such external
events may lead the player to revise her strategic considerations.5 We agree
that the type of events we have in mind here, gusts of wind and the like,
are irrelevant to a game-theoretic analysis. But these events do change the
context6 of a game by revealing or hiding important information to all or
some of the players and, more generally, changing their beliefs. This chapter
is a rst step towards a more general project that uses the dynamic epistemic
logic framework to represent changes in the informational context of a game.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 pro-
vides the necessary background on (dynamic) epistemic logic and knowledge
structures. Note that this Section was written for a reader already familiar
with the key concepts and denitions. Consult [154] and [52] for motivations
and a broader discussion of the literature. Our main result is in Section 2.3.2
with the technical preliminaries to be found in Section 2.3.1. We conclude in
Section 2.4 with a discussion of topics for future research.
5This reasoning squares nicely with the many moments interpretation of extensive
games, see [45]. The many moments interpretation holds that a player chooses anew at
each of her action nodes in an extended game. In picking a strategy for an entire game, the
player thus needs to predict which choices she will make at her future decision nodes, based
on the information she envisages herself to have at the respective node. This expectation
can, of course, turn out to be wrong, in which case she might want to move dierently
than anticipated.
6Here, we take the context" of a game to be all events that inuence the players' beliefs
in the game situation.
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2.2 Background
2.2.1 A Primer on Dynamic Epistemic Logic
We assume the reader is familiar with the basics of (dynamic) epistemic logic,
and so we only give the key denitions here (see the textbooks [53, 154] for an
introduction to the subsequent denitions). Let I be the nite set of players
and At a (nite or innite) set of atomic propositions.7
Denition 2.1 (Epistemic Language). The epistemic language, denoted
LEL, is the smallest set of formulas generated by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Kiϕ
where p ∈ At and i ∈ I. Dene Liφ as the dual of Ki (i.e., Liφ := ¬Ki¬φ)
and the other boolean connectives (e.g., ∨,→) as usual. /
The intended interpretation of Kiφ is agent i knows that φ (is true)".
The standard semantics for LEL are Kripke structures.
Denition 2.2 (Kripke Structure). AKripke structure (for a set of atomic
propositions At) is a tuple 〈W, {Ri}i∈I , V 〉 where W is a set of states, Ri ⊆
W × W is an equivalence relation8, and V : At → ℘(W ) is a valuation
function. To simplify notation, we may write w ∈M when w ∈ W . /
Formulas of LEL are interpreted at states in a Kripke model in the standard
way, we only remind the reader of the denition for the knowledge modality:
M, w |= Kiφ i for all v ∈ W if wRiv thenM, v |= ϕ
The central idea of dynamic epistemic logic is to describe events that
change a situation and the (uncertain) perceptions of these events by the
agents as a so-called event model.
Denition 2.3 (Event Model). An event model is a tuple 〈E, {Qi}i∈I , pre〉
where E is a set of basic events, Qi ⊆ E ×E is an equivalence relation9 and
pre : E → LEL assigns to each primitive event a formula that serves as a
precondition for that event. We write e ∈ E if e is an event in E . /
7Atomic propositions are intended to represent properties of states of nature.
8In this work, we restrict attention structures where the epistemic relations are equiva-
lence relations. These are known in the literature as S5-structures or Aumann structures.
9To keep things manageable for this initial study, we restrict attention to event models
with equivalence relations. For much of what follows, this assumption is not crucial.
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The primitive events represent the basic observations available to the
agents in a dynamic situation. Similar to Kripke structures, uncertainty
about which events are taking place is represented by relations Qi. Given
our assumptions that each Qi is an equivalence relation, the intended inter-
pretation of eQif is that agent i cannot distinguish between events e and
f . The key operation of product update describes how to incorporate into a
Kripke structureM (describing an epistemic situation) the epistemic event
described by an event model E .
Denition 2.4 (Product Update). The product update of a Kripke model
M = 〈W, {Ri}i∈I , V 〉 and an event model E = 〈E, {Qi}i∈I , pre〉 is a Kripke
modelM⊕E = 〈W ′, {R′i}i∈I , V ′〉 dened as follows:
• W ′ = {(w, e) ∈ W × E | M, w |= pre(e)}
• (w, e)R′i(w′, e′) i wRiw′ and eQie′
• (w, e) ∈ V ′(p) i w ∈ V (p) /
This operation (together with variants appropriate for modeling belief
and preference change) has been extensively studied in the literature. We
do not provide an overview of this literature here: see [154, 160] for an
extensive analysis. Rather, the focus is on how to understand this theory
of information dynamics in the context of models of knowledge (and beliefs)
typically found in the game theory literature. We need one additional notion
from the general theory of modal logic.
Denition 2.5 (Bisimulation). Suppose thatM1 = 〈W1, R1, V1〉 andM2 =
〈W2, R2, V2〉 are Kripke structures. A nonempty relation Z ⊆ W1 ×W2 is a
bisimulation provided for all w1 ∈ W1 and w2 ∈ W2, if w1Zw2 then:
(atomic harmony) For all p ∈ At, w1 ∈ V1(p) i w2 ∈ V2(p).
(zig) If w1R1v1 then there is a v2 ∈ W2 such that w2R2v2 and v1Zv2.
(zag) If w2R2v2 then there is a v1 ∈ W1 such that w1R1v1 and v1Zv2.
We write M1, w1 ↔ M2, w2 if there is a bisimulation relating w1 with w2.
We writeM1 ↔M2 if there is a bitotal bisimulation betweenM1 andM2,
that is a bisimulation Z such that for every v ∈ M1 there is some W ∈ M2
with vZw and vice versa. The relation Z is called a simulation from M1
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to M2, denoted M1, w1 → M2, w2, if Z satises the atomic harmony
and zig properties. Z is called total provided for each w1 ∈ W1 there is a
w2 ∈ W2 such that w1Zw2. Finally, Z is called functional if it is total and
a function from W1 to W2 (i.e. for every w1 ∈ W1 and w2, w̃2 ∈ W2 it is the
case that w1Zw2 and w1Zw̃2 implies w2 = w̃2). /
2.2.2 Knowledge Structures
Knowledge structures were introduced in [52] as an alternative semantics for
the basic epistemic language LEL.10 They are non-probabilistic versions of
Harsanyi type spaces which are the predominant model of knowledge and
beliefs in the literature on the epistemic foundations of game theory ([29]
oers some explanation about why this is the case).
The key concept is a κ-world (also called a type in the game theory
literature) describing the players' innite hierarchy of knowledge (belief) of
a given state of aairs.
Denition 2.6 (κ-world). Let S be a (nite or innite) nonempty set (whose
elements are called states). A κ-world is a vector of functions f = 〈f0, f1, f2 . . .〉
of length κ (a possibly innite ordinal) dened inductively as follows:
• A 1-world is a vector 〈f0〉 where f0 is a state of nature (i.e., f0 ∈ S).11
• For κ > 1 of the form κ = λ+ 1 (i.e. κ is a successor ordinal) a κ-world
is a vector 〈f0 . . . fλ〉 such that 〈fi | i < λ〉 is a λ-world and fλ is a
function from the set of agents I to the power set of the set of λ-worlds
over S (i.e., fλ : I → ℘(Fλ(S)), where Fλ(S) denotes the set of all
λ-worlds over S) that satises the following conditions. Let f<β denote
the initial segment of f of length β.
Extendability If 0 < α < λ, then g ∈ fα(i) i there is some h ∈ fλ(i)
such that g = h<α (i.e., higher-order worlds are extensions of
lower-order worlds and every lower-order world has at least one
higher-order extension).
10See [52] for an extended discussion of knowledge structures aimed at game theorists.
Fagin [51] and Fagin and Vardi [55] show how variants of knowledge structures can provide
an elegant semantics for many modal logics.
11For the comparison with epistemic logic, it is useful to think of the set of states S
as the set of propositional valuations on a set At of atomic propositions. In this case f0
would be a propositional valuation function.
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In addition, since we intend κ-worlds to represent the knowledge of
the players, we impose two additional conditions:
Correctness For each agent i ∈ I, f<λ ∈ fλ(i) (i.e., every agent must
consider the actual state of the world possible).
Introspection For all i ∈ I, if 〈g0, g1, . . .〉 ∈ fκ(i), then gλ(i) = fλ(i),
for all λ with 0 < λ < κ (i.e., players cannot consider states
possible that dier in their description from their own lower-order
beliefs). /
• Finally, for κ a limit ordinal a κ-world is a vector of functions 〈fi | i < κ〉
such that for every λ < κ the vector 〈fi | i < λ〉 is a λ-world.
We denote the set of all κ-worlds over S by Fκ(S).
The intended interpretation is that fκ(i) ⊆ Fκ(S) is the set of all κ-worlds
player i considers possible. Then, κ-worlds f are descriptions of the state of
aairs and the players' higher-order knowledge (up to level κ). Thus, we can
interpret the basic epistemic language at κ-worlds. For simplicity, we assume
there is an atomic proposition E for every subset of the set of states S (i.e.,
At = ℘(S)). This language is interpreted as follows:
f |= E ⇔ f0 ∈ E
f |= ¬ϕ ⇔ f 6|= ϕ
f |= ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔ f |= ϕ and f |= ψ
f |= Kiϕ ⇔ for each g ∈ fl(i) : g |= φ
where l is the quantier depth12 of ϕ.
There is an alternative way of dening truth of the knowledge modality by
dening an accessibility relation on Fκ(S), which transforms Fκ(S) into a
Kripke model. We can then use the standard denition of a modal operator.
For a κ-world f = 〈f0, f1, . . .〉, let f i = 〈f1(i), f2(i), . . .〉 (note that the state
of nature is not part of f i) and dene a relation ∼i on the Fκ(S) as follows:
f ∼i g i f i = gi (equality is dened component-wise). If f ∼i g then we
say f and g are equivalent according to agent i. It is easy to see that these
relations are equivalence relations. They turn Fκ(S) into a Kripke structure
(with At = ℘(S) and the valuation function V dened by w ∈ V (E) i
12Quantier depth is dened as usual by induction on the structure of φ ∈ LEL: For-
mally, qd(p) = 0, qd(¬φ) = qd(φ), qd(φ∧ψ) = max(qd(φ), qd(ψ)), and qd(Kiφ) = 1+qd(φ).
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w ∈ E). Fagin et al. show ([54, Theorem 2.4]) that the interpretation of
the epistemic language given above coincides with the interpretation of the
epistemic language obtained by interpreting 〈Fκ(S), {∼i}i∈I , V 〉 as a Kripke
structure. So, there are two equivalent ways to interpret the basic epistemic
language on the set Fκ(S) of κ-worlds. In the remainder of the chapter, we
will use whichever denition is most convenient.
We are interested in general maps between Kripke structures and knowl-
edge structures. To this end, we x a set of atomic propositions At and
assume that the state space S is the set of propositional valuations of At,
i.e., S = ℘(At). To simplify our exposition, we identify p ∈ At with {e ∈
S | p ∈ e} ⊆ S, i.e. the set of valuations containing p.
The key observation is that every Kripke structure can be naturally as-
sociated with a substructure of 〈Fω(S), {∼i}i∈I , V 〉. The mapping is dened
as follows:13
Denition 2.7 (Embedding from Kripke structures to knowledge struc-
tures). LetM = 〈W, {Ri}i∈N , V 〉 be a Kripke structure. We associate with
each state w ∈ W in M an ω-world fM,w = 〈fw0 , fw1 , fw2 , . . .〉 where the fwα
are dened by synchronous induction on all worlds w ∈ W :
• fw0 = {p | w ∈ V (p)}.
• To dene the function fwk+1 assume inductively that fx0 , fx1 , fx2 , . . ., fxk
have been dened for all worlds x ∈ W (k a natural number). Then,
fwk+1(i) = {〈fx0 , fx1 , . . . fxk 〉 | wRix}.
Dene the map r : W → Fω(℘(At)) as r(w) = fM,w. /
For every ordinal λ we can continue the construction to get a vector
〈fxi | i < λ〉. Thus this map naturally generalizes to maps rλ : W →
Fλ(℘(At)) for every ordinal λ. To simplify notation, assume for the rest
of our analysis that S = ℘(At) and that S is nite. The map rκ gives a
precise way to connect the class of all Kripke structures to a single structure
Mκ = 〈Fκ(S), {∼i}i∈I , V 〉 for any κ. The following observation is immediate
from the relevant denitions.
13The mapping is a functional simulation but in general not a bisimulation onto its
image. Nonetheless, it is a natural mapping in the sense that when applied to connected
components K of 〈Fω(S), {∼i}i∈I , V 〉 it is simply the embedding of K into 〈Fω(S), {∼i
}i∈I , V 〉
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Observation 2.8. LetM = 〈W, {Ri}i∈I , V 〉 be a Kripke structure andMκ
be the structure 〈Fκ(S), {∼i}i∈I , V 〉.
i) The relation wZf i rκ(w) = f is a functional simulation fromM into
Mκ, but, in general, is not a bisimulation.
ii) There is an ordinal λ, depending on M such that Z is a bisimulation
if κ ≥ λ.14
iii In particular, ifM is nite, then there is a bisimulation betweenM and
r(M) = 〈r[W ], {∼i}, V 〉. Moreover, r(M) is the minimal bisimulation
contraction of M, i.e. the Kripke model of minimal cardinality that
allows for a total bisimulation toM.
Proof. i) The functionality of Z is obvious, since rκ is a function. Atomic
harmony holds by denition of fw0 . To see that zig holds let v0, v1 ∈M with
v0Riv1 and w ∈ Mκ with v0Zw. Since Z is functional we have w = fM,v0
An induction shows that f v0i = f
v1
i for every i ≤ κ, thus fM,v0(i) = fM,v1(i).
Thus by denition of ∼i we have fM,v0 ∼i fM,v1 . By denition of Z we also
have v1ZfM,v1 , thus zig holds. Example 3.10 of [52] shows that Z is in general
not a bisimulation.
ii) Choose λ′ such that for all v, w ∈ M holds: If there is some µ such that
rµ(v) 6= rµ(w), then rλ′(v) 6= rλ′(w) and let λ := λ′ + ω. We have to show
that zag holds: Let vZw with Z dened as above and let w ∼i w′. We
have to show that there is some v′ ∈ M with rλ(v′) = w′. Indeed, since
w ∼i w′ we have for all µ < λ that w′  µ ∈ wµ(i). By the construction
of rλ this implies that for every µ < λ there is some v′ ∈ M such that
w′  µ = rµ(v′). By the choice of λ′ and the extendability condition, we have
that ∃µ ∈ [λ′;λ] : rµ(v′) ∈ wµ(i) implies ∀µ ∈ [λ′;λ] : rµ(v′) ∈ wµ(i). In
particular we have by the limit condition that rλ(v′) = w′ as desired. See
chapter 3 of [52] for more details.
iii) Obvious from ii) and the denition of rω. 
14In fact, forM = Fκ(S) we have λ = κ. In particular, there are functional simulations
betweenM = Fκ(S) andM = Fλ(S) for all κ, λ > ω. Though Fκ(S) and Fλ(S) are not
bisimilar for κ 6= λ.
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2.3 Information Dynamics on Knowledge Struc-
tures
Our aim is to examine natural transitions between types in a knowledge
structure. These transitions are intended to represent some type of reasoning
process or information update about the state of nature of the beliefs of other
players. For this initial study, we focus on the operation of product update
(restricted to equivalence relations as in Denition 2.4).
2.3.1 Technical Preliminaries: Generalized Product Up-
date
Our rst contribution is to dene a sequence of products ×Nn between Kripke
structures. The idea to apply product update between Kripke structures
(rather than Kripke structures and event models) was initially proposed by
Jan van Eijck and colleagues [161]. We follow the same basic idea, although
our approach diers in a technical, but crucial, way.
In order to generalize the product update operation so that it applies
between two Kripke structures, we must replace the precondition function
with something appropriate for merging two Kripke structures. Our approach
is to explicitly mark which of the formulas we are interested in, and treat
these formulas as atomic propositions.15 Fix a set I of players and At of
atomic propositions (for simplicity assume both are nite).
Denition 2.9 (Language extension). 1. Let T ⊆ LEL with At ⊆ T .
For every ϕ ∈ T we introduce a new constant ϕ̌ called the name of ϕ.
Let Ť := {ϕ̌|ϕ ∈ T }. The language extension with T , denoted by
LTEL, is the epistemic language with Ť as atomic propositions. By a
slight abuse of notation we write p instead of p̌ for p ∈ At ⊆ T . We
denote the valuation function over the language LTEL by VT . As usual,
we omit the subscript when it is clear from the context.
2. LetM = 〈W, {Ri}i∈I , V 〉 be a Kripke model with atomic propositions
At and let T ⊆ LEL with At ⊆ T . ThenM can naturally be interpreted
15In general, this type of language extension can be used to model agents with limited
memory. For instance, this is needed for an analysis of situations such as the sum and
product riddle involving the dialogues: A: I don't know ϕ. B: I knew you didn't know
before you said that (cf. [144] for an analysis of this puzzle in Public Announcement Logic).
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as a Kripke model over LTEL by dening VT as: w ∈ VT (ϕ̌) iM, w  ϕ.
We denoteM viewed over LTEL byMT . /
In ⊕-updates every state v in the event model comes with a (generally
complex) formula ϕ that is the precondition for v to occur. That is (w, v)
is only dened ifM, w  pre(v). This is exactly the idea of the ×T update
dened below: pairs of states are in the new model only if they agree on the
formulas in T .
Denition 2.10 (Product update). i) Let T ⊆ LEL with At ⊆ T . Let
M = 〈W, {Ri}i∈I , V 〉 andM′ = 〈W ′, {R′i}i∈I , V ′〉 be two Kripke models over
LTEL. The product modelM×M′ = 〈W ′′, {R′′i }i∈I , V ′′〉 over LTEL is dened
as follows:
• W ′′ = {(w,w′) | w ∈ W,w′ ∈ W ′ and for all ϕ̌ ∈ Ť : w ∈ VMŤ (ϕ̌) i
w′ ∈ VM′Ť (ϕ̌);
• (w,w′)R′′i (v, v′) i wRiv and w′R′iv′; and
• (w,w′) ∈ V ′′Ť (ϕ̌) i w ∈ V
M
Ť (ϕ̌) (and thus also w
′ ∈ V ′Ť (ϕ̌) ).
ii) The generalized product update of M and M′ over T , denoted by
M×T M′ is the model M×M′ as dened above interpreted as a model
over LEL. (That is: removing all atoms ϕ̌ with ϕ ∈ T \ At and identifying p̌
with p for all p ∈ At.) /
We write M ×T M′ where M and M′ are Kripke models over LEL,
meaning that we interpret M and M′ as being models over Ť and do the
×T -update as dened above. The procedure that we follow to compute this
product runs as follows:
1. Pick a set T of statements to keep track of,
2. Build the Product in LTEL, and
3. Remove the additional information, i.e., restrict the valuation function
from Ť to At.
The following example demonstrates this procedure.
Example 2.11: Let T = {p,K1p,K2p,K1¬p,K2¬p}. Then the product of
the two models is calculated as follows.

























Note that the reexive and transitive arrows are not drawn in the above
picture for simplicity. The set T is rich enough to uniquely describe all
knowledge assignments of level at most one. Thus, the product reects a
merging of models taking into account the agents' rst-order information.
The fragments of T true at the individual worlds are:
M, w1  {p,K1p} M, w2  {K1¬p} M′, v1  {p,K1p}
M′, v2  ∅ M′, v3  p M′, v4  {K1¬p}
The only pairs satisfying the same fragment of T are (w1, v1) and (w2, v4).
Observe that in the modelM×T M′ we have:
M×T M′, (w1; v1)  {p,K1p,K2p}
which is dierent from the fragment of T satised byM, w1 andM′, w2.
In general, taking a generalized product update consists of two steps: The
rst is picking a set of statements T ⊇ At that one wants to keep track of
and extending the language to LTEL. The second is to do generalized product
update ×T , that is the normal product × over LTEL followed by omitting all
the information about the valuation of Ť \At, i.e., making the newly created
model an LEL model again. The above example shows that the ×T product
does not preserve higher order information.
Remark 2.12: There are epistemic models K, w and L, v over LEL a frag-
ment T of LEL and some ϕ ∈ T \ At such that (v, w) ∈ K × L (the product
over LTEL) and K×L, (v, w)  ϕ̌, but K×L, (v, w) 6 ϕ. (Where, in the last
formula, ϕ is evaluated as a formula of LEL.)
There is a close connection between generalized product update and the
⊕-update. In both cases, the result is not the complete cartesian product
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between the two state spaces, but a subset that is characterized by a certain
set of formulas. The precise connection between the two concepts is claried
by the following lemma.
Lemma 2.13. For every event model E there is some fragment T ⊆ LEL
and a Kripke modelM′ (for the language LTEL) such that ⊕E is the same as
×TM′ (i.e., for all Kripke modelsM,M⊕E is isomorphic toM×T M′).
Proof. Let E = 〈E, {Qi}i∈I , pre〉 be an event model. Let T be the set
{pre(e) | e ∈ E} ∪ At. Construct the modelM′ = 〈W ′, {R′i}, V ′〉 as follows:
Let W ′ be the set of pairs (e, Le) where e ∈ E and Le ⊆ T is a maximally
consistent subset of T containing pre(e). The relations R′i are dened as
(e, Le)Ri(e
′, L′e) i eQie
′, and the valuation V ′ is dened by Le (i.e., (e, Le) ∈
V (ϕ̌) provided ϕ̌ ∈ Le). It is easy to check that this M′ has the desired
properties. 
Corollary 2.14. If there is an upper bound for the quantier depths of the
preconditions in the event model E (i.e., the set {qd(pre(e)) | e ∈ E} has an
upper bound) then the set T in the above lemma can be chosen nite. This
holds in particular if E is nite.
Proof. Let n be an upper bound for the quantier depths of {pre(e) | e ∈
E}. Recall that Fn(℘(At)) is nite, and so there are characteristic formulas
φt for every t ∈ Fn(℘(At)) (that is, Fn(℘(At)), s  φt ⇔ s = t). Let T :=
{φe | e ∈ Fn(℘(At))} ∪ At and construct a modelM′ as follows:
W ′ := {(e, t)|e ∈ E, t ∈ Fn(℘(At)) and Fn(℘(At)), t |= pre(e)},
let (e, t)R′i(e
′, s) if eQie′, and dene V ′ as:
(e, t) ∈ V ′(ϕ̌) i Fn(℘(At), t  ϕ

The sets S = {φt | t ∈ Fn(℘(At))} chosen above are special in that these
sets reect all possible knowledge assignments up to depth n. We denote
the resulting set of formulas by Nn (i.e., Nn = {φt | t ∈ Fn(℘(At))} ∪ At).
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Remark 2.15:
i) In the above proof, we can turnM′ into an event model E ′ by letting
pre(e, t) = ϕt. In this case we haveM×NnM′ =M⊕E ′ for allM. In
particular E ′ is a special event model that only has preconditions from
Nn. This follows a general pattern: The initial strength of arbitrary
event models is that they allow for a very intuitive description of events
in a multi-agent setting. However, from a technical point of view arbi-
trary event models can be dicult to handle. Therefore it sometimes
proves useful to translate arbitrary event models into a certain sub-
class of event models which are easier to work with. For instance, [159]
dened a class of canonical event models that are useful for studying
when two event models are equivalent.
ii) The translation of an event model into a Kripke model blurs the dis-
tinction between static descriptions of situations and descriptions of
events.
There is an interesting peculiarity of the ×T -products. Obviously, ×T is
commutative, but the following example shows that it is not associative.16
Example 2.16: This example is similar to Example 2.11. Suppose that
T = {p,K1p,K2p,K1¬p,K2¬p}. Consider the following LEL-models which

























16In general, it is clear that the process of consecutive learning is not commutative. One's
actions in some event B can depend on having learned A before. In our formalization, the
non-associativity captures this intuition: (A×SB)×S C is to be read as being in situation
A and learning B, then C, whereas A ×S (B ×S C) = A ×S (C ×S B) corresponds to
learning B and C at a time. A similar phenomenon has been noticed in the belief merging
literature (cf. [115, Section 5.1]).
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We now show that (M1 ×T M2)×T M3 6=M1 ×T (M2 ×T M3). As we
already noted in the previous example (Example 2.11), M1 ×T M2 = M3.
In particular, (M1 ×T M2) ×T M3 = M3 ×T M3 = M3 where the last
equivalence holds since u1 and u2 satisfy dierent formulas from T .
On the other hand, note that the following formulas from T are true at
states inM3:
M3, u1  {p,K1p,K2p} M3, u2  {K1¬p,K2¬p}
However, there are no states in M2 satisfying precisely these formulas, so
M2 ×T M3 = ∅ and consequentlyM1 ×T (M2 ×T M3) = ∅. Thus, we have
(M1 ×T M2)×T M3 6=M1 ×T (M2 ×T M3). 17
The interpretation of this statement is that rst learning E and then
learning E ′ is dierent to learning E and E ′ at the same time. To be more
precise, we have (E ×T F)×T G 6= E ×T (F ×T G) 6= E ×T F ×T G18 This non-
associativity shows that our framework is rich enough to distinguish between
consecutive learning and receiving all information at once.
These observations should be contrasted with the theory developed in
[161]. The authors of [161] are concerned with updates where all precon-
ditions are boolean combinations of the ground variables (describing non-
epistemic facts about the state of the world). Learning facts about the world
is associative (cf. [161, Theorem 1]), whereas learning facts about the players'
previous knowledge is not!
Van Eijck et al. [161] study the monoid generated by ×At products. Our
primary goal in this chapter is to understand how the ⊕-update works in
type spaces. To that end, we rst generalize a result from [158].
Theorem 2.17. Let M1 be a Kripke structure such that for any v, w ∈ M
there is an epistemic formula ϕ distinguishing v and w (i.e. M, w  ϕ and
M, v  ¬ϕ). Let M2 be an arbitrary Kripke structure. Then there is a set
of formulas T and LTEL-Kripke structureM′ such thatM1 ×T M′ ↔M2 if
and only if there is a total simulation from M2 to M1. Furthermore, if the
modelM1 is nite the set T can be chosen nite.
17There are examples where both (M1 ×T M2)×T M3 andM1 ×T (M2 ×T M3) are
non-empty; however, they are more complicated while making the same point.
18Here E ×T F ×T G is the obvious generalization of ×T where all tuples (e, f) in the
denition are replaced by triples (e, f, g).
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Proof. The direction from left to right is easy: LetM′ and T be such that
M1×T M′ =M2. It is easy to see that the mapM1×T M′ →M1 sending
every pair (w,w′) to w is a functional, hence total, simulation.
For the direction from right to left: Let Z be a total simulation fromM2
toM1. First we dene a Kripke modelM◦ = 〈WM
◦
, {RM◦i }i∈Agt, VM
◦〉:
• WM◦ = {(t1, t2)|ti ∈Mi, i = 1, 2 and t1Zt2}
• (t1, t2)RM
◦
i (s1, s2) i t1R
M1
i s1 and t2R
M2
i s2
• (t1, t2) ∈ VM
◦
(p) i t2 ∈ VM2(p) (and thus also t1 ∈ VM1(p) )
First we show that the model M◦ is bisimilar to M2. We show that the
projection map π2 mapping every (t1, t2) ∈ M◦ to t2 ∈ M2 is a bitotal
bisimulation (recall Denition 2.5). The atom condition is clear. For forth
assume that (t1, t2)π2t2 and that (t1, t2)RM
◦





i s2 and by denition of π2 we have (s1, s2)π2s2, thus forth is
fullled.
Similarly, for back assume that (t1, t2)π2t2 and that t2R
M2
i s2. Since Z is
a total simulation and t1Zt2 holds by the construction ofM◦, there is some
s1 ∈ M1 with s1Zs2 and t1RM1i s1. But this means that (s1, s2) ∈ M◦ and
that (t1, t2)RM
◦
i (s1, s2), thus proving the back condition.
SinceM2 ↔M◦, it suces to show that there is someM′ withM1 ×T
M′ =M◦.
Note, that the projection π1 :M◦ →M1 sending each pair (t1, t2) to t1
is a functional left simulation. The atom condition is clear, and the rest can
be shown with arguments similar to the ones given above.
Now, pick a set T ∗ ⊆ LEL that contains a distinguishing formula for
any v, w ∈ M1 and let T := T ∗ ∪ At. Turn M◦ into an LTEL-model M′
by dening: (t1, t2) ∈ V T (ϕ̌) i M1, t1  ϕ. Since T ∗ is separating, s1 ∈
M1 and (t1, t2) ∈ M◦ satisfy the same Ť -formulas i s1 = t1. Therefore
M1 ×T M′ =M◦ as desired. Furthermore, ifM1 is nite, then the set T ∗
can be chosen nite, thus proving the last statement. 
Remark 2.18: [158] contains a proof for a similar statement about ⊕-updates
in the nite case. However, the generalization to innite Kripke models does
not hold for the ⊕-update.
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Remark 2.19: Note that the model M′ constructed in the right-to-left di-
rection of the prove of Lemma 2.13 is in general not a LEL model that is
simply interpreted as an LTEL model. That is: There is in general some ϕ ∈ T
and some w ∈ M′ such thatM′, w  ϕ̌ butM′, w 6 ϕ (where ϕ̌ is an atom
and ϕ is a formula evaluated in M′ interpreted as a Kripke model over At
(i.e. only containing atoms from {p̌ | p ∈ At}). In order to gain the expres-
sive power of updating with an arbitrary event model, that is, one needs the
class of all LTEL-models. Interestingly enough, this is no longer true when
we restrict ourselves to the class of nite Kripke structures. There, the full
expressive power of the class of all ⊕-updates is already given by the class of
all nite Kripke models over LEL together with the set of all ×Nn products
for n ∈ ω. More formally, we have the following theorem (whose slightly
tedious proof is relegated to the appendix).
Theorem 2.20. Let K = 〈W, (Ri)i, V 〉 and L = 〈W ′, R′i, V ′〉 be nite Kripke
structures such that L is obtainable from K by an update. Then there is some
T ⊇ At and some Kripke modelM over the ground language LEL such that
K ×T M = L.
2.3.2 Characterization Result
As discussed in the previous section, every ⊕-update can be written as a
×T -update over a language in which the formulas in T are treated as atomic
propositions. This will help us represent the product update in knowledge
structures.
First, we need an equivalent to the extension of atomic propositions
on types: For n ∈ N let Sn denote the set of all possible n-worlds, thus
Sn = Fn(S) and S0 = S). Technically, this is redundant, though it helps
conceptually to distinguish Fn(S) as a type space generated by S and Sn
which is the same type space reinterpreted as new set of atoms. By switch-
ing between those interpretations, every n+ k world over S can be seen as a
k-world over Sn and thus there is a canonical embedding Fω(S)→ Fω(Sn).19
For any two Kripke models K, v and L, w we have dened the product up-
date (K×L, (v, w)) over the unextended language LEL above. Furthermore,
we have seen that there is some κ such that rκ is a bisimulation of K onto
19Note that this map is not surjective for n ≥ 1: For instance the introspection conditions
of Fk+1(S) gives some limitations on which elements of F2(Sk) can come from Fk+1(S).
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its image. Since rκ(v) is obviously in the image of rκ this implies that parts
of K are somehow coded in rκ(v). The idea of the following denition is that
we can unravel enough information about K and L from rκ(v) and rκ(w) to
determine rκ((v, w)). We dene a product ×0 below and we will show later
(lemma 2.23) that rκ((v, w)) = rκ(v)×0rκ(w). As with the original denition
of a κ-world (see 2.6), the denition is by induction.
Denition 2.21. Suppose that n ∈ N and f ,g ∈ Fω(S). Then the ×0-
product (f ×0 g) ∈ Fω(S) ∪ {∅} is dened as follows:
• (f ×0 g)0 = 〈f0〉 i f0 = g0 and ∅ otherwise.
• (f ×0 g)m(i) = {(f ′ ×0 g′)m−1 | f ′ ∈ fm(i),g′ ∈ gm(i)}
This denition can be lifted to an analogue of the generalized product update:
The operator ×n will correspond to a product update with T = Nn. First
observe that the above denition of ×0 works equally well if all S are replaced
by Sn. As in the case of the generalized product update, the ×n update
implicitly consists of two steps: First a product update between two elements
of Fκ(Sn) followed by a removal of information, i.e. a projection from Sn to
S. As with general product updates, the denition contracts these two steps
into one:
Denition 2.22 (×n-Product). Let π̄ : Sn → S be the projection map
sending the tuple 〈f0 . . . fn−1〉 to f0. Dene ×n : Fω(Sn)×Fω(Sn)→ Fω(S)
as follows:
• (f ×n g)0 = 〈s0〉 i π̄(f0)) = π̄(g0) = s0, and ∅ otherwise.
• (f ×n g)m(i) = {(f ′ ×n g′)m−1 | f ′ ∈ fm(i),g′ ∈ gm(i)}. /
The following lemma describes the relationship between the ×Nn-product
and the ×n-product. Basically, the ×Nn product of two Kripke models (K, w)
and (L, v) carries the same information as the ×n-product on the types r(v)
and r(w).
For technical convenience we need a denition before we state the lemma:
Recall that Nn\At was chosen to be a set of characteristic formulas for Fn(S).
Therefore, every state w in a Kripke structure K over LEL satises exactly
one formula of Nn \ At. In particular for any Kripke model L over LNnEL we
have that (v, w) ∈ K ×Nn L implies that there is exactly one ϕ̌ ∈ Nn \ At
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with w ∈ V (ϕ̌). We call Kripke models over LNnEL satisfying this property
admissible. Since every e ∈ Fn(S) satises exactly one formula from Nn\At
we have that every state of nature in an admissible Kripke model corresponds
to exactly one e ∈ Fn(S) and we can dene a map r′ from admissible Kripke
models to Fω(Sn) in the same way as we dened r.
Lemma 2.23. Let n ∈ ω and let K,L, be Kripke models over LNnEL. Let
v ∈ K, w ∈ L satisfying the same Nn-formulas. Let (v, w) ∈ K×Nn L denote
the product of v and w in K×Nn L. Then we have r((v, w)) = r′(v)×n r′(w),









Proof. Let n ∈ N and v ∈ K, w ∈ L satisfying the same Nn-formulas.
We inductively show that (r′(v) ×n r′(w))k = r(v, w)k. For k = 0 this is
trivial: If v and w satisfy the same atomic propositions over Ňn we have
(r′(v)×nr′(w))0 = r((v, w))0 = {p ∈ At : v ∈ V K(p)}. If they satisfy dierent
atomic propositions we have (v, w) 6∈ K ×Nn L and r′(v)×n r′(w) = ∅. Now
assume the statement holds for k − 1 and let i ∈ I (the set of agents).
First, we show r(v, w)k(i) ⊆ (r′(v) ×n r′(w))k(i). Let x ∈ r((v, w))k(i),
thus x is a k − 1-world. By construction of the map r there is some x̃
in K ×Nn L such that x̃Ri(v, w) and r(x̃)k−1 = x. Thus there are x1 ∈
K and x2 ∈ L such that the product of x1 and x2 in K ×Nn L is x̃ - in
particular x1Riv and x2Riw and x1 and x2 satisfy the same Nn-formulas. In
particular, r′(x1)×nr′(x2) 6= ∅ and by induction we have that (r(x1, x2))k−1 =
(r′(x1) ×n r′(x2))k−1. On the other hand, we have r′(x1)k−1 ∈ r′(v)k(i) and
similarly for x2 and w by the construction of r′. In particular, we have
x = (r′(x1) ×n r′(x2))k−1 ∈ (r′(v) ×n r′(w))k(i) as desired, thus proving the
rst direction.
The argument for the reverse inclusion r(v, w)k(i) ⊇ (r′(v)×n r′(w))k)(i)
is similar: Let x ∈ (r(′v) ×n r′(w))k(i). Then there are x̃1 ∈ r′(v) and
x̃2 ∈ r′(w) such that (r′(x̃1) ×n r′(x̃2))k−1 = x and such that there are
x1 ∈ K, x2 ∈ L such that r′(xi) = x̃i and x1Riv and x2Riw hold. Since
x̃1 ×n x̃2 exists, x1 and x2 satisfy the same Nn-formulas. In particular there
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is some (x1, x2) in K ×Nn L with (x1, x2)Ri(v, w). By construction of r we
have r((x1, x2))k−1 ∈ r((v, w))k and by induction we have r((x1, x2))k−1 = x,
thus proving the reverse direction. 
Note that the calculation of f ×n g from types f and g is computationally
ecient: In order to calculate the k-th level of f ×n g only the rst n + k
levels of f and g are required.
The above denition of ×n updates gives a way of modeling dynamics on
a type space  thus opening up the eld of epistemic game theory to belief
dynamics. Event models were designed as a very intuitive and natural tool
for representing epistemic events in a multi agent setting. The translation
of event models into the corresponding pair of Kripke models and a product
relation ×Nn , and further into a type and a relation ×n allows us to calculate
the change of epistemic status brought about by an event model E .
On the other hand, every product update with a nite event model can
be written as a ×n-update, thus it suces to understand the structure of ×n
to study product updates. Thus, Fω(℘(S)) is not only a universal Kripke
model in the static sense, together with the products ×n is also universal in
that it incorporates all potential updates.
On Kripke structures, translating event models into types allows us to
study updating events as separate entities without any reference to a ground
type. Furthermore, the translation blurs the distinction between types as
static descriptions of epistemic states and knowledge changing events.
One natural and important question is: Given two types f and g, is
there a possible piece of incoming information that transforms f into g?
The intuition behind the answer given by the following theorem is: In the
entire model, the agents are assumed to be omniscient and non-forgetting.
Thus, an event cannot add any uncertainty about the state of nature, it can
only remove some states from the sets of possible states. In contrast, for
the higher order information, essentially anything is possible as long as it
is compatible with individuals gaining new information about the state of
nature. In particular, an epistemic event may increase the uncertainty about
other agents' types. This idea is captured by the following denition.
Denition 2.24 (Admissibility of Types). For a type f ∈ Fα(S) we say that
a type g is admissible for f i
• f0 = g0;
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• for all agents i: g1(i) ⊆ f1(i); and
• for α > 1: If h ∈ gα(i) then there is some h′ ∈ fα(i) such that h is
admissible for h′. /
Our characterization theorem is similar to Theorem 2.17.
Theorem 2.25. Let f ,g ∈ Fα(S) be types such that g is obtainable by an
update from f , i.e. there is some n and some h ∈ Fα(Sn) such that f×nh = g.
Then g is admissible for f . If the submodel of Fω(S) generated by f is nite
also the converse holds true.
Before we can prove this theorem, we recall the following result from
innite combinatorics.
Theorem 2.26. (König's Lemma) Let T be an innite, nitely branching
tree. Then, T has an innite branch.
Proof. Construct an innite branch 〈x0, x1, . . .〉 as follows: x0 is the root.
For i > 0: If x0, . . . xi are already in the branch, pick a successor xi+1 of xi
that has itself innitely many successors (since the tree is nitely branching
such a successor always exists). Then 〈x0, x1, . . .〉 is an innite branch. 
Proof of Theorem 2.25. The rst statement is straightforward: Let F
and G be the epistemic submodels of Fω(S) induced by f and g, respectively.
Assume that there is some h ∈ Fω(Sn) such that f ×n h = g. By Lemma
2.23, this is equivalent to saying that F ×Nn H = G, where F ,G,H are the
generated Kripke models (over LNnEL) from f ,g, and h. By Theorem 2.17
there is a total simulation S from G to F . We inductively show that every
g′ ∈ G is admissible for every f ′ ∈ F with f ′Sg′. The 0th-level is clear by
the denition of a simulation. Now it suces to show that the denition of
admissibility is fullled at the 1st level: Since we do this for all g′ ∈ G, the
rest follows from the inductive denition of admissibility and the map r. To
see that admissibility is fullled at the 1st level, let h ∈ G with g′ ∼i h. By
denition, there is a h′ ∈ F with f ′ ∼i h′. Thus, every state of nature that
is conceivable for agent i in G via h is also conceivable in F via h′ - this is
exactly the denition of being admissible in the rst level.
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For the second statement let g be admissible for f and let the submodel
of Fω(℘(S)) generated by g be nite. Again, let F and G be the Kripke
submodels of Fω(S) induced by f and g. Dene the Relation Z between F
and G as f ′Zg′ i g′ ∈ G is admissible for f ′ ∈ F . We will show that Z is
a total simulation from G to F , thus showing that G is obtainable by F via
update (again using Theorem 2.17 and Lemma 2.23).
By assumption, g is admissible for f . We show that whenever g′ ∈ G is
admissible for f ′ ∈ F and g̃ ∼i g′, then there is some f̃ ∼i f ′ such that g̃
is admissible for f̃ . This proves that Z is a left simulation. To see that Z
is total, note that for every g′ in G there is a chain g ∼i1 g1 ∼i2 . . . ∼in g′
connecting g with g′. Let g′ ∈ G be admissible for f ′ ∈ F and g̃ ∼i g′.
We construct an ω-tree (T,≺) as follows: The k-th level consists of all those
types in f ′k+1(i) that enlarge g̃k. The ≺-relation is dened as r ≺ s i r is an
initial segment of s. By denition of the admissibility relation, every nite
level of T is non-empty. Since the state of nature is considered nite, every
nonempty level is also nite. Thus, by König's lemma T has an innite path
P . By construction, f̃ =
⋃
r∈P r is a type and g̃ is admissible for f̃ . Since F
is the substructure of Fω(S) induced by f (and thus by f ′) we have f̃ ∈ F ,
thus the simulation Z relates g̃ to f̃ . 
Again, there is an obvious counterpart of Remark 2.19 allowing us to up-
date with F(S) worlds rather than F(Sn) worlds, provided all the induced
Kripke structures involved are nite. To be precise, we can show the follow-
ing: Let f ,g ∈ Fω(S) be such that the epistemic submodels of Fω(S) induced
by f and g are nite. Then g is admissible for f if and only if there is some
natural number n and some h ∈ Fω(S) such that f ×n h = g.
2.4 Conclusion and Future Work
Many dierent formal models have been used to describe the players knowl-
edge and beliefs in game-theoretic situations. The variety of models reect
dierent mathematical conventions used by the various sub-communities, as
well as competing intuitions about how best to describe the players' beliefs
and reasoning in a game situation. It is important to understand the precise
relationship between the alternative modeling paradigms. In this chapter,
we focused on the two most prominent models found in the literature on
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the epistemic foundations of game theory: Kripke or Aumann structures and
knowledge structures (non-probabilistic variants of Harsanyi type spaces).
There are two main contributions in this chapter. The rst is to initiate
a study of information dynamics" for knowledge structures in the style of
recent work on dynamic epistemic logic (cf. [154]). Such a theory would
further illustrate the subtle relationship between type spaces and Kripke
structures (updating the discussion initiated in [52, 54]). In particular, it
allows us to combine the strengths of both approaches and use event models
as a tool to describe epistemic events. The main technical contribution is the
denition of a product operation ×n on the type space Fω(S). We provide
a procedure that allows us to translate arbitrary event models into types.
Furthermore, we show that the ×n product is powerful enough to simulate all
updates by event models. Furthermore, we prove a characterization theorem
(Theorem 2.25) showing when a type can be transformed into another type
by updates with an event model.
This is only an initial study. We see our work here opening up many
dierent avenues of future research. In particular, we plan on investigating
the following issues in the future.
• What happens if we allow only updating types from a certain subclass
of Fα(Sn) (for example, nite epistemic models 〈Fα(Sn), {∼i}i∈I , V 〉)?
• What are the behavioral" implications of our main characterization
theorem (Theorem 2.25)? For example, if a strategy is rational for a
type f in a game G, does that strategy remain rational for all types
that are admissible for f?
• How do we extend the ideas developed in this work to Harsanyi type
spaces where the beliefs are represented by probability measures? The
rst step is to generalize the dynamic epistemic logic framework to
settings where beliefs are represented by probabilities. Fortunately,
this has largely been done (see [2, 155] for details). A very interesting
direction for future research is to explore how to use the probabilistic
event models and product update operation of [155] to prove a result
analogous to our main characterization theorem (Theorem 2.25) for
Harsanyi type spaces.
• The relation obtainable by an update" together with our extended
theorem (see Remark 2.19) turns the set of nite induced submodels of
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FS(w) into an algebra. Can we characterize this algebra?
2.5 Appendix
Before we can prove Theorem 2.20, we need the following lemma showing
that every n-world can be extended in at least n+ 2 dierent ways.
Lemma 2.27. Let |At| ≥ 2 and |I| ≥ 2. Let n ∈ N and let f ∈ Fn(S) be an
n-world. Then f has at least n+ 2 dierent extensions to n+ 1-worlds.
To prove both, the above lemma and the theorem, we construct a special
Kripke Model Wf , the induced Kripke model of f :
For the rest of the construction x some n-world f . We inductively con-
struct a nite set of points W together with partial partitions20 Pi of W for
every agent i ∈ I. In the construction every w ∈ W is labeled with a k-world
l(w) for some k ≤ n To do this, we dene the following operations:
For a point labeled with a k-world g, that is not contained in any Pi-
partition cell yet, we dene the i-extension of a point w to be the following:
• if k = 0 no new point is added and a single partition cell only containing
w is added to Pi
• if k > 0 we add one new point for every k−1-world h ∈ gk(i) and label
it with h. We add a new partition cell to Pi containing w and all newly
added points.
We then construct the set W f as follows: We start with a set containing
one point x labeled with f and all Pi empty. Inductively for all constructed
points w and all agents i we do the following: If w is not contained in any
partition cell of Pi yet, execute the i-extension of w. It is easy to see that
the set W f that is constructed by this procedure fullls the following:
Fact 2.28. • W is nite
• Pi is a partition on W f for every i (i.e. every w ∈ W is contained
in exactly one partition cell). Note that reading the partition sets as
equivalence classes induces an equivalence relation on W f . By a slight
abuse of notation, we will denote both the partition and the induced
equivalence relation by Pi
20A partial partition of a set X is a set K ⊂ Pow(X) such that X1 6= X2 ∈ K implies
X1 ∩X2 = ∅. That is, a partial partition is a set that can be extended to a partition.
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• The actual result does not depend upon the order of executing the i-
updates
Note that by denition r0(l(w)) ∈ S = ℘(At). Thus we can dene a
valuation V f on W f via: w ∈ V (p) :⇔ p ∈ r0(l(w)). Since all Pi are
equivalence relations, W f together with V f denes a Kripke structureWf =
〈W f , (Pi)i∈I , V f〉. We call Wf the induced Kripke model of f .
By induction on k ≤ n it is not too dicult to see that the following
holds:
Fact 2.29. For all w ∈ W f we have: rk(w) = rk(l(w)) whenever the latter
is dened, i.e. l(w) is a k′-world for some k′ ≥ k.
Note that W f has a pseudo-tree structure in the following sense: Let
w be the initial point labeled with f and let w′ ∈ W f be dierent from
w. Then there are vectors (i1 . . . in) and (v1 . . . vn) and a chain: w =
v0Pi1v1Pi2v2 . . . Pinvn = w
′. Furthermore, if we demand that ij 6= ij+1 for
all j and vj 6= vr for all j 6= r then both vectors are unique - we denote them
by i(w′) and v(w′). Furthermore, if f is an n-world and l(w′) is an n′-world
then i(w′) has length n− n′.
Now we have all prerequisites to prove Lemma 2.27.
Proof of Lemma 2.27. We show the following: Let f be an n-world and
let v0 ∈ W f be such that l(v0) is a k-world for some k ≥ 1. Then there are
at least k + 2 extensions W1, . . .Wk+2 of the Kripke-Model Wf such that
• each v′ still satises rk(v) = rk(l(v)) whenever this is dened
• rk+1(v0)(i) calculated in Wi is dierent from rk+1(v0)(i) calculated in
Wj for all i 6= j.
We will construct the Wi such that
• v0 ∈ v(x) whenever xPiy for some x ∈ W f and y ∈ Wi/W f .
• For all x ∈ Wi/W there is a chain v0Ki1v1Ki2 . . . Kirvr = w of at most
length k + 1.
We prove the lemma by induction over k. To start, let k = 1. We
have to construct three dierent Kripke models W1,W2,W3 as claimed in
the statement. Pick an agent j such that all elements of Pj[v0] other than
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v0 itself are labeled with 0-worlds (and there is at least one such element).
Note that such an j exists by the construction of Wf .
Let W1 = Wf . By construction, we have the following: All v ∈ Pj[v0]
with v 6= v0 are labeled with a 0-world. By construction of Wf it holds that
for all these v and all agents j′ 6= j the singleton {v} is a partition cell of Pj′
- thus j′ knows the state of nature in v′. Thus in all but possibly one of the
1-worlds (f itself) that j considers possible at v0 all other agents know the
state of nature. Furthermore, j considers at least one such 1-world possible,
since there is some v 6= v0 in Pj[v0]
Now we expand W f to a new set of worlds W2 in the following way: For
every v ∈ Pj[v0] that is labeled with a 0-world we add another world v′.
We expand the partitions Pi to partitions of W2 as follows: {v′} is a new
partition cell in Pj. For i 6= j the partition cell {v} of Pi is replaced by {v, v′}.
Furthermore, for every new v′ we pick a 0-world l(v′) such that l(v′) 6= l(v).
The valuation induced by this labeling makes W2 again a Kripke model W2.
Furthermore this Kripke model satises the following:
• Still, we have rk(v) = rk(l(v)) whenever l(v) is a k′-world for some
k′ ≤ k
• r2(v0) satises: For all 1-worlds that j considers possible (apart from
possibly l(v0) itself) every agent l 6= j considers exactly two dierent
states of nature possible. In addition j considers at least one such
1-world possible.
In the same style, we construct a modelW3 in the following way: Instead
of adding only one new point w′ for every w ∈ Pj[v0]/{v0} we add two new
points w′ and w′′. The new partition cells are adapted as above, i.e. {w′, w′′}
is a new cell in Pj and for all agents i 6= j we replace the singleton {w} in
Pi by {w,w′, w′′}. Note that |At| ≥ 2, thus |S| ≥ 4, since S = ℘(At) In
particular we can label the new points with 0-worlds such that l(w), l(w′)
and l(w′′) are all mutually distinct. Again this gives a new Kripke-modelW3
such that:
• We still have rk(v) = rk(l(v)) whenever l(v) is a k′-world for some
k′ ≤ k
• r2(v0) satises: For all 1-worlds that j considers possible (apart from
possibly l(v0) itself) every agent l 6= j considers exactly three dierent
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states of nature possible. In addition j considers at least one such
1-world possible.
It is easy to see that the Wl, l ∈ {1, 2, 3} are as claimed.
Now assume inductively that we have already shown that for every v
with l(v) a k world there areW1, . . . ,Wk+2 as claimed. We want to show the
statement for k+ 1. Assume that v0 is labeled with a k+ 1 world l(w′) = f ′.
Fix some j ∈ At such that all x ∈ Pj[v0] other than v0 itself are labeled
with k-worlds. (Again, the construction of Wf ensures that such a j exists).
By the correctness axiom, we have rk(l(v0)) ∈ l(v0)k+1(j). Thus, by our
construction there is some v1 ∈ Pj[v0] labeled with rk(l(v0)). Furthermore,
these two are the only points x ∈ Pj[v0] satisfying rk(l(x)) = rk(l(v0)) Thus
if we calculate rk+2(v0) in Wf there are at most two dierent k + 1-worlds
g1, g2 ∈ rk+2(v0)(j) with rk(gi) = rk(l(v0)) By induction, there are extensions
W1 . . .Wk+2 ofWf such that eachWi comes along with a dierent extension
of v1 to a k + 1-world. By our inductive construction, all these Wi have the
same set Pj[v0].
In particular, in Wi we have that rk+2(v0)(j) contains l(v0) and rk+1(v1)
as realized in Wi and these are the only k-worlds h in rk+2(v0)(j) satisfying
rk+1(g) = l(v0). In particular, since allWi induce dierent extension rk+1(v1)
of l(v1) we have that allWi induce dierent extension rk+2(v0). Furthermore,
by induction all, these Wi fulll the extra claims we made about them.
Thus, we need to nd one more W̃k+3 oering a dierent extension of l(v0)
to an n+ 2-world. We rst dene the set of states Wk+3. By induction there
are W1,W2,W3 such that all rk+1(v1) calculated in Wi are dierent. We can
assume without loss of generality that W1 and W2 are such that rk+1(v1)
calculated in W1 and W2 are dierent from l(v0). Let X = (W2/W f ) ∪ {x ∈
W f : v1 ∈ v(x)}. Note that X has induced partitions Pi coming from Wj.
We dene Wk+1 as follows. The set of worlds of Wk+1 is W1∪̇X. We
denote the elements v1 of Wk+1 coming from W1 and X by v11 and v21. For
the partitions note that
• For every agent i 6= j and all x ∈ X the W2 partition-cell Pi[x] is
completely contained in X
• For all x 6= v0 in X the W2-partition cell Pj[x] is completely contained
in X.
We dene the partition cells Pi as follows: For all i 6= j the partitions Pj are
just the union of the partitions onW1 and on X. For Pj take the union of all
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partition cells of W1 and X not containing v11 resp v21. We add one further
partition cell Pj[v11]∪{v21}. (where Pj[v11] is the partition cell of v11 inWi). It
is not too dicult to see that the Pi thus dened are indeed total partitions.
By construction, Pi[v0] contains v0, v11 and v
2
1 thus rk+2(v0)(j) has three
dierent elements xi satisfying rk(xi) = rk(l(v0)). In particular, the value
of rk+2(v0)(j) in Wk+3 is dierent from the value in all other extensions.
Furthermore, since v1 ∈ v(x) implies v0 ∈ v(x) the extra claim for the Wk+3
is fullled.
Finally, for w labeled with our initial type f theW1 . . .Wn+2 witness that
there are n+ 2 dierent extensions of f to a n+ 1-world

Now we have all ingredients for the proof of Theorem 2.20
Proof of Theorem 2.20. Without loss of generality we can assume that K
does not contain any bisimilar states. Furthermore, by Theorem 2.17 there
is a functional left simulation S from L to K.
Next, pick n0 such that for v 6= w ∈ W holds rn0(v) 6= rn0(w). Such an n0 ex-
ists since K is nite and has no bisimilar state. Let n = 3 ·(n0 + |W |2 + |W ′|).
We will show that there is some epistemic modelM such that K×NnM = L.
We construct M as follows: By assumption, every v ∈ W ′ has exactly one
w ∈ W with wSv. We dene a labeling l on W ′ by l(v′) := rn(w). In
particular, we have l(v1) = l(v′2) i w1Riw2 in K (Where wi ∈ W are such
that wiSvi). Since S is a left simulation we have l(x) = l(y) whenever
xR′iy for x, y ∈ W ′. Inductively, we construct a labeled set W ′′ ⊇ W ′
as follows: For every i and every partition cell C of Ri intersecting the
image of S we pick some v ∈ c such that xSv for some x ∈ W ′. For
every g ∈ l(v) we add a new point vg to W ′′. To label this point, we
pick some extension ḡ of g to an n-world such that ḡ 6∈ {rn(v)|v ∈ W}.
(Note that this is possible by lemma 2.27 since n > |W |2.) Furthermore,
we construct these extensions such that for all w,w′ ∈ W ′ holds that if
¬(wR′iw′) then also {l(vg)|g ∈ l(w)n(i)} 6= {l(vg)|g ∈ l(w′)n(i)}. Again, this
is possible by lemma 2.27 and the choice of n. For x ∈ W and i ∈ I let
Px,i = R
′
i[x] ∪ {vg|g ∈ l(x)n(i)} and let Pi = {Px,i|x ∈ W ′}. Thus Pi is a
partial partition of W ′′. As in construction of induced graphs, we construct
a set W̃ by iteratively applying i-extensions to all labeled points not yet con-
tained in a partition cell of Pi. (Note that all x ∈ W ′ are in Pi-partition-cells
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for every i).
As above, we turn W ′′ into a Kripke modelM′ in the standard way. It
is not dicult to see that inM′ we have rs(v) = rn(ls(v)) whenever l(v) is
a k-world for some k ≥ s. Furthermore we have constructed M′ such that
{(x, y) ∈ K×NnM′|y ∈ W ′} = L. Thus we only have to ensure that no pair
(x, y) with y /∈ W ′ appears in K ×NnM′.
To ensure this, we enlargeM′ to a modelM. Consider the set X of all
points labeled with n/3-worlds. By our choice of n we can extend every such
n/3 world to an n/3 + 1 world g with g 6∈ {rn/3+1(w)|w ∈ W}. The proof of
2.27 shows that for every v ∈ X there is an extensionM(v) ofM′ such that
• rn/3+1(v) = g where g is as chosen above
• It still holds for all v ∈ M′ and i ∈ N that rk(v) = rk(l(v)) whenever
this is dened
• New points added inM(v) are only related to points that were created
by iteratedly applying i-extensions to v
• For all new points x added there is a sequence i1, . . . , ik of length at
most n/3 + 2 such that there are vi with v = v0Pi1v1Pi2v2 . . . Pikvk = x.
Applying the same technique toM(v) again for some v′ 6= v we get some
M(v, v′) with the same properties. Iterating this problem for all of X we get
a modelM(X) =:M satisfying
• For all v ∈ X holds: rn/3+1(v) =6∈ {rn/3+1(w)|w ∈ W}
• till for every v ∈M′ and all i ∈ N holds rk(v) = rk(l(v)) whenever this
is dened
• For all y ∈ M/M′ there is some x ∈ X and a sequence i1, . . . , ik of
length at most n/3+2 such that there are vi with x = v0Pi1v1Pi2v2 . . . Pikvk =
y.
Since it holds for all g ∈ X that g 6∈ {rn/3+1(w)|w ∈ W}, we have for
every k and every k-type h: If some agent i considers in h possible a k − 1
type where some agent j considers possible a k− 2-type where. . . where some
agent k considers the (n
3
+ 1 ) type g possible, then h 6∈ {rk(w)|w ∈ W}.
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On the other hand, notice that for every v ∈M′ that is labeled with a k-
world for some k < n there is some vector (i1, . . . , ir) of length at most 2/3n−
1 and some (w0 . . . wr) such there is a chain v = w0Pi1w1Pi2w2 . . . pirwr = x
for some x ∈ X. The same holds for all points inM/M′: Thus, by induction
we have: For every world x′ ∈M holds: If x′ is not labeled with an n-world,
then rn(x′) 6∈ {rn(w)|w ∈ W}. By our initial choice the same holds for all
w ∈ W ′/W ′′. In particular
{w ∈M|rn(w) ∈ {rn(w)|w ∈ W}} = W ′
Thus we have for all (x, y) ∈ K×NnM that y ∈ W ′, therefore K×NnM = L
as desired. 
Chapter 3
Levels of Knowledge and Belief
Information is a central driving force for social interaction. The epistemic
and doxastic states of the various parties not only decide whether some so-
cial interaction happens at all, but also how it pans out. To sharpen our
intuitions, we start with two examples.
Example 3.1: Our rst example is about a pedestrian trying to cross a
road. As it so happens, a car is heading down that same road at the very
same time. These two are bound to collide unless one of them is aware of
the situation and acts accordingly. Thus, we would assume both parties to
collect as much information about the situation as possible or, to say it in
other words, to pay attention to the trac. However, in his work on social
software [127], Rohit Parikh reports a seemingly paradoxical observation. In
many countries, pedestrians ostentatiously look away before crossing a street,
rather than concentrating on the approaching car. Parikh then continues
to explain this behavior as strategically rational. While both parties, the
pedestrian and the motorist, prefer not to crash, an accident would have far
worse consequences for the former. The pedestrian will thus be more likely to
back o from a conict situation and, knowing this, the driver can speed up,
leaving it to the pedestrian to avoid the accident. Obviously, if the trac was
dense enough and if all drivers adopted this reasoning, the pedestrian would
be stuck on her side on the road forever. One possible escape route from
this strategic disadvantage for the pedestrian is to undermine the driver's
reasoning. If the driver can't be sure that the pedestrian is aware of him, he
can no longer safely assume that the latter would refrain from crossing. Thus,
This chapter is based on joint work with E. Pacuit. We thank J. van der Meeren for
valuable discussions.
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if the pedestrian is suciently positive that the driver is paying attention, it
is a dominant strategy for her to signal not to be paying attention, leaving
it to the driver to prevent the accident.
Example 3.2: For our second example, consider a group of mountaineers
having gotten lost in a snow storm while it is already turning dark. After
analyzing the situation thoroughly, the group identies two major options.
First, they could hold out, spend the night and hope for rescue in the morn-
ing or, second, they could attempt to climb up a risky route and try to
arrive at a safe place where help could reach them easily. In either case, the
mountaineers decide to stay together as a group, so they jointly deliberate
on what to do. While discussing dierent options, the group nds it helpful
to know how many of them are supporting either option. However, since
the stakes are high and the situation is stressful, the group fears the risk of
some members blindly following others, or saying whatever seems to avoid
discussion, rather than reporting their true beliefs. In order to minimize this
risk and incentivize truthful reports, the group decides that it should become
common knowledge how many members opted for the dierent options, but
not who did so.1,2
The driving factor in both these examples is the higher order information
available to the dierent agents. For a successful social interaction, it can
be important to have the right amount of rst and higher order information
among the parties involved. Obviously, a lack of relevant information can
lead to undesirable results, a car accident or an ill-chosen decision among
the mountain climbers. But also too much information can lead to unwanted
results, strategizing motorists or climbers reporting their preferences untruth-
fully.
In this chapter, we will inquire into the various informational states that
can occur in social interaction, and in how to represent these. The two
central questions thus are what information we are interested in precisely
and how this information should be represented. To start, we give a rst,
tentative, answer to the how. We use this chapter to explore dierent
logical frameworks for representing informational states, mainly stemming
from epistemic and doxastic logic. Our main goal here is to compare these
1We silently ignore those cases where all or all but one group member share the same
opinion. In these cases the goal is obviously not or only partially realizable.
2How to do so without pens, paper or a ballot box is a central topics in the theory of
secure communication. See [140, chapter 6] for a solution.
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dierent frameworks with respect to two criteria, their ability to adequately
represent the relevant aspects of some informational setting, and the diculty
of realizing or bringing about some informational distribution formulated
within some framework. We will explain both of these criteria later in greater
detail.
Regarding the what, we will focus our inquiry on the informational
attitudes towards a single proposition ϕ. We should emphasize here that
we do not restrict the content of this proposition ϕ. In general, ϕ could be
of arbitrary length, possibly conjoining a multitude of simpler statements
about the matter of fact and the beliefs and intentions of the various agents.
We hold that focusing on a single proposition only does not pose a major
restriction in studying social situations. For a broad range of situations,
the relevant informational setting can be described by the attitudes towards
a potentially complex proposition ϕ. For instance, in both of the above
examples all the relevant information consists in dierent epistemic attitudes
towards the propositions the car and the pedestrian are heading towards a
collision and we should camp over night respectively. In the road crossing
case, the relevant epistemic attitudes will be of rst order, the motorist and
the pedestrian both knowing that ϕ, but also of second order, the motorist
not knowing that the pedestrian knows that ϕ. The second example even
needs to refer to third order epistemic states, each individual climber knowing
that no other group member will know whether that agent believes ϕ.
This leads us straight to a second, more ne-grained characterization of
what we want to represent. In discussing informational attitudes, we will
not be interested in a complete description of all properties that hold true
about ϕ. Just on the contrary, we will solely focus on those informational
attitudes about ϕ that are relevant for the situation in question and the
behavior of the dierent agents. For instance, in the trac example the rel-
evant propositions will be The driver knows that ϕ, The pedestrian knows
that ϕ and so on, while propositions such as The nearby shop owner be-
lieves that ϕ are irrelevant for the further development of that situation.
We will call the set of all expressions relevant for the situation, i.e., of formu-
las whose truth or falsity might inuence the panning out of the situation,
the reasoning language. Of course, dierent situations will require dierent
reasoning languages. But more than that is true. Dierent situations may
even require dierent types of reasoning languages. For instance, all the rel-
evant properties of the rst example are of the form A knows that B knows
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that ϕ, requiring only knowledge modalities to express them. In contrast,
the second example additionally requires disjunctive formulas of the forms A
knows that either B1 or B2 believes that ϕ. These examples are indicative of
the fact that various types of situations require dierent types of reasoning
languages. To give two more examples, all formulas appearing in the analysis
of bounded reasoning [89] will have a bounded quantier depth, whereas the
logical analysis of distributed computing [16, 38, 71, 129] is primarily inter-
ested in positive knowledge, formulas that only involve ϕ and the knowledge
modalities.
In this chapter, we will inquire into some salient choices of reasoning lan-
guages and their respective properties. We mainly focus on two properties
of the dierent reasoning languages. The rst of these, expressive power, is
quite intuitive. The expressive power of a framework or a reasoning language
describes its ability to distinguish situations and express the bits and pieces
of information relevant for some social situation. Our second criterion of
interest is realizability. To illustrate this criterion, assume that we use some
reasoning language to describe a given social situation such as the case of
pedestrians crossing a road. Assume further, that we have identied some in-
formational setting, a distribution of rst and higher order information about
ϕ, that would foster a desirable outcome of that situation. We will call such a
particular informational setting a level of information. A natural question to
ask then is whether such a level of information, a favorable informational set-
ting, could realistically occur and, if so, how we could bring it about, that is
how we could realize it. Of course, this denition depends upon how we esh
out the realistically. We will come back to this issue later. Relating this
discussion back to reasoning languages, we will be interested in whether and
how levels of information given in a particular reasoning language are realiz-
able. To be a bit more precise, our second criterion is to ask which reasoning
languages guarantee that every consistent level of information expressable in
that language could arise in a realistic scenario.
As is easy to see, these two criteria, expressive power and realizability,
draw in dierent directions. The more ne grained distinctions a language
allows to make, that is the more expressive it is, the more dicult it is to
realize a given level formulated in that reasoning language. In the most
extreme case, the full multi-agent epistemic language allows for a highly
detailed description of any situation. However, the price to pay is that most
such descriptions, even if consistent, cannot be realized in a suciently small
45
model. On the other extreme, a highly impoverished reasoning language,
only allowing to express whether some agent i believes ϕ or not, makes it
extremely easy to realize any given level of information: Since such a level
can only express whether i believes ϕ or not, we just need to convince that
agent of ϕ or its opposite. However, this language is, of course, too poor to
discuss most social situations adequately. In general, we will have to decide
case by case which reasoning language to pick, depending upon the situation
we want to model and its relevant features.
Before proceeding, we should clarify how our criteria, expressive power
and realizability, relate to standard discussions of models. To begin with, we
should emphasize that we do not apply these criteria to particular, concrete
models of some situation. Rather, they serve to discuss reasoning languages
or logics, formal frameworks for composing and describing models of concrete
situations.3 Notably, the reasoning languages themselves do not need to be
models of anything, they simply are formal languages with some internal
structure. In a sense, the choice between dierent reasoning languages or,
more generally, between dierent logics, can be seen as a choice between
general modeling paradigms for any concrete situation to come. As we will
elaborate later, in chapter 7, this choice is guided by a variety of factors,
two of them being expressive power and realizability. The rst of these
two, expressive power, is one of the most widely used criteria in comparing
dierent logical frameworks for a given target domain, see for instance the
discussion in [130]. The expressive power of a reasoning language is loosely
related to the precision of its models. The more expressive a logical language,
the more precisely it can describe how the target system is or is not. The
second criterion, realizability, roughly is a measure of internal coherence of
the corresponding reasoning language. Intuitively, some (consistent) set of
formulas is easily realizable if all formulas in that set cohere well, if they are
interrelated smoothly.
Now, it is time to be a bit more precise about what we mean with a realis-
tic situation in discussing realizability. For this paper, we will adapt a rather
weak criterion about which situations could possibly arise in realistic settings.
Arguably, a necessary condition for an informational setting to be realizable
in a real-world situation is that it must rest on a nite amount of options
3Amodel of a concrete situation will then correspond to a subset of a reasoning language
describing what is and is not the case in that situation. This is exactly what levels of
information are supposed to do.
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or states the dierent agents take into account. Thus, we are interested in
which levels of information could arise within such a nitely represented sit-
uation. Going back to reasoning languages, this leads us to the following
criterion: We want to distinguish reasoning languages that guarantee that
every consistent level of information expressible in these languages is repre-
sentable in a nite setting from those that do not. In the rst part of this
paper, we will focus on a closely related question. We will distinguish lan-
guages that allow for only few, countably many, dierent consistent levels
from those that allow for uncountably many.4 The main contribution of this
chapter is to unify and extend two previous results about the cardinality of
levels of information in the literature. The rst result by Parikh and Kra-
sucki [129, Theorem 3] shows that there are only countably many levels of
knowledge. A related result by Hart et al. [74, Theorem 2.2.] proves that
there are, in fact, uncountably many states of knowledge. Of course, these
results are not contradictory as the two papers are, in fact, counting dier-
ent sets. The crucial dierence is that Parikh and Krasucki are interested
in knowledge that, that is their reasoning language consists of all statements
of the form A knows that B knows that ϕ, whereas Hart et al. analyze the
case of knowledge whether, that is statements of the form A knows whether
B knows whether ϕ. Building on these results, we aim at identifying which
fragments of the standard epistemic language guarantee that there are only
countably many dierent levels of information and which parts cause an ex-
plosion to uncountably many levels. As it will turn out, the dividing line
between countably and uncountably many dierent state descriptions can be
sharp and unexpected. We will show that the dierence can be as subtle
as adding an additional connective to the reasoning language or even simply
adding a further agent to the situation. The rest of this chapter is structured
as follows: We start by introducing our formal denitions and motivating
the problem in section 3.1. In the next section 3.2 we then provide several
results about which languages allow for countably many levels of informa-
tion and which do not. In the third section, we come back to the question
of realizability, identifying which levels of information identied in the pre-
vious section are realizable within nite models under various conditions. In
section 3.4 we then conclude and outline some directions for future research.
4To clarify the connection: There are only countably many nite models of some given,
nitely generated language, thus only countably many dierent levels of information could,
in principle, be represented within a nite model.
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Finally, the appendix contains some proofs and constructions.
3.1 The Framework
Our analysis will be conducted in the framework of multi-agent epistemic
logic. To start, we give a quite general denition of the reasoning language
we are going to employ. Since we restrict ourselves to the informational
attitudes towards a single proposition, our language will have a single propo-
sitional variable x.5 For some given index set I, let L be the logical language
generated by the following Backus-Naur normal form:
ϕ ::= x|ϕ ∧ ϕ|¬ϕ|iϕ for i ∈ I
where the derived operators such as→,∨ or 3i are dened in the usual way.
Of course, I is intended to be a set of agents, in which case the modal opera-
tors will be knowledge or belief modalities, denoted byKi and Bi respectively.
However, much of the subsequent analysis applies to more general modal log-
ics and we wish to maintain the exibility to accommodate a broader class of
languages. For instance, knowledge-belief logics equip each agent with two
modal operators, one representing her knowledge the other one representing
the belief states. In the following, we will write Ki whenever we mean a
knowledge operator and Bi for the respective belief operators. We will use
the standard axiomatizations for these, that is
normality Ki(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Kiϕ→ Kiψ)
factivity Kiϕ→ ϕ
positive introspection Kiϕ→ KiKiϕ
negative introspection ¬Kiϕ→ Ki¬Kiϕ
for the knowledge operator and normality plus the last two, positive and
negative introspection, for the belief operator. As usual, we will refer to these
axiomatizations as S5 and KD45 respectively. We will further assume that
there are no additional interaction rules between the operators for dierent
agents. As we have motivated above, we won't be interested in the entire
5In the following, the proposition of interest ϕ will be represented by the atomic formula
x. Of course, ϕ could, in principle, be itself a complex proposition such as Kix or x∧¬x.
We hold that the case of an atomic proposition is the most fundamental case and all other
cases follow from there.
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logical language, but only in some selected subset of formulas relevant for
our purpose. To dene that formally, we have
Denition 3.3 (reasoning language). A reasoning language is any frag-
ment Lreas ⊆ L. The reasoning language generated by a set of operators
O = {O1 . . . Ok} denable in L, where each Oi has arity ni, is dened by the
Backus-Naur normal form:
ϕ ::= x|O1(ϕ . . . ϕ︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1
)|O2(ϕ . . . ϕ︸ ︷︷ ︸
n2




To give an example, the reasoning language of positive knowledge LK , gener-
ated by the set {K1, . . . , Kn} is the set of all formulas of the form Ki1 . . . Kirx
with all ij ∈ {1, . . . , n}, that is, formulas that only use x and any number
of knowledge operators. Next, we can dene our primary target of research,
levels of information of some given reasoning language LO.
Denition 3.4 (Level of Information). A level of LO-information or,
short, a level of information, is a set T ⊆ LO such that the set
T ∪ {¬ϕ|ϕ ∈ LO \ T}
is consistent. We will denote the set of all levels of information for LO by
TLO . /
With other words, a level of information is a complete list of all and exactly
those formulas of LO that are or should be made true in a given situation.
While this denition is fully syntactic, a part of our original question was
semantic, asking about the realizability of a given level of information within
a model. Of course, these denitions are equivalent, as witnessed by the
several completeness theorems of modal logic (see for instance [124]). Thus,
an equivalent denition of a level of information would be:6
Alternative Denition (Level of Information). A level of O-information
or, short, a level of information, is a set T ⊆ LO such that for some Kripke
or Neighborhood ModelM and some w ∈M we have
T = {ϕ ∈ LO|(M, w)  ϕ}
In this case, we say that the pointed model (M, w) realizes the level T . /
6For a denition of Kripke structures see chapter 2, Denition 2.2. Neighborhood
structures are a generalization of Kripke structures where the accessibility relations are
replaced by a map N :W → P(P(W )). See [124] for details
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Since we are especially interested in the cases of knowledge and belief, we
briey recall two particular completeness results that we will need later in
this chapter. The logic S5, and thus also multi-agent S5 is sound and strongly
complete with respect to the class of Kripke frames where all accessibility
relations are equivalence relations ([22, Theorem 4.29]), while KD45 with
its multi-agent variants is the logic of Kripke frames where all accessibility
relations are transitive, serial and Euclidean.
So let us come back to our main question, how many dierent levels of
knowledge there are for a given reasoning language LO. If the reasoning
language is innite,7 there are uncountably many subsets S ⊆ LO, so why
isn't it trivial that there are uncountably many levels of information? The
answer lies, of course, in the consistency conditions. Not every subset S ⊆ LO
is consistent and can thus be (part of) a level of information. The following
is an example of an inconsistent subset of the language with two knowledge
operators:8
{x,K1x,¬K2K1x,¬K1¬K2K1x,K2¬K1¬K2K1x}
A second reason why it is not obvious that there are uncountably many levels
of information of some proposition φ is that two sets of formulas X and Y
may, while consistent, correspond to the same level of information. That
is, we might have that X ⊆ T ⇔ Y ⊆ T for every level of information
T ∈ TLO . The following is an example of two subsets representing the same
information:
X = {x,K1x,K3x,K1K2K3x} and Y = {x,K1x,K2x,K3x,K1K2K3x}
The reason for why X and Y represent the same information leads us straight
to the countability result by Parikh and Krasucki that the language LK
generated by {K1 . . . Kn} has only countably many levels of information. In
line with their use of notation, we will refer to levels of LK information as
levels of knowledge. To begin with, let us study the case of a single agent.
7If LO is nite, there are only nitely many levels of information since TLO ⊆ P(LO)
and the latter is nite.
8This example is from [74]. To see that it is not a level of knowledge, note that
K2K1x → K1x is derivable in S5, so by propositional reasoning we have that ¬K1x →
¬K2K1x is derivable, by basic modal reasoning we can derive K1¬K1x → K1¬K2K1x.
Applying the negative introspection axiom we can derive ¬K1x → K1¬K2K1x. Then,
by propositional reasoning we have ¬K1¬K2K1x → K1x is derivable. By basic modal
reasoning, we then derive K2¬K1¬K2K1x→ K2K1x. This shows the set is inconsistent.
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As can be easily seen, there are three dierent possible levels of knowledge
towards a single proposition x. The proposition x could be false, it could
be true but our only agent doesn't know this or it could be true and the
agent knows about this. By positive introspection, the agent in the latter
case also knows that she knows, knows that she knows that she knows and
so on. Thus, the three possible levels of knowledge are:9
T1 = {} T2 ={x} T3 = {x,Kx,KKx . . .}
As a rst step towards a multi-agent account of knowledge, note that
the factivity axiom Kiϕ → ϕ for agent i, inserted into the left side of the
normality axiomKj(χ→ ψ)→ (Kjχ→ Kjψ) for agent j yields the following
rule
KjKiϕ→ Kjϕ
Applying this rule and the factivity axiom several times gives us the following
general result:
Lemma 3.5. Let ϕ ∈ LK, say ϕ = Ki1 . . . Kimx. Further, let s1 < . . . <
sr ∈ {1, . . .m}. Then the following holds:
Ki1 . . . Kimx→ Kis1 . . . Kisrx
Or to say it dierently: if ϕ = Ki1 . . . Kimx is contained in some level of
knowledge T , then so is every formula ψ that is obtained by removing any
number of knowledge operators for ϕ and leaving the remaining operators in
the original order. This shows that the sets X and Y from above contain the
same information which is, in fact, the information already contained in the
singleton {K1K2K3x}. To explore this property further, we let the property
of the above lemma dene a relation . That is, we dene:
Let Kj1 . . . Kjrx  Ki1 . . . Kimx i there is an order preserving em-
bedding from the rst to the second formulas, that is, a sequence
s1 < . . . < sr such that Kisl = Kjl
This pre-order has some intriguing structural properties, as has been found by
Higman is his 1952 combinatorial lemma [80]. To state this result, recall that
9In the belief case there are four possible levels. The three above with each K replaced
by a B and a fourth level in which our agent believes x even though x is false. Thus, this
level is given by {Bx,BBx . . .}.
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a well-partial order on a set X is an order in which all strictly descending
sequences as well as all antichains, that is sets of mutually -incompatible
elements, are nite.
Theorem 3.6 (Higman's Lemma). The order  is a well quasi order.
While Higman derived this lemma from a more general result, we will pro-
vide an elementary derivation in the appendix. From Higman's lemma, we
can immediately derive that there are only countably many levels of knowl-
edge.
Theorem 3.7 (Theorem 3 of [129]). There are only countably many levels
of knowledge.
Proof. By Lemma 3.5, every level T ∈ TLK is downward closed under 
and thus the complement C = LK \ T is upward closed. Since  has no in-
nitely descending sequences, C is characterized by the set M of its minimal
elements. Naturally the dierent minimal elements are mutually incompara-
ble, thus M is an antichain and therefore nite. In particular, every level of
knowledge is uniquely characterized by a nite subset of LK . Since LK has
only countably many nite subsets, there can be at most countably many
dierent levels of information. 
Note that the only properties used in the proof of the countability result were
normality and the factivity axiom. Thus we immediately get the following
generalization:
Corollary 3.8. Let 1 . . .n be normal modal operators that satisfy the
factivity axiom. Then the language L generated by the set {1 . . .n} has
only countably many levels of knowledge.
Next, we will show that Theorem 3.7 and Corollary 3.8 capture minimal
conditions for ensuring that levels of information remain countable. If either
the normality or the factivity axiom is given up, there will, in general, be
uncountably many levels of information already for the most basic case of
only two agents. We illustrate this along two examples, the case of belief
as a normal operator violating the factivity axiom and the case of knowing
whether as a non-normal modal operator. For the case of belief we have
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Lemma 3.9. The language LB generated by {B1, B2} has uncountably many
levels of information.10
Proof. We will show that the formulas ϕn dened by
ϕn := B1B2B1B2 . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
n operators
x
are mutually independent. That is, for every I ⊆ N there is some level of
information T ∈ TLB such that ϕn ∈ T ⇔ n ∈ I. In particular, there are
uncountably many levels of LB-information. To nish the proof, consider the
following frame F where reexive relations are omitted.
s v1 v2 v3 v4
. . .1 2 1 2
For any I ⊆ N, let the model MI based on F be dened by the valuation
V al(x) = {vi|i ∈ I}. Then it is not dicult to see thatMI , s  ϕn ⇔ n ∈ I.

Thus, as soon as levels of information concern the doxastic states of several
agents, they immediately become uncountable. In the rest of this chapter,
we will therefore focus our attention on dierent aspects of knowing about
a situation. To start, we consider the case of knowledge whether, analyzed
by Hart et al. in [74]. Here, knowledge whether ϕ, written Jiϕ, means that
agent i knows the truth value of ϕ while being silent about that truth value,
formally: Jiϕ := Kiϕ ∨ Ki¬ϕ. Thus, knowledge whether is a non-normal
modal operator11 denable within multi-agent S5. The result obtained by
Hart et al. is:
Theorem 3.10 (Theorem 2.2. of [74]). Let LJ be the reasoning language gen-
erated by {J1, J2}. Then there are uncountably many levels of LJ-information.
10This result has already been mentioned by Parikh in [128, Fact 5], however without
giving a proof. To the best of our knowledge, no proof of this result has been published
so far.
11To give a bit more detail: Starting from a multi-agent knowledge model W , the
neighborhood model for knowing whether is dened by the neighborhood relations: ni :
W → P(P(W )) with ni(w) = {X ⊆ W |X ⊇ Ki[w] or X ∩Ki[w] = ∅} where Ki[w] is the
knowledge cell of agent i containing w.
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They key idea of the proof provided in [74] is again to show that all
formulas of the form J1J2J1 . . . x are mutually independent. To see this, they
construct a universal model, realizing uncountably many levels of information
at once, as follows (we only sketch the main idea here, see the full paper for
more details): LetM consist of all pairs (a, b); where a, b ∈ {0, 1}ω. Dene
the relations as (a, b) ∼1 (a′, b′) i a = a′ and ak = a′k = 1 ⇒ bk−1 = b′k−1
and similarly for ∼2. Let ϕ denote the fact a0 = b0 = 0. Then an induction
argument shows that J1J2J1 . . . ϕ holds at (M, (a, b)) i ak = 1 for k the
number of quantiers in J1J2J1 . . . ϕ and similarly for J2J1 . . . x and bk = 1.
In particular, all those formulas are mutually independent, thus there are
uncountably many levels of knowing whether.
3.2 Results
In the last section we have seen that the countability of levels of knowledge
is closely tied to certain properties of the knowledge operator. But of course,
not every reasoning language based on n knowledge operators keeps the lev-
els of information countable. As illustrated by Theorem 3.10, the knowing
whether modality, denable from the knowledge modality, negation and dis-
junction, makes for uncountably many levels of information. In this section,
we explore the behavior of several extensions of LK to slightly richer reason-
ing languages by incorporating conjunctions, disjunctions or negations.
Not every informational state we might be interested in can be expressed
with the knowledge modality alone. For instance, recall our second example
about the mountain climbers. There, some of the relevant propositions were
of the form K1(K2ϕ∨K3ϕ) expressing that agent 1 knows that either agent
2 or 3 supports ϕ, but might not necessarily know which of the two does.
Thus, the appropriate reasoning language needs to contain some form of
disjunctions. Yet other social situations might call for further operators such
as negation, conjunction or the epistemic possibility operator.
To give an example, assume that some researcher just learned about a
highly interesting talk to be delivered in twenty minutes time. She has,
however, a lunch appointment at the same time with two colleagues from her
faculty whom she does not want to let down. These colleagues would, in fact,
also attend the talk if they knew about it, thus a necessary condition for her
to go is to know that her colleagues c1 and c2 know. The natural way to
express this condition is K(Kc1x∧Kc2x), requiring the conjunction operator
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next to the knowledge modalities. Or, for a second example, consider a
slight variation of this setting. This time, instead of coordinating with her
colleagues, the agent is trying to avoid yet another colleague at all price.
This colleague is, at it stands, also interested in that talk, thus a necessary
condition for her going is to be sure that said colleague is not aware of the
talk, or formally K¬Kax.
As these examples show, there are plenty of situations that cannot be ad-
equately described with the knowledge modalities alone, but we might need
to add further operators such as conjunction, disjunction or negation. Some-
times, these operators only occur in some highly constrained surroundings
such as the denition of the knowing-whether operator form negation and
disjunction (Jϕ := Kϕ ∨ K¬ϕ) or of epistemic possibility (L = ¬K¬), at
other times these operators might be added unrestrictedly. In the following
we inquire into adding these conjunctions, disjunctions and negations both
restrictedly and unrestrictedly.
We begin our inquiry with the negation operator. For cases such as the
researcher trying to avoid some colleague we need to incorporate negations,
the knowledge that somebody else does not know something, into our reason-
ing language. We start our inquiry with a cautious introduction of negation
through the epistemic possibility operator L, denable from K as L = ¬K¬.
Note that for instance in our very rst example about the pedestrian trying
to cross the road, we do not need the driver to know that the pedestrian
does not know about him approaching. It would suce for the driver to
consider it possible that the pedestrian might not be paying attention, i.e.,
Ldriv.Lpedes.x. The following is, in a certain sense, a dual of Theorem 3.7.
Lemma 3.11. Let LL be the reasoning language generated by {L1, . . . , Ln}.
Then there are at most countably many levels of LL-information.
Proof. For a given ϕ ∈ LL let ϕ# ∈ LK be the formula resulting by re-
placing every Li with the corresponding Ki. Then we claim that the map f
sending T ∈ TLL to f(T ) = LK \ {ϕ#|ϕ ∈ T} is a bijection between TLL and
TLK . To see this, let T be a level of LL information and let (M, w) be a model
realizing T , i.e., for every ϕ ∈ LL holds that ϕ ∈ T ⇔ (M, w)  ϕ. Then,
using the identity Li = ¬Ki¬, we have for every ϕ ∈ LL with ϕ = Li1 . . . Lirx





Thus, M′, the model M where the valuation V (x) is replaced by V ′(x) =
W \ V (x), satises for all ψ ∈ LK that M′, w  ψ ⇔ ϕ ∈ f(T ) ⇔ ψ 6∈
{ϕ#|ϕ ∈ T}, thus showing that f is indeed an injective function. The same
construction applied to LK shows that the inverse of f is also well dened
and injective, thus f is a bijection. 
Next, we show that slightly less generosity about negation operators, ex-
pressed by allowing for Ki and Li to appear simultaneously, blows up the
expressive power drastically.
Lemma 3.12. Assume there are at least two agents and let LL,K be the
language generated by {L1 . . . Ln, K1 . . . Kn}. Then there are uncountably
many levels of LL,K-information.
Of course, we immediately get the following generalization, using that Li =
¬Ki¬:
Corollary 3.13. Assume there are at least two agents and let LK,¬ be the
language generated by {¬, K1 . . . Kn}. Then there are uncountably many lev-
els of LK,¬-information.
Proof of Lemma 3.12. The proof strategy is similar as in the proof of
Lemma 3.9. We will show that the formulas ϕn dened by
ϕ := L1L2 . . . L1L2︸ ︷︷ ︸
2n (L1L2) blocks
K1K2 . . . K1K2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n (K1K2) blocks
x
are mutually independent. That is for every I ⊆ N there is some model
MI , s such that MI , s  ϕn i n ∈ I. To this end, let the model Mn be
dened as:
s v1 v2 v2n−2 v2n−1 v2n+1
1 2 1 2
with the valuation given by V (x) = {vi|2n+1− 2n ≤ i ≤ 2n+1}, thus x is true
at the 2n + 1 right-most worlds. It is not dicult to see that Mn, s  ϕn
and Mn, s 6 ϕm for all m 6= n. Now, for any subset I ⊆ N we dene the
modelMI in the following way: We take allMn for n ∈ I, identify all the
points s from the dierentMn and replace the equivalence relations by their
transitive closure. For the case I = {m,n}, we thus get the following picture:
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s
v1 v2 v2n−2 v2n−1 v2n+1







Now, it is not dicult to see that (MI , s)  ϕn i n ∈ I, which completes
our proof. 
The last lemma nishes our analysis of negations and we can shift our
attention to conjunctions. In the rst part of the above example, we used
conjunctions to express the fact that some researcher knows that both of her
colleagues are aware of some interesting talk. Intuitively, this information
is already contained in her level of knowledge. Saying that the agent knows
that both her colleagues know about the talk is nothing else but saying
that she knows that the rst colleague knows about the talk and that she
also knows that the second colleague knows about the talk. This intuition
is made precise in the following lemma, showing that conjunctions do not
change the expressive power of our reasoning language.
Lemma 3.14. Let LK,∧ be the language generated by {K1, . . . , Kn,∧}. Then
there are only countably many levels of LK,∧-information. Furthermore, there
is a bijection f : TLK,∧ → TLK such that any pointed Kripke model (M, w)
realizes some level T ∈ TLK,∧ if and only if (M, w) realizes f(T ).
Proof of Lemma 3.14. Let f : TLK,∧ → TLK be the map sending every
T ∈ TLK,∧ to T ∩ LK . To see that f is well-dened, note that every model
(M, w) realizing T also realizes f(T ). For surjectivity let S ∈ TLK and pick
some model (N , w) realizing S. Let S ′ be the LK,∧ level dened as S ′ = {ϕ ∈
LK,∧|(M, w)  ϕ}, thus f(S ′) = S. Finally, for injectivity, note that the rule
Ki(a ∧ b)⇔ Kia ∧Kib is valid on all knowledge models. Thus, by applying
this rule repeatedly, every ϕ ∈ LK,∧ is equivalent to a formula of the form
ψ1 ∧ . . .∧ψn where the ψi do not contain the symbol ∧, i.e., ψi ∈ LK . Thus,
we have for all T ∈ TLK,∧ that ϕ ∈ T ⇔ ψ1 ∧ . . .∧ψn ∈ T ⇔ ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ T ,
i.e., every level T ∈ TLK,∧ is already determined by T ∩ LK . 
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Finally, we turn to the analysis of disjunctions. The disjunction operator
can be used to weaken the concept of knowledge in various ways. Knowledge
whether, for instance, states the presence of some information while being
silent about its content, while distributed knowledge expresses that some
member knows ϕ without saying who does. Or, even more generally, we
might use disjunctions to express the fact that some agent knows that one
out of a list of propositions is true without knowing which. As it will turn
out, the disjunction connective is the most delicate of the extensions studied.
For a start, we consider a cautions introduction of disjunctions, used only to
dene distributed knowledge. For any subset J ⊆ I of agents, we dene the





Thus, DJ expresses that some members of J know ϕ without specifying
who. Note that D{i} = Ki, thus the reasoning language LD dened by
{DJ | J ⊆ I} is an extension of LK . In fact, LD is a proper extension of
LK and it is even more expressive than LK , that is there are two models
(M, w) and (M′, v) that satisfy exactly the same formulas from LK , that is
M, w  ϕ⇔M′, v  ϕ for all ϕ ∈ LK , but these models are distinguishable
in LD, i.e., there is some ψ ∈ LD such that M, w  ψ and M′, v 6 ψ.
Nevertheless, the language LD still only allows for countably many levels of
knowledge.
Lemma 3.15. Let LD be the reasoning language dened by {DJ | J ⊆ I}.
Then LD has only countably many levels of knowledge.
Proof. We derive this statement from corollary 3.8. First, we note that,
by a simple case distinction, the modal operators DJ all satisfy the factivity
axiom. The DJ are, however, no normal modal operators, but they satisfy
the property
DJDJ ′ϕ→ DJϕ
which is all that was needed for the proof of 3.8. To see this, letDJ =
∨
i∈J Ki
and assume that DJDJ ′ϕ holds. Then there is some i ∈ J such that KiDJ ′ϕ
holds, which, by the normality of DJ ′ , implies that Kiϕ. By ∨-introduction
we nally get that
∨
i∈J Kiϕ = DJϕ, as desired.

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Next, we turn to a less cautious use of disjunctions. We study the full
language obtained by adding disjunctions unrestrictedly, i.e., the language
generated by {K1, . . . , Kn,∨}. As it turns out, the properties of this language
crucially depend upon the number of agents. It is a well known phenomenon
in modal logic that the behavior of knowledge models for two agents can
dier radically from models with three or more agents in certain aspects.
The following two lemmas show that levels of information are such a case:
Lemma 3.16. Let L∨2 be the language generated by {K1, K2,∨}. Then L∨2
has only countably many levels of information.
Lemma 3.17. Let LK,∨ be the language generated by {K1, . . . , Kn,∨} for
n ≥ 3. Then LK,∨ has uncountably many levels of information.
We relegate the slightly lengthy proofs of these lemmas to the appendix.
We want to emphasize here that Lemma 3.17 in a certain sense represents
minimal conditions for arriving at uncountably many levels. Several slight
restrictions, such as adding an upper bound to the number of disjunctions
allowed to appear in any formulas or an upper limit for the quantier depth
under which conjunctions may occur, turns levels of information countable
again. To conclude this chapter, we collect the results we have presented so
far in a theorem:
Theorem 3.18. i) The following reasoning languages have countably many
levels of information:
Reasoning language generated by
LK {K1 . . . Kn} (Parikh/Krasucki)
LL {L1 . . . Ln}
LK,∧ {K1, . . . , Kn,∧}




ii) The following reasoning languages have uncountably many levels of infor-
mation:
Reasoning language generated by
LB {B1 . . . Bn}
LL,K {K1, . . . , Kn, L1 . . . Ln}
LK,¬ {K1 . . . Kn,¬}
LJ {J1, . . . , Jn} where Jiϕ = Kiϕ ∨Ki¬ϕ
(knowing whether, Hart et al.)
LK,∨ {K1, . . . , Kn,∨} for n ≥ 3
3.3. REALIZING LEVELS OF INFORMATION 59
3.3 Realizing Levels of Information
Having discussed the dierent reasoning languages and their expressive power
abstractly, it is now time to relate levels of information back to social situa-
tions where they could arise. In the two examples we gave in the introduction,
a pedestrian crossing a street and strayed mountaineers discussing their op-
tions, we used levels of information to denote an ideal state of information
that some of the agents want to achieve. So let us assume that we identi-
ed some level of information T that we wish to bring about. The natural
question to ask here is whether this is possible at all and, if so, how. In the
broadest sense, the answer to the rst question is trivial. By the complete-
ness theorem, for a level of information T , being consistent just means that
T is realizable in some Kripke model (M, w). However, so one could argue,
there are limits to which we can realize Kripke models in a realistic multi-
agent setting. Given that all our information is nite, as are the agents whose
reasoning the Kripke model represents, a natural criterion would be that the
Kripke models realizing some levels of information should also be nite. If
our reasoning language was nite, the nite model property (see [22, section
3.4] for details)would guarantee exactly that: Every consistent formula, and
thus also every nite set of consistent formulas of the knowledge or belief
language is realizable in a nite Kripke model. This does, however, not hold
true anymore for innite reasoning languages. By a well-known fact from
innite combinatorics, there are only countably many nite Kripke Models
of a given language. Thus, if our reasoning language allows for uncountably
many levels of information, we cannot hope for all of them being realizable
in nite Kripke Models. The following result shows that for the reasoning
languages we studied in the last section, the converse holds also true. If we
pick a reasoning language that allows for only countably many dierent levels
of information, every such level can be represented in a nite Kripke Model.
Thus, the following theorem can be seen as an extension of the nite model
property mentioned above. The proof is again relegated to the appendix.
Theorem 3.19. Let Lc be any of the reasoning languages in part i) of The-
orem 3.18 and let T be a level of Lc information. Then T is realizable in a
nite model.
Also this answer might not be fully satisfactory for some practical pur-
poses. In most cases, the agents will have some prior information about the
60 CHAPTER 3. LEVELS OF INFORMATION
situation or about each others' information. For instance, some of the moun-
taineers might have already stated their positions publicly or the pedestrian
may have visibly reacted to the car. Thus, rather than producing some in-
formational situation from scratch, our eorts to bring about T will have to
start with the prior informational setting of the agents. And of course, this
prior information may limit the levels of information that are still realizable.
For instance, we can provide agents with additional information, truthful
or not, but we cannot force them to forget whatever they already know or
believe.12 Thus, the question to ask here is: Under which circumstances
can some given level of information, describing the initial information of the
agents, be transformed into some other level of information that we wish
to bring about? We give a partial answer to this question for the case of
LK . Note that this analysis immediately extends to the reasoning languages
LK,∧,L∨2 and LL: Each level of information T for the former two languages
is determined by T ∩ LK (see Lemmas 3.14 and 3.16), while each level of
LL information realized in some model (M, w) is uniquely determined by
the level of knowledge of ¬x realized at (M, w) (see Lemma 3.11). For the
following theorem, recall the denition of event models (Denition 2.3 of
chapter 2). Before stating our result we need to introduce one more piece of
notation. For some level of knowledge T , we will denote the set of -minimal
elements of LK \T byM(T ). By Theorem 3.7 the set M(T ) is nite for each
level of knowledge T , and T is completely determined by M(T ).
Theorem 3.20. Let L1 6= ∅ and L2 be consistent LK levels of knowledge for
some atomic or boolean proposition x. Let M, w be a nite Kripke model
realizing L1. Then there is an event model (E, e) such that (M, w) ⊕ (E , e)
realizes L2 if for every ϕ ∈M(L2) there is some ψ ∈M(L1) such that
i) ψ  ϕ
ii) Let ϕ = Ki1 . . . Kirx and ψ = Kj1 . . . Kjsx. Then Kir = Kjs.
The rst condition simply expresses that L1 ⊆ L2, that is, the knowledge
about ϕ can only increase. However, the following example 3.21 shows that
L1 may not contain all the information in (M, w) relevant for which levels
of knowledge could be obtained by product updates from (M, w). Condition
ii) of the theorem precisely excludes this type of counterexamples. As is well
12We could, however, try to make some agent overwrite their information. This falls in
the realm of belief revision that we do not touch upon in this work.
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known, no positive knowledge can be lost through product updates. Thus,
condition i), stating precisely this, is also a necessary condition for which
levels of knowledge are reachable from (M, w). This condition is even a
maximal necessary condition in the following sense. For every L1 ⊆ L2 there
is some model (M, w) realizing L1 and some event model (E , e) such that
(M, w)⊕ (E , e) realizes L2.
Example 3.21: To see that M, w may restrict the levels of knowledge
realizable through product updates beyond what is expressed in L1, consider









It is easy to see that the level of information T realized inM, w is charac-
terized byM(T ) = {K1K2x}, thus T consists of exactly those formulas in LK
that do not contain the letters K1 and K2 in this order. Next, consider the
type T ′ characterized by M(T ′) = {K1K2K3x}. Since K1K2x ≺ K1K2K3x
we have that T ⊂ T ′. Yet, T ′ cannot be realized in any update model of
M, w. To see this, observe that the formula K3x ∨K3¬x is valid onM and
thus also on all product updates of M. Thus, using factivity, x → K3x is
valid on all updates ofM, which, in turn, implies that K1K2x→ K1K2K3x
is also a validity. By contraposition we get ¬K1K2K3x → ¬K1K2x imply-
ing that no level of knowledge T̃ obtainable through an update can have
K1K2K3x ∈M(T̃ ).
A next direction of research now would be to ask which levels of knowledge
could be realized if the means of communication are limited. For instance,
Parikh and Krasucki [129] study which levels of knowledge can arise under
private communication with delays and which levels require public announce-
ments. As their analysis shows, a combination of both methods suces to
bring about every level of knowledge. For our general levels of informa-
tion, this is no longer true. For instance, the level of information desired by
the mountain climbers in our initial example, everybody knowing how many
group members support x, but not which, is reachable through communica-
tion among the mountain climbers, but only if there is common knowledge
in some underlying protocol, a case that is excluded by Parikh and Krasucki.
Thus, the question arises as to which means of communication are neces-
sary to realize all possible levels of information. The last lemma reduces this
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question for many reasoning languages to an analysis of product updates and
the question which communication channels are needed to produce certain
update models. We leave this question for future work.
3.4 Conclusions and Outlook
Information is an important building block in our understanding of social
procedures. As is emphasized by a vast body of work, ranging from epis-
temic game theory [131] to the analysis of conventions [106] and social norms
[19], the epistemic and doxastic states of the various agents decisively shape
the way in which interactive situations pan out. In this chapter, we have
concentrated on an abstract representation of the epistemic and doxastic
states present in a situation. Our main goal was to compare several lan-
guages we could use to represent epistemic states, all of them fragments of
the full epistemic language L, with respect to their expressive power and
their realizability, that is the question of whether an epistemic state is real-
izable in a nite situation or whether it requires an innite model. On the
expressive power side, we distinguish languages allowing for only countably
many levels of information, consistent descriptions of a situation, from those
that give rise to uncountably many dierent levels. Our rst main result is
to identify which operators and junctors of the logical vocabulary cause an
explosion in expressive power and which do not. In particular, we show that
negations and an unlimited use of disjunctions raise the expressive power
drastically while conjunctions and a limited use of disjunctions have a slight
or no eect on the expressive power. Our second main result is related to the
realizability of levels of information, that is to the question whether every
consistent level of information is realizable in a nite Kripke Model. Here, we
have shown that all those languages studied that allow for at most countably
many dierent levels of information guarantee in return that every possible
such level is already realized in some nite situation. We end this chapter
with indicating some possible topics for future research.
A rst direction for extended research was already indicated at the end
of the previous section, namely to clarify the connection between commu-
nicational means and levels of information. In their attempt to realize a
certain level of information, a set of agents may only have access to a limited
amount of communication channels. A group of card players sitting at a table
will only have access to public announcements, while a group of friends at
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a distance, communicating over text messages, are limited to asynchronous
messaging with uncertain success. In the rst case it is hard to exchange
information between two parties without the rest of the table learning about
it [43], in the second case it is impossible to generate common knowledge
among any subgroup of agents [71]. Thus, the main question in this research
stream is which levels of information can be realized within a given, limited
set of communicational tools or, conversely, what kind of communication is
needed to bring about some desired level of information.
The second direction of future research is to extend our analysis to more
general reasoning languages. So far, we have primarily focused on reasoning
languages that are based on the knowledge or belief modalities. Of course,
there are interesting extensions to this. First of all, it would be interesting
to see how an interaction of these modalities work for instance studying
the beliefs of one agent about the knowledge of another agent. Here, even
the basic case, that is the reasoning language generated by {K1, B2} makes
for uncountably many levels of information. A related direction of research
would be to introduce relations between the dierent agents. For instance, if
some agent i gets accepted as a guru by agent j, the formula BjBiϕ→ Bjϕ
would be part of the underlying axioms. Also here the question would be
which and how many correlations between agents can make for countably
or uncountably many levels. Some other cases will call for dierent modal
operators altogether. To give a prominent example, Bicchieri's analysis of
conventions and social norms [19] can be translated into levels of information
for a single proposition ϕ, if we add additional modal operators Di, where
Diϕ denotes that agent i is prepared to do ϕ in certain types of situations.
With this language, the fact that some agent i has a convention about ϕ in









meaning that agent i adheres to a descriptive norm regulating ϕ whenever
she is willing to follow ϕ if and only if she expects a large group of agents,
denoted by the big enough, to do likewise. In this same style, the fact that
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That is, agent i has a social norm concerning ϕ if she is willing to do ϕ
whenever she expects enough people to also follow ϕ in such circumstances
and if she expects these people to expect her to follow ϕ under the appropriate
circumstances.
In light of corollary 3.8, we expect that much of the analysis presented
here carries over to a quite general class of modal operators. But, of course,
details need to be checked.
Finally, a third and last direction of future research is how to combine
dierent levels of information. Within some given situation, we might have
learned about the available information concerning some proposition p and
also about the level of information about some q. But what does this imply
about the information concerning more complex formulas such as p → q or
p ∧ q? Let's consider the reasoning language LK as an example. There,
the level of knowledge about p ∧ q is exactly the intersection of the level of
knowledge of p and q. However, this is not true for disjunction: The level
of knowledge of p ∨ q can be a proper superset of the union of the levels of
knowledge of p and q. The general question is how the levels of information
of φ and ψ are related to the levels of information of φ ∨ ψ, φ ∧ ψ, φ → ψ,
etc. More generally, we can dene a map Ψ assigning each formula of our
language L a level of information over some reasoning language Lr. Can
we characterize such maps, depending on Lc? For example, for LK we have
Ψ(ϕ) 6= ∅ implies Ψ(¬ϕ) = ∅, whereas, for LB we only have that Ψ(ϕ) ∩
Ψ(¬ϕ) = ∅.
3.5 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.6. To start, we introduce a simplifying assumption.
Throughout this proof, we will identify every formula Ki1Ki2 . . . Kinx with
the corresponding word Ki1Ki2 . . . Kin , omitting the x. To introduce a bit
of notation: For a given set Σ = {K1 . . . Kn} let Σ∗ denote the set of nite
words in Σ, i.e., nite sequences where all members are from Σ. Now, dene
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the relation ≤ on Σ∗ by: x ≤ y i there is an order preserving injection from
x to y. Thus, we have to show that ≤ is a well quasi order on Σ∗. The proof
will proceed in several steps.
Step 1: The fact that ≤ is a well quasi order is equivalent to the statement
that every innite set X in Σ∗ contains an innite ≤-increasing sequence
S = 〈xi|i ∈ N〉. To show this, we start with the direction from right to left.
Assume that ≤ was not a well quasi order. Then it has either an innite
antichain or an innite ≤-decreasing subsequence. Neither of these contain
an innite increasing subsequence. For the direction from left to right assume
X ⊆ Σ∗ is an innite subset. Assume to the contrary that every increasing
sequence in X is nite. Let Y ⊆ X be the set of elements appearing as
maximal elements in some maximally increasing subsequence of X. Then Y
is an antichain and thus nite. On the other hand, the relation x ≤ y implies
that the word x is not longer than y, thus {x ∈ X|x ≤ y for some y ∈ Y } is
nite. But this contradicts the fact that Y consists of all maximal elements
of maximally increasing subsequences.
Step 2: Let n ∈ N and dene ≤n on (Σ∗)n componentwise. Then ≤ is a well
quasi order on Σ i ≤n is a well quasi order on Σ∗. We prove this step by
induction on n. The case n = 1 is trivial. Assume the claim holds for n,
and we have to show it for n + 1. Let X ⊆ (Σ∗)n+1 be innite. By Step 1,
there is an innite sequence X ′ ⊆ X such that ≤ is a linear order on the
last components of X ′. Applying the induction assumption to the rst n
components of X yields the desired.
Step 3: The fact that ≤ is a well quasi order is equivalent to the claim that
for every innite X ⊆ Σ∗ there is some x ∈ X such that the set X ′ = {y ∈
X|x ≤ y} is innite. For the direction from left to right pick X ′ as in step
1 and x = min(X ′). For the direction from right to left pick such x and X ′.
Then, applying the claim to the innite set X ′, we can pick some x′ such
that X ′′ ∈ {y ∈ X|x′ ≤ y} is innite. Iterating this construction innitely
often yields an increasing sequence 〈x, x′ . . .〉.
Step 4: Now we can nally prove the theorem. We will do so by induction
over n, the size of alphabet. The case n = 1 is trivial, thus assume we have
shown it for n− 1 and want to show it for n. Let X be innite and let x be
a shortest word in X, let k be its length. Let w be the word.
w = K1K2 . . . KnK1K2 . . . Kn . . . K1K2 . . . Kn︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
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Thus we have x ≤ w, though not necessarily w ∈ X. Now, for every y ∈ X,
we dene a partial map f : w → y with the following algorithm: Send the
the rst letter of w, K1, to the rst K1 appearing in y. Then, send the
second letter of w, K2 to the rst K2 that appears in y after the image of
K1 just chosen, and so forth. Stop this algorithm whenever some letter of
w cannot be mapped successfully because it doesn't appear in y after the
image of the previous letter. Furthermore, let m(y) denote the number of
letters that could be mapped successfully before the algorithm stopped, that
is m(y) ∈ [0; k · n]. Now, pick some innite set X ′ ⊆ X such that m(·) is
constant on X ′. Here we distinguish two cases:
Case 1: m(y) = n · k for all y ∈ X ′. Thus the algorithm described above
dened an order preserving injection fy : w → y for every y ∈ X ′. In
particular we have w ≤ y and thus also x ≤ y and therefore (x,X ′) is as in
step 3.
Case 2: m(y) = r < n · k for all y ∈ X ′. In this case let w1 . . . wr−1 be the




2w2 . . . wr−1M
y
r




i for every i ≤ r. But since eachM
y
i does not contain letter wr, it is
already dened over a vocabulary with n− 1 words. Thus, by the induction
hypothesis and step 2 applied to the set {(Myi )i≤r |y ∈ X ′}, there is some
innitely increasing ≤-sequence X ′′ in X ′. 
Proof of Lemma 3.16. We show that every ϕ ∈ L∨2 is equivalent to some
ψ ∈ LK . In particular, every T ∈ TL∨2 is uniquely determined by T ∩LK and
thus TL∨2 is countable. To this end, we note that for any ϕ ∈ L∨2 of the form
ϕ = ψ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ψn and for every level of information T ∈ TL∨2 , it holds that
ϕ ∈ T i ψi ∈ T for some i. Thus, every T ∈ TL∨2 is uniquely determined by
its elements ϕ of the form ϕ = Kiψ for some i ≤ n and ψ ∈ L∨2. It therefore
suces to show that for every ϕ of that form there is some ψ ∈ LK with
ϕ↔ ψ.
Before we proceed, note that the following three rules are valid:
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(I) Kiϕ ∨Kiψ → Ki (ϕ ∨ ψ)
(II) Ki (Kiϕ ∨ ψ)→ Ki (ϕ ∨ ψ)
(III) Ki (x ∨ ψ)→ Kix for ψ ∈ L∨2
The rst two are general validates, the third follows the fact that ϕ → x
holds for all ψ ∈ L∨2, which in turn follows from the factivity axiom by
induction over the complexity of ϕ. Now we can nally prove that for every
ϕ ∈ L∨2 of the form ϕ = Kiψ there is some ψ ∈ LK with ϕ ↔ ψ. Without
loss of generality, we can assume that ϕ 6∈ LK . We will construct a sequence
ϕ = ψ0 → ψ1 → . . .→ ψn = ψ
Assume ψi is given and ψi 6∈ LK . To construct ψi+1 write ψi in the form
Ki1 . . . Kir (ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn). Now, if any of the ϕi is x, rule III from above
implies ψi → Ki1 . . . Kirx. Set Ki1 . . . Kirx = ψi+1 and end the construction.
If none of the ϕi is x, check whether there are ϕl, ϕm of the form Kaχl resp.
Kaχm for some a ∈ {1, 2}. If this is the case, apply rule (I) to ϕi∨ϕj, that is
ψi+1 = Ki1 . . . Kir
(




. Finally, if there are no ϕl, ϕm
of this form, then some of the ϕi must be of the form Kirχ, wlog ϕ1 is of that
form. In this case apply rule (II) and let ψi+1 = Ki1 . . . Kir (χ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn).
Note that every application of rules (I) or (II) reduces the number of Ki
operators by one, thus there can be only nitely many applications of these
rules before applying rule (III) and stopping the algorithm. Thus, we have
ϕ→ ψ. To nish the proof, we need to show the converse, that is ψ → ϕ. To
this end, we need to introduce a bit of vocabulary. For ϕ, ψ ∈ L∨2, say that
ψ is a pruning of ϕ i ψ can be obtained from ϕ by repeatedly replacing some
disjunctions (χ1∨χ2) appearing in ϕ by one of the disjuncts χ1 or χ2. By ∨-
introduction we have that ψ → ϕ whenever ψ is a pruning of ϕ. Further call
ψ a complete pruning of ϕ if ψ does not contain any further ∨-operators and
let Sϕ denote the set of complete prunings of ϕ. Now, it is not dicult to see
that rules (I) and (II) leave Sϕ invariant, that is Sϕ = Sψ0 = . . . = Sψn−1 .
Further, by our application of rule (III), we have that ψn ∈ Sψn−1 = Sϕ.
Thus ψ is a pruning of ϕ and thus ψ → ϕ.

Proof of Lemma 3.17. We will show that the reasoning language LK,∨
generated by {K1, K2, K3,∨} has uncountably many levels of information.
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In the following, we will mimic substantial parts of the proof for the belief
case (Lemma 3.9). In particular, we will again dene a set of formulas ϕn
such that all ϕn are mutually independent, i.e., such that for all I ⊆ N there
is some model M, w such that M, w  ϕn ⇔ n ∈ I. To be a bit more
precise, we will construct two unary operators B1 and B2 and a formula χ,
all denable in LK,∨, such that the formulas of the form
ϕn := B1B2 . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
n operators
χ
are all mutually independent. Just as in the belief case, we would like to
build a linear Kripke frame, based on an innite set of worlds {v1, v2, v3 . . .}.
However, in order to dene our operators, we need to connect an additional
ve-node cluster to each vi. Thus, we will work will the following Kripke
Frame F depicted in table 3.1 where reexive arrows are omitted.
Now, let I ⊆ N be any subset. We dene a modelMI on F by picking
the following valuation V .
vi, ui ∈ V (x) for all i ∈ N xi ∈ V (x) i i even
yi, zi ∈ V (x) i i ∈ I wi ∈ V (x) i i odd
Thus x is true on the darkly shaded areas above and each lightly shaded area
labeled with yi or zi are in V (x) i i ∈ I. We now dene the operators B1
and B2 as:
B1ϕ := K1 (K3K1x ∨ ϕ) B2ϕ := K2 (K3K2x ∨ ϕ)
First, note that on the set of worlds labeled with vi, the operator Bi behaves
like a belief operator. That is, we have for i evenMI , vi  B1ϕ iMI , vi  ϕ
and MI , vi  B2ϕ i MI , vi+1  ϕ and vice versa for i odd. Now, dene
χ = K3(K1K3p ∨ K2K3p), then it is not dicult to see that MI , vi  χ i
i ∈ I. Combining these insights, we get that
MI , v1  ϕn i n ∈ I
where ϕn is as dened above. Thus, all ϕn are independent, this nishes our
proof. 


































Table 3.1: The Kripke frame F
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Proof of Theorem 3.19. Recall that any type in T ∈ Tc for c ∈ {LK,∧;L∨2}
is already determined by T ∩ LK . Further, the proof of Lemma 3.11 shows
that every T in TLL is realizable in a nite model i every T ′ ∈ TLK is.
Finally, note that LK ⊆ LD, thus it suces to show the claim for LD.
The proof will use some of the constructions from chapter 2. Let T ∈ TD
be the type we want to realize and let N , v be some (not necessarily nite)
model realizing T . By the proof of Lemma 3.15, T is characterized by the
nite set M of minimal elements of LD \ T . Denote the maximal length of
any of the formulas inM , that is the number of DI in that formula, by r and
let k = r+2. By part ii) of Observation 2.8, there is some ordinal γ ≥ ω such
that the map r : N → Fγ(S) dened in Denition 2.7 is a bisimulation onto
its image, where S = {∅, {x}}. By a slight abuse of notation, we will identify
N, v with its image under r, that is we will assume that N, v ⊂ Fγ(S).
Let πk : Fγ(S) → Fk(S) be the projection sending every type t ∈ Fγ to
its initial segment of length k. Then dene M := {πk(x)|x ∈ N} and let
w := πk(v). Since M ⊆ Fk(S), we can turn M into a Kripke Model with
the equivalence relation induced by Fk(S). We claim that M, w realizes
T . First, we show that M, w 6 ϕ whenever N , v 6 ϕ To prove this, rst
note that for all ϕ ∈ LD of quantier depth at most k − 1 we have that
M, w  ϕ ⇔ N , v  ϕ. This follows by an induction over the quantier
depth of ϕ, see [54, Lemma 2.5.] for details. In particular, this implies
M, v 6 ϕ for all ϕ ∈M and thus alsoM, v 6 ψ for all ψ ∈ LD \ T , since for
every such ψ there is a ϕ ∈M with ψ → ϕ.
Next, we show the converse direction, N , v  ϕ ⇒ M, w  ϕ. By the
denition of the Kripke structures Fκ the map πk is a functional simulation,
that is f ∼i g for f ,g ∈ Fγ(S) implies that πk(f) ∼ki πk(g), where ∼i and
∼ki are the equivalence relations for agent i in Fγ(S) and Fk(S) respectively.
Thus, since LD only contains instances of positive knowledge, we get N , v 
ϕ→M, w  ϕ for all ϕ ∈ LD, thus nishing our proof. 
Remark: Alternatively we could have given a constructive proof of Theorem
3.19, giving an explicit construction of a model of M, w realizing T . This
construction is lengthy and slightly tedious, but basically straightforward.
Proof of Theorem 3.20. Let L1, L2 be as stated in the theorem and let
M, w be a nite Kripke Model realizing L1. To nd the desired event model,
we use a characterization result from [158]: For two multi-agent S5-models
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M′, s andM′′, t there is an event model E , e such that
M′, s⊕ E , e↔M′′, t
if and only if there is a total simulation fromM′′, t toM′, s.
Thus, it suces to construct a model N , v that realizes level L2 such
that there is a total simulation from N , v to M, w. Note again that L1
and L2 are completely determined by M(L1) and M(L2) respectively and
let k = maxx∈M(L1)(qd(x)) +maxx∈M(L2)(qd(x)) + 3, where qd(x) stands for
the quantier depth of x. To begin our construction of N , v, we construct a
nite tree T of height k with root v. In this tree, every node will be labeled
with a world fromM and every edge will be labeled with one of the agents.
We dene this tree inductively as follows:
- The root v is labelled with w
- To construct the rst level do the following: For every pair (i, x) where i
is an agent and x ∈M with wRix (where Ri is the equivalence relation
for agent i in M), add a new node and label it with x. Further, add
an edge between this new node and v and label it with i.
- Assume the l-th level has been constructed for 1 ≤ l < k. For every
vertex v in the l-th level do the following: Let iv be the label of the
edge connecting e to some edge in the l − 1st level and let mv be the
label of v. For every pair (j, x) where j is an agent and x a world with
xRjmv add a new node and a new edge from that node to v. Label the
node with x and the edge with j.
In the following we write l(v) for the label of some node v ∈ T . We turn
this tree T into a Kripke Model N in the following way: The accessibility
relations RNi are the equivalence relations generated by the edge labeling on
T . The valuation V N on N is generated by the valuation VM ofM by the
formula v ∈ V N (x) :⇔ l(v) ∈ VM(x). Now it is not dicult to see that the
labeling on N , i.e., the map l : N → M sending every v ∈ N to l(v) is a
functional and hence total simulation from (N , v) to (M, w). First, we note
that (N , v) also realizes L1, the level of knowledge ofM, w.
To see this, rst note that since l is a simulation, we have that N , v 6 ϕ
implies M, w 6 ϕ for all ϕ ∈ LK . For the converse direction, we introduce
the following notation: For ϕ ∈ LK of the form ϕ = Ki1 . . . Kirx let ϕ̄ =
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Li1 . . . Lir¬x, thus M, w 6 ϕ ⇔ M, w  ϕ̄. Note that for all ϕ ∈ M(L1),
with ϕ = Ki1 . . . Kirx, there is some sequence wRi1w1Ri2 . . . Rirwr in M
witnessing that M, w  ϕ̄. By the choice of k, the height of our tree, we
have r < k, thus there is a corresponding sequence vRi1v1Ri2 . . . Rirvr with
l(vi) = wi in N witnessing that N , v  ϕ̄. Therefore,M, w 6 ϕ implies that
N , v 6 ϕ for all ϕ ∈M(L1) and thus also for all ϕ ∈ LK .
Next, we thin out the tree T and thus the model N to a submodel N ′
such that (N ′, v) realizes L2. Before we do so, note that after removing any
set of nodes from N , the labeling function l still is a functional simulation
on whatever remains of N . Thus, we only have to ensure that our thinning
out is performed in such a way that (N ′, v) realizes L2. To do so let Ψ be
the set of all ϕ ∈ L2 of length at most k. For each ψ ∈ Ψ of the form
ψ = Ki1 . . . Kirx we do the following: If N , v 6 ψ there are some witnesses
for ψ̄ ∈ N , v, i.e., sequences of the form vRi1v1Ri2 . . . Rirvr with x 6∈ V N (x).
We remove all nodes v ∈ T that appear as a last node in any such sequence
for any ψ ∈ Ψ and call the resulting graph T #. We turn T # into a tree
by removing all connected components that do not contain v. We call the
resulting tree T ′ and the corresponding induced model N ′. Thus, we have
that N ′, v  ψ for every ψ ∈ Ψ. Next, we show that N ′, v  ϕ for all ϕ ∈ L2.
Assume not and assume that ψ is a counterexample. Since we have shown
this claim already for Ψ, we can assume that the quantier depth of ψ is
r > k. Let vRi1v1Ri2 . . . Rirvr be a witness that N ′, v  ϕ̄. Since r > k and
since T is a tree of height k, there are some l < j with vl = vj such that
vRi1v1 . . . RilvlRij . . . Rirvr (i.e., the string vl+1Rl+1 . . . Rj has been removed)
has length r′ ≤ k. This shortened sequence is a witness of the fact that
N ′, v 6 ϕ′, where ϕ′ = Ki1 . . . KilKij+1 . . . Kir , yet ϕ′ ∈ L2 since ϕ′  ϕ. But
this is an contradiction, since ϕ′ ∈ Ψ and we have already shown the claim
for Ψ.
Last, we show that N ′, v 6 ϕ for every ϕ ∈ LK \ L2. Again, it suces
to show this for ϕ ∈ M(L2). Let thus ϕ ∈ MLT2), say ϕ of the form
Kj1 . . . Kjsx. By our assumption we can pick some ψ ∈ M(T1) of the form
Ki1 . . . Kirx with ψ  ϕ and Kir = Kjs . Thus, by the denition of the order
, there is an increasing function f{1 . . . r} → {1, . . . s} witnessing that
there is an embedding form ψ to ϕ, that is Kir = Kjf(r) . Since Kir = Kjs ,
we can also assume that f(r) = s. Next, we dene an adjoint function
f̄ : f{1 . . . s} → {1, . . . r} sending every j to max{i ≤ r||f(i) ≤ s}. By
construction, there is some path p = vRi1v1Ri2 . . . Risvs in N witnessing that
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ψ 6∈ L1, that is vr 6∈ vN (x). Since ψ ∈ M(L1) we also have vi ∈ V N (x) for
i ≤ r. Now, let p′ = vRj1y1Ri2 . . . Rjsys be the sequence dened by yi = vf̄(i).
We claim that p′ is a path in T ′. First, we show the weaker claim that p′
is in T . To see this, observe that p′ was constructed by p by inserting some
reexive arrows into p, that is every segment yj−1Rijyj of p
′ either satises
yj−1 = yj or it is of the form vf̄(j)−1Rf̄(j)vf̄(j). In either case the associated
labels l(yj−1) and l(yj) satisfy l(yj−1)Rij l(yj) inM and thus p′ ∈ T . To see
that p′ is also in T ′, observe that ys−1 = vr−1 by our construction of f̄ , thus
yi ∈ V N (x) for all i < s, which implies that none of these yi got removed in
the transition from T to T ′. Since ϕ ∈M(L2), also yr did not get removed,
thus p′ ∈ T ′. Hence, N ′, v  ϕ̄ which nishes our proof.

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Chapter 4
Modeling Individual Expertise in
Group Judgments
4.1 Introduction
Groups frequently make judgments that are based on aggregating the opin-
ions of its individual members. A panel of market analysts at Apple or
Samsung may estimate the expected number of sales of a newly developed
cell phone. A group of conservation biologists may assess the population size
of a particular species in a specic habitat. A research group at the Euro-
pean Central Bank may evaluate the merits of a particular monetary policy.
Generally, such problems occur in any context where groups have to combine
various opinions into a single group judgment [for a review paper, see 40].
Even in cases of fully shared information, the assessment of the evidence
will generally vary among the agents and depend on factors such as profes-
sional training, familiarity with similar situations in the past, and personal
attitude toward the results. Thus, it will not come as a surprise that the
individual judgments may dier. But how shall they be aggregated?
Often, some group members are more competent than others. Recog-
nizing these experts may then become a crucial issue for improving group
performance. Research in social psychology and management science has
investigated the ability of humans to properly assess the expertise of other
group members in such contexts [26, 40, 100]. Most of this research stresses
that recognizing experts is no easy task: perceived and actual expertise need
not agree, data are noisy, questions may be too hard, and expertise dier-
This chapter is based on joint work with J. Sprenger. It is an extended version of [93].
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ences may be too small to be relevant [e.g., 113]. This motivates a compar-
ison of two strategies for group judgments: (i) deferring to the agent who
is perceived as most competent, and (ii) taking the straight average of the
estimates [78, 146]. The overall outcomes suggest that the straight average
is often surprisingly reliable, apparently being one of those fast and frugal
heuristics [66] that help boundedly rational agents to make cost-eective
decisions.
On the other hand, even if not explicitly recognized as such, experts
tend to exert greater inuence on group judgments than non-experts [26].
This motivates a principled epistemic analysis of the potential benets of
expertise-informed group judgments. We characterize conditions under which
dierentially weighted averages, fed by incomplete and perhaps distorted in-
formation on individual expertise, ameliorate group performance, compared
to a straight average of the individual judgments. Our paper approaches this
question from an analytical perspective, that is, with the help of a statisti-
cal model. We follow the social permutation approach [e.g., 24] and model
the agents as unique entities with dierent abilities. This diers notably
from more traditional social combination research where individual agents
are modeled as interchangeable [e.g., 44]. Our main result  that individual
expertise makes a robust contribution to group performance  is not without
surprise, given the generality of our conditions that also allow for pertur-
bations such as individual bias or correlations among the group members.
Therefore, our analytical results provide theoretical support to research on
the recognition of experts in groups [e.g., 14], and they directly relate to em-
pirical comparisons of dierentially weighted group judgments to composite
judgments, such as the group mean or median [25, 49, 81, 108].
Our work is also related to two other research streams. First, there is a
thriving epistemological literature on peer disagreement and rational consen-
sus, where consensus is mostly reached by deference to (perceived) experts.
However, this debate either focuses on social power and mutual respect re-
lations [e.g., 103], or on principled philosophical questions about resolving
disagreement [e.g., 50]. By means of a performance-focused mathematical
model, we hope to bring this literature close to its primary target: the truth-
tracking abilities of various epistemic strategies. There is also a vast literature
on group decisions preference and judgment aggregation [e.g., 112], but two
crucial features of our inquirythe aggregation of numerical values and the
particular role of expertsdo not play a major role in there.
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Second, there is a fast increasing body of literature on expert judgment
and forecasting, which has emerged from applied mathematics and statis-
tics and became a ourishing interdisciplinary eld. This strand of research
deals with the theoretical modeling of expert judgment, most notably the
(Bayesian) reconciliation of probability distributions [111], but it also in-
cludes more practical questions such as comparison of calibration methods,
choice of seed variables, analyses of the use of expert judgment in the past
[42], and the study of general forecasting principles, such as the benets of
opinion diversity [7, 126]. We dier from that approach in pooling individual
(frequentist) estimators instead of subjective probability distributions, but
we study similar phenomena, such as the impact of in-group correlations.
Admittedly, our baseline model is very simple, but due to this simplicity,
we are able to prove a number of results regarding the behavior of dieren-
tially weighted estimates under correlation, bias and benchmark uncertainty.
Here, our paper builds on analytical work in the forecasting and social psy-
chology literature [13, 83], following the approach of Einhorn et al. [49].
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: we begin with explain-
ing the model and stating conditions where dierentially weighted estimates
outperform the straight average (Sect. 4.2). In the sequel, we show that this
relation is often preserved even if bias or mutual correlations are introduced
(Sect. 4.3 and 4.4). Subsequently, we assess the impacts of over- and un-
dercondence (Sect. 4.5). Finally, we discuss our ndings and wrap up our
conclusions (Sect. 4.6).
4.2 The Model and Baseline Results
Our problem is to nd a good estimate of an unknown quantity µ. For
reasons of convenience, we assume without loss of generality that µ = 0.1
We model the group members' individual estimates Xi, i ≤ n, as inde-
pendent random variables that scatter around the true value µ = 0 with
variance σ2i . The Xi are unbiased estimators of µ, that is, they have the
property E[Xi] = µ. This baseline model is inspired by the idea that the
agents try to approach the true value with a higher or lower degree of pre-
cision, but have no systematic bias in either direction. The competence of
1Rewriting our results for the general case µ 6= 0 is just a matter of ane transfor-
mation, but comes with some notational baggage. Therefore we focus without loss of
generality on µ = 0.
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an agent is explicated as the degree of precision in estimating the true value.
No further assumptions on the distributions of the Xi are madeonly the
rst and second moments are xed.
To illustrate our assumptions further, it might be instructive to compare
our approach to the famous James-Stein estimator. This estimator, pre-
sented by James and Stein in their seminal 1961 paper [86], is a powerful
classical example for how dierential weights can improve upon the quality
of an estimator under quite general conditions. James and Stein treat the
case of estimating several, at least three, parameters pi at once. The only
information given about these parameters is a single draw wi from a normal
distribution centered around each parameter. These normal distributions are
all assumed to share the same variance. Notably, all pi are independent of
each other, thus one could naturally assume 〈w1, . . . , wn〉 to be the best esti-
mator for the vector 〈p1, . . . , pn〉. Surprisingly, James and Stein showed that
this is not true. There is some weighted average, the James-Stein estimator,
that always outperforms 〈w1, . . . , wn〉 as an estimator in terms of mean square
error. In its basic setting, the James-Stein estimator shares some properties
with ours. Also we deal with a vector of random draws, each taken from a
dierent distribution. However, all these distributions are centered around
the same parameter p. That is, they all share the same mean. We do, on the
other hand, allow our distributions to dier in their variances, mirroring the
varying degrees of expertise of the individual agents. In a certain sense, the
settings of both approaches are orthogonal to each other. While the James-
Stein estimator deals with a single judgment on many dierent, at least three,
variables at once, our case consists of an entire group of judgments about a
single variable. That is, both approaches need to make dierent types of
assumptions on the underlying estimator. As described above, the James-
Stein estimator assumes all distributions to share the same variance, while
in our case the distributions all need to be centered around the same mean.
Further, the weights in our approach only depend on the variances of the in-
dividual estimators, not on the outcomes of the random draw, and we allow
for any type of input distributions. In the James-Stein case, on the other
hand, the distributions all need to be normal and the weights depend upon
the outcomes of the random draw. Of course, our weaker assumptions come
at a price. While the James-Stein estimator is guaranteed to outperfom the
initial observation vector under any conditions, we merely aim to identify a
(broad) range of conditions under which dierential weighting fares better
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than straight averaging.
In our model, the question of whether the recognition of individual ex-
pertise is epistemically advantageous translates into the question of which
convex combination of the Xi, µ̂ :=
∑n
i=1 ciXi, outperforms the straight av-
erage µ̄ := 1
n
∑n
i=1Xi. Standardly, the quality of an estimate is assessed by
its mean square error (MSE) which can be calculated as
































Thus, naming the c∗i as the optimal weights is motivated by two independent
theoretical reasons:
1. As argued above, for independent and unbiased estimates Xi with vari-
ance σ2i , mean square error of the overall estimate is minimized by the




iXi. Thus, for a standard loss function,
the c∗i are indeed the optimal weights.
2. Even when the square loss function is replaced by a more realistic
alternative [76], the c∗i can still dene the optimal convex combination
of individual estimates. In that case, we require stronger distributional
assumptions.2
The problem with these optimal weights is that each agent's individual
expertise would have to be known in order to calculate them. Given all the
biases that actual deliberation is loaded with, e.g., ascription of expertise due
to professional reputation, age or gender, or bandwagon eects, it is unlikely
that the agents succeed at unraveling the expertise of all other group members
[cf. 7, 121].
Therefore, we widen the scope of our inquiry:
2Hartmann and Sprenger [76] prove the optimality of the c∗i for the case of normally
distributed independent and unbiased estimates with variance σ2i and the loss function
family Lα(x) = 1− exp(−x2/2α2). That paper also contains an elaborate justication for
choosing this family of loss functions.
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Question: Under which conditions will dierentially weighted
group judgments outperform the straight average?
A rst answer is given by the following result where the dierential weights
preserve the expertise ranking:
Theorem 4.1 (First Baseline Result). Let c1, . . . , cn > 0 be the weights of the
individual group members, that is,
∑n
i=1 ci = 1. Without loss of generality,








Then the dierentially weighted estimator µ̂ :=
∑n
i=1 ciXi outperforms the
straight average. That is, MSE(µ̂) ≤ MSE(µ̄), with equality if and only if
ci = 1/n for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
This result demonstrates that relative accuracy, as measured by pairwise
expertise ratios, is a good guiding principle for group judgments as long as
the relative weights are not too extreme.
The following result extends this nding to a case where the benets of
dierential weighting are harder to anticipate: we allow the ci to lie in the
entire [1/n, c∗i ] (or [c
∗
i , 1/n]) interval, allowing for cases where the ranking of
the group members is not represented correctly. One might conjecture that
this phenomenon adversely aects performance, but this is not the case:
Theorem 4.2 (Second Baseline Result). Let c1 . . . cn ∈ [0, 1] such that∑n
i=1 ci = 1. In addition, let ci ∈ [
1
n
; c∗i ] respectively ci ∈ [c∗i ; 1n ] hold for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then the dierentially weighted estimator µ̂ :=
∑n
i=1 ciXi
outperforms the straight average. That is, MSE(µ̂) ≤ MSE(µ̄), with equality
if and only if ci = 1/n for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Note that none of the baseline results implies the other one. The condi-
tions of the second result can be satised even when the ranking of the group
members diers from their actual expertise, and a violation of the second
condition (e.g., c∗i = 1/n and ci = 1/n+ ε) is compatible with satisfaction of
the rst condition. So the two results are really complementary.
We have thus shown that dierential weighting outperforms straight av-
eraging under quite general constraints on the individual weights, motivating
the eorts to recognize experts in practice. The next sections extend these
results to the presence of correlation and bias, thereby transferring them to
more realistic circumstances.
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4.3 Biased Agents
The rst extension of our model concerns biased estimates Xi, that is, esti-
mates that do not center around the true value µ = 0, but around Bi 6= 0.
We still assume that agents are honestly interested in getting close to the
truth, but that training, experience, risk attitude or personality structure
bias their estimates into a certain direction. For example, in assessing the
impact of industrial development on a natural habitat, an environmentalist
will usually come up with an estimate that signicantly diers from the es-
timate submitted by an employee of an involved corporationeven if both
are intellectually honest and share the same information.
For a biased agent i, the competence/precision parameter σ2i has to be re-
interpreted: it should be understood as the coherence (or non-randomness)
of the agent's estimates instead of the accuracy. This value is indicative of
accuracy only if the bias Bi is relatively small.
Under these circumstances, we can identify an intuitive sucient condi-
tion for dierential weighting to outperform straight averaging.
Theorem 4.3. Let X1, . . . , Xn be random variables with bias B1, . . . , Bn.
(a) Suppose that the ci in the estimator µ̂ =
∑n
i=1 ciXi satisfy one of the
conditions of the baseline results (i.e., either 1 ≤ ci/cj ≤ c∗i /c∗j or















Then dierential weighting outperforms straight averaging, i.e.,fMSE(µ̂) <
MSE(µ̄).



















Then dierential weighting does worse than straight averaging, that is,
MSE(µ̂) > MSE(µ̄).
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Intuitively, condition (4.3) states that the dierentially weighted bias is
smaller or equal than the average bias. As one would expect, this property
favorably aects the performance of the dierentially weighted estimator.
Condition (4.4) states, on the other hand, that if the dierence between the
mean square biases of the weighted and the straight average exceeds the
mean variance of the agents, then straight averaging performs better than
weighted averaging.
When the group size grows to a very large number, both parts of Theorem
4.3 collapse into a single condition, as long as the biases and variances are
both bounded. This is quite obvious since the last term of (4.4) is of the
order O(1/n). Theorem 4.3 applies in particular in the case where agents
are biased into the same direction and less biased agents make more coherent
estimates (that is, with smaller variance):
Corollary 4.4. Let X1, . . . , Xn, be random variables with bias B1, . . . , Bn ≥
0 such that ci ≥ cj implies Bi ≥ Bj (or vice versa for B1, . . . , Bn ≤ 0). Then,
with the same denitions as above:
• MSE(µ̄) ≥ MSE(µ̂).
• If there is a uniform group bias, that is, B := B1 = . . . = Bn, then
MSE(µ̄)−MSE(µ̂) is independent of B.
So even if all agents have followed the same training, or have been raised
in the same ideological framework, expertise recognition does not multiply
that bias, but helps to increase the accuracy of the group's judgment. In
particular, if there is a uniform bias in the group, the relative advantage of
dierential weighting is independent of the size of the bias. All in all, these
results demonstrate the importance of expertise recognition even in groups
where the members share a joint biasa nding that is especially relevant
for practice.
4.4 Independence Violations
We turn to violations of independence between the group members. Consider
rst the following fact that compares two groups with dierent degrees of
correlation:
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Fact 4.5. If 0 ≤ E [XiXj] ≤ E [YiYj] ∀i 6= j ≤ n and E [X2i ] = E [X2j ], then
both straight averaging and weighted averaging on Xi yield a lower mean
square error than the same procedures applied to Yi.
Fact 4.5 shows that less correlated groups perform better, ceteris paribus.
For practical purposes, this suggests that heterogeneity of a group is an
epistemic virtue since strong correlations between the agents are less likely
to occur, making the overall result more accurate [cf. 126].
Regarding the comparison of straight and weighted averaging, we can
show the following result:
Theorem 4.6. Let X1, . . . , Xn be unbiased estimators, that is, E [Xi] = µ =
0, and let the ci satisfy the conditions of one of the baseline results, with µ̂
dened as before. Let I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} be a subset of the group members with
the property
∀i, j ∈ I : ci ≥ cj ⇒ ∀k ∈ I, k 6= i, j : E [XjXk] ≥ E [XiXk] ≥ 0. (4.5)
(i) Correlation vs. Expertise If I = {1, . . . , n}, then weighted averaging
outperforms straight averaging, that is, MSE(µ̂) ≤ MSE(µ̄).












Then weighted averaging still outperforms straight averaging, that is,
MSE(µ̂) ≤ MSE(µ̄).
To fully understand this theorem, we have to clarify the meaning of con-
dition (4.5). Basically, it expresses that an expert i is less correlated with
any given group member k than a non-experts j.3
Once we have understood this condition, the rest is straightforward. Part
(i) states that if I equals the entire group, then dierential weighting has an
edge over averaging. That is, the benets of expertise recognition are not
oset by the perturbations that mutual dependencies may introduce. Ar-
guably, the generality of the result is surprising since condition (4.5) is quite
3Recall that E [Xi, Xk] ≤ E [Xj , Xk] can be rewritten as σi/σj ≤ ρjk/ρik with ρij
dened as the Pearson correlation coecient ρij := E [XiXj ]/σiσj . Also, if ci ≥ cj then
automatically σi ≤ σj .
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weak. Part (ii) states that dierential weighting is also superior whenever
there is no correlation with the rest of the group, and as long as the average
competence in the subgroup is lower than the overall average competence
(see equation (4.6)).
It is a popular opinion [e.g., 150] that correlation of individual judg-
ments is one of the greatest dangers for relying on experts in a group. To
some extent, this opinion is vindicated by Fact 4.5 in our model. However,
expertise-informed group judgments may still be superior to composite judg-
ments, as demonstrated by Theorem 4.6. The interplay of correlation and
expertise is subtle and not amenbale to broad-brush generalizations.
4.5 Over- and Undercondence
We now consider a specic family of ci's in order to study how group mem-
bers' self-assessment in terms of quality aects group performance as a whole,
modeled again as unbiased estimates Xi with variance σ2i .
Suppose that the group members have some idea of their own competence.
That is, they are able to position themselves in relation to a commonly
known benchmark : they are able to assess how much better or worse they
expect themselves to perform compared to a default agent, modeled as a
unbiased random variable with variance s2. Such a scenario may be plausible
when agents have a track record of their performance, or obtain performance
feedback. The agents then express how much weight they should ideally get
in a group of n− 1 default agents. Using equation 4.1, this ideal weight ci in
a group of benchmark agents (i.e. σ2j = s











s2 + (n− 1)σ2i
. (4.7)
Assume further that every agent uses the same benchmark, that these weights
also determine to what extent a group member compromises his or her own
position, and that decision-making takes place on the basis of the normalized
ci. It can then be shown (proof omitted) that the dierentially weighted
estimator µ̂ dened by equation (4.7) outperforms straight averagingin
fact, this is entailed by the Second Baseline Result (Theorem 4.2).
Here, we want to study how over- and underestimating the competence
of a default agent will aect group performance. Is it always epistemically
detrimental when the agents misguess the group competence?
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The answer is, perhaps surprisingly, no. To explain this result, we rst
observe that the less condence we have in the group (= s2 is large), the
more does the weighted average resemble the straight average. Recalling
equation (4.7), we note that all ci will be very close to 1. This implies that
the expertise-informed average will roughly behave like the straight average.
Conversely, if the group is perceived as competent (=small value of s),
then the ci will typically not be close to 1 such that dierential weights will
diverge signicantly from the straight average. This intuitive insight leads
to the following theorem:
Theorem 4.7. Let µ̂s2 and µ̂s̃2 be two weighted expertise-informed estimates
of µ, dened according to equation (4.7) with benchmarks s2 and s̃2, respec-
tively. Then MSE(µ̂s2) ≤ MSE(µ̂s̃2) if and only if s2 ≤ s̃2.
It can also be shown (proof omitted) that this procedure approximates the
optimal weights c∗i if the perceived group competence approaches perfection,
that is, s → 0. In other words, as long as the group members judge them-
selves accurately, optimism with regard to the abilities of the other group
members is epistemically favorable. On the other hand, overcondence in
one's own abilities relative to the group typically deteriorates performance.
4.6 Discussion
We have set up an estimation model of group decision-making in order to
study the eects of individual expertise on the quality of a group judgment.
We have shown that, in general, taking into account relative accuracy posi-
tively aects the epistemic performance of groups. Translated into our sta-
tistical model, this means that dierential weighting outperforms straight
averaging, even if the ranking of the experts is not represented accurately.
The result remains stable over several representative extensions of the
model, such as various forms of bias, violations of independence, and over-
and undercondent agents (Theorems 4.34.7). In particular, we demon-
strated that dierential weighting is superior (i) if experts are, on average,
less biased; (ii) for a group of uniformly biased agents; (iii) if experts are less
correlated with the rest of the group than other members. We also showed
that uniform overcondence in one's own abilities is detrimental for group
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performance whereas (over)condence in the group may be benecial. These
properties may be surprising and demonstrate the stability and robustness
of expertise-informed judgments, implying that the benets of recognizing
experts may oset the practical problems linked with that process.
Our model can in principle also be used for describing how groups actu-
ally form judgments. In that case, the involved tasks should neither be too
intellective (that is, there is a demonstrable solution) or too judgmental [101]:
in highly intellective tasks, group will typically not perform better than the
best individual (=the one who has solved the task correctly). This diers
from our model where any agent has only partial knowledge of the truth.
On the other hand, if the task is too judgmental, any epistemic component
will be removed and the individual weights may actually be based on the
centrality of a judgment, such as in Hinsz's (1999) SDS-Q scheme.
Finally, we name some distinctive traits of our model. First, unlike other
models of group judgments that are detached from the group members' indi-
vidual abilities [44, 47, 82, 103], it is a genuinely epistemic model, evaluating
the performance of dierent ways of making a group judgment.4 Thus, our
model can be used normatively, for supporting the use of dierential weights
in group decisions, but also descriptively, for tting the results of group de-
cision processes.
Second, we did not make any specic distributional assumptions on how
the agents estimate the target value. Our assumptions merely concern the
rst and second moment (bias and variance). We consider this parsimony
a prudent choice because those distributions will greatly vary in practice,
and we do not have epistemic access to them. Classical work in the social
combination literature makes much more specic distributional assumptions
(e.g., the multinomial distributions in Thomas and Fink 1961 and Davis
1973), restricting the scope of that analysis.
Third, we are not aware of other analytical models that take into account
important confounders such as correlation, bias and over-/undercondent
agents. Thus, we conclude that our model makes a substantial contribution
to understanding the epistemic benets of expertise in group judgments.
4Lehrer and Wagner also defend their model from a normative point of view, but their
arguments for this claim are not particularly persuasive, see e.g., Martini et al. [114].
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4.7 Appendix: Proofs
We will need the following inequalities repeatedly in the subsequent proofs.




















again with equality if and only if c1 = . . . = cn. Both inequalities are special
cases of the Power Mean Theorem [cf. 165, 258].
For the First Baseline Result, we need the following:
Lemma 4.8. Let k < n and let (c1, . . . , cn) be a sequence such that
(1)
∑n
i=1 ci = s for some s > 0 and all ci are positive;
(2) c1 = . . . = ck and ck+1 = . . . = cn;














Furthermore, we show that under the above conditions (i.e.
∑n
i=1 ci = s), the








Proof of Lemma 4.8. Fix r such that
• ci = sn −
r
k
for i ≤ k
• ci = sn +
r
n−k for i > k.
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Now the left hand side of the above equation is a quadratic function in r






































Now this is a function of the form kx−a
x+b
with a, b > 0. Since these functions
























(σ − 1)σk+1k(n− k)
σk+1((n− k)σ + k)
.



















(σ − 1)k(n− k)
(n− k)− σk
.
In particular r < r0, nishing the proof of (4.10). For the last statement of
Lemma 4.8, observe that the left hand side of (4.10) is a quadratic function
with minimum 1
2
r0, and that r ≤ 12r0. 
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Proof of Theorem 4.1. By assumption the ci are ordered increasingly,
thus the σi are ordered decreasingly. For a vector of weights w ∈ Rn (i.e. all
wi positiv and
∑
iwi = 1), we denote the mean square error of the estimator∑




Thus for c = (c1 . . . cn) as in the theorem we have to show Ψ(c) ≤ Ψ(e),
where e is the equal weight vector ( 1
n
, . . . , 1
n
). To this end we will construct
a sequence of weight vectors e = d0, . . . ,dn−1 = c such that
(i) each di satises the assumptions of Theorem 1;
(ii) for di = (d1 . . . dn), there is some k ∈ N such that
d1 = . . . = dk and d1 > c1; . . . ; dk > ck;
dj = cj for k < j ≤ k + i (where i is the index of di);
dk+i+1 = . . . = dn and dk+i+1 ≤ ck+i+1; . . . ; dn ≤ cn;
(iii) Ψ(di−1) ≥ Ψ(di).
Thus di−1 = c and Ψ(c) ≤ Ψ(e) as desired. The di are constructed induc-
tively as follows: Assume di−1 = (d′1 . . . d
′
n) has already been constructed. If
i = 1 let k be the unique index such that ck < 1n and ck+1 ≥
1
n
. If i > 1 let k
be as in the above conditions for di−1. First note that if k = 0, then d′j ≤ cj
for all j and thus di−1 = c since both are weight vectors and we are done.
Thus assume k ≥ 1 for the rest of the proof. With a similar argument, we
can show that k + i+ 1 ≤ n. Now choose the maximal r ∈ R that satises
d′k − ck ≥
r
k
ck+i+1 − d′k+i+1 ≥
r
n− k − i− 1
. (4.12)
By the above conditions, r ≥ 0. Then dene di = (d1, . . . , dn) by
• dj = d′j − rk for j ≤ k;
• dj = cj for k < j ≤ k + i;
• dj = d′j + rn−k−i−1 for j ≥ k + i+ 1.
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To see that di satises conditions (i)-(iii), rst note that since r was chosen
to be maximal, one of the two inequalities in (4.12) has to be an equality.

















n− k − i− 1
= 1.
Using that the ci are ordered increasingly, it is easy to see that di satises
the assumptions of Theorem 4.1. Furthermore, applying the monotonicity











i . Thus Ψ(di) ≤ Ψ(di−1) since di−1 and di coincide
outside I. This nishes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 4.2. We would like to show that the mean square
error of the straight average µ̄ := (1/n)
∑n
i=1Xi exceeds the mean square
error of the weighted estimate µ̂. The MSE dierence can be calculated as




























(cf. equation (4.1)). Thus, instead of considering ∆, it suces to show that









To this end, let Ii := [1/n; c∗i ] (respectively [c
∗
i ; 1/n]) and letQ := I1×. . .×In.
Then,








c2i is a positive determinate quadratic form in the ci, we get that
∆′−1([0;∞)) is convex. Thus, it suces to show that ∆′ is positive on the
vertices of D. Note that since {x|
∑
xi = 1} is of dimension n − 1, the ver-
tices of D are of the form v = (c∗1, . . . , c∗k−1, ck, 1/n, . . . , 1/n)  the ordering
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is assumed for convenience, and ck is dened such that ||v||1 = 1. Thus we
have to show that ∆′(c∗1, . . . , c
∗
k−1, ck, 1/n, . . . , 1/n) ≥ 0.
In the case k = 1, the desired inequality holds trivially since ck = 1 −
(n− 1) · (1/n) = 1/n. Thus we assume k > 1 for the remainder of this proof.







Observe that for ci = 1n the corresponding summands in ∆
′ vanish. Thus we









































Since the ci add up to one, we can express the dependency between l and ck
by
ck =
(k − 1)(1− l) + 1
n




Inserting this into (4.13) gives






n(k − 1)− 1
c∗k













(1 + l)n− l
c∗k
((1− l)(k − 1) + 2)
)]
.
Since the rst factor is always positive, it suces to show that the factor in
the square brackets, denoted by P (l), is positive for every l that can occur
in our setting. We do this by a case distinction on the value of c∗k.
Case 1: c∗k ≤ 1/n. Noting ck ∈ [c∗k, 1n ] and the dependency (4.14) between
l and ck, we have to show that P (l) ≥ 0 for all l ∈ [1;
k−nc∗k
k−1 ]. We observe that
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P is a polynomial of third order with zero points of P given by P (1) = 0 and
r± =
k + 1− nc∗k ±
√
(k + 1− nc∗k)2 − 4(k − 1)c∗kn
2(k − 1)
with r+ denoting the larger of these two numbers. With some algebra it also
follows that P ′(1) ≥ 0 if and only if ck∗ ≤ 1/n. From the functional form of
P (l)  a polynomial of the third degree with negative leading coecient  we
can then infer that l = 1 must be the middle zero point of P . To prove that
P (l) ≥ 0 in the critical interval, it remains to show that for the rightmost











k + 1− c∗kn+
√
(k + 1− nc∗k)2 − 4(k − 1)c∗kn
2(k − 1)
⇔k − 1− nc∗k ≤
√
(k + 1− nc∗k)2 − 4(k − 1)c∗kn
⇔c∗kn ≤1
completing the proof for the case ck∗ ≤ 1/n.
Case 2: ck∗ ≥ 1/n. In this case we are dealing with the interval l ∈
[
k−nc∗k
k−1 ; 1]. The same calculations as above yield
k − nc∗k
k − 1
≥ r+ if and only if c∗kn ≥ 1,
in particular r+ < 1. Thus l always lies between the middle and the rightmost
zero point of P (l), and in particular, P (l) ≥ 0 for all l ∈ [k−nc
∗
k
k−1 ; 1]. 
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Let the Xi center around Bi > 0. Then E [Xi −
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Like in Theorem 4.2, we dene ∆(c1, . . . , cn) := MSE(µ̄) −MSE(µ̂) as the
dierence in MSE between both estimates and show that ∆(c1, . . . , cn) ≥ 0
if equation (4.3) is satised.













)2 − (∑ni=1 ciBi)2 .
By Theorem 4.1 and/or Theorem 4.2, the rst line is greater or equal to
zero, and by equation (4.3), the second line is also non-negative. Thus
∆(c1, . . . , cn) ≥ 0, showing the superiority of dierential weighting.

















Proof of Lemma 4.4. It is easy to see that the conditions of the corollary
satisfy the requirements of part (a) of Theorem 4.3. This yields the desired
result for the rst part of the theorem. For the second part, let the Xi all































Therefore, under the conditions of the theorem,











showing that ∆ only depends on the centered estimates. 
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E [YiYj] ≥ 0.
The proof exploits that Xi and Yi have the same variance, thus E [X2i ] =
E [Y 2i ]. The proof for dierential weights is similar, making use of the fact
that the ci are the same for Xi and Yi because they only depend on the
variance of the random variable. 
Proof of Theorem 4.6, part (i). First, assume without loss of general-
ity that ci ≥ ci+1 for all i < n. Thus, our assumption on the E [XiXj] reduces
to E [XiXk] ≤ E [XjXk] for i ≥ j 6= k. First, we show the theorem under
the assumption that all E [XiXj] with i 6= j are equal, say E [XiXj] = γ. By












cicj E [XiXj] ≥ 0.


















under the constraints x1, . . . , xn ≥ 0 and
∑
























= 1 and combining this equality





















4.7. APPENDIX: PROOFS 95
thus proving the statement in the case that all E [XiXj] are the same.
For the general case let us assume that not all ci are the same (otherwise
the theorem is trivially true). Thus we either have c1 > cn−1 or c2 > cn since
the ci are ordered decreasingly. In the following, we assume c2 > cn, the










cicj E [XiXj] .
Thus, we can concentrate on {E [XiXj]|i > j}. We x a natural number c
and let Sc be the set of all vectors (E [XiXj])(i>j) fullling the conditions of
our theorem and
∑





























on Sc. Observe that every Sc contains exactly one point eeq where all E [XiXj]
are equal. By the rst part of this proof, ϕ̃(eeq) is non-negative. Thus, it suf-
ces to show that eeq is an absolute minimum of ϕ̃ on Sc. First, observe that





j<i E [Xi, Xj] is constantly
c
n2







cicj E [XiXj] (4.18)
attains its maximum on Sc in eeq.
To do so, we show the following: For every e ∈ Sc with e 6= eeq there is
some e′ ∈ Sc with ϕ(e′) > ϕ(e). In particular, ϕ does not take its maximum
on Sc in e. Thus assume that e = (E [XiXj])(i>j) ∈ Sc is given. Since e 6= eeq
there are some indices s > t and k > l such that E [XsXt] 6= E [XkXl].
Furthermore, we can assume that t ≥ l. Without loss of generality (by
potentially replacing one of the two entries with E [XsXl]) we can assume
that either s = k or t = l. In the following we assume s = k, the other
case works similarly. The idea of the following construction is: We show that
moving towards a more equal distribution of the entries E [XiXj] increases
ϕ(e). In particular, we construct e′ = (E ′[XiXj])(i>j) ∈ Sc as follows: In
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every row ri := 〈E [XiX1] . . . E [XiXi−1]〉 of e we replace all the entries of this
































In particular e′ is in Sc. Furthermore, we have assumed that the ci are
ordered decreasingly. Recall that ck > cj implies E [XiXk] ≤ E [XiXj] by
assumption, therefore the rows ri were ordered increasingly, and thus the
rows of e′ − e:
E ′[Xi, X1]− E [XiX1]; . . . ; E ′[Xi, Xi−1]− E [XiXi−1]
are ordered decreasingly (since the rows of e′ are constant). In particular, we




E ′[XiXj]− E [XiXj] ≤
∑
j<i
cicj(E ′[XiXj]− E [XiXj]) (4.19)
where the ≤ comes from the fact that both cj and E ′[XiXj] − E [XiXj] are












cicj (E ′[XiXj]− E [XiXj]) = ϕ(e′)− ϕ(e).









(E ′[XsXj]− E [XsXj]) + E ′[XsXt]− E [XsXt] + E ′[XsXl]− E [XsXl]
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with both,∑
j<s,j 6=t,l
E ′[XsXj]− E [XsXj] ≤
∑
j<s,j 6=t,l
cscj (E ′[XsXj]− E [XsXj])
and
E ′[XsXt]− E [XsXt] + E ′[XsXl]− E [XsXl]
≤ csct(E ′[XsXt]− E [XsXt]) + cscl(E ′[XsXl]− E [XsXl]).
By construction we have E [XsXt] 6= E [XsXl], thus we would have a strict
inequality in the last summand (and thus in the entire sum) if we knew that
ct 6= cl. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. However, we have put
ourselves in a situation where applying the same construction again with
E ′[X2X1] and E ′[XnX1] replacing E [XsXt] and E [XsXl] yields the desired
(since we have assumed that c2 > cn). To see this, observe that
• E [X2X1] = E ′[X2X1] by construction
• E ′[XsX1] > E [XsX1] since E [XsXt] 6= E [Xs, Xl] and E [XsX1] is the
minimal element in the row rs
• E [X2X1] ≤ E [XsX1] by assumption.
Thus we have
E ′[X2X1] = E [X2X1] ≤ E [XsX1] < E ′[XsX1] ≤ E ′[XnX1].
By assumption we have c2 > cn and repeating the construction from above
with columns replacing rows and E ′[X2, X1], E ′[Xn, X1] as the two reference
points yields the desired.
Proof of Theorem 4.6, part (ii): We have to show that the statement
holds if all E [XiXj] with i 6= j ∈ I are the same. The step from this case to
the general statement works as in the proof above. As in the proof of i), it
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Let c̄ = 1|I|
∑


























with the last inequality coming from our assumption that c̄ < 1.
Proof of Theorem 4.7: Let the benchmark agent have standard deviation
s > 0, that is, variance s2. We will show that ∆(s, σ1, . . . , σn)the MSE
dierence between the dierentially weighted and the straight averageis
strictly monotonically decreasing in the rst argument. To this eect, we
calculate














Now we show that ∂
∂s
∆(s, σ1, . . . , σn) ≤ 0, where c′i denotes (∂/∂)sci:
∂
∂s
































































3 < 0 , it suces to show that(





We show that the terms in both brackets have the same sign.
For the rst bracket we have:
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which is larger than or equal to 0 if and only if σ2i > σ
2
j . Similarly, we observe
for the second bracket that
c′i =
2(n− 1)sσ2i
(s2 + (n− 1)σ2i )2
.


















Thus, both factors in (4.20) have the same sign, implying ∂
∂s
∆(s, σ1, . . . , σn) ≤
0 which is want we wanted to prove. 
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Chapter 5
Expressive Voting: Modeling a
Voter's Decision to Vote
5.1 Introduction
Elections are a central element of group decision making. It is voting that
creates the link between a myriad of individual preferences, opinions and
interests and the actions and decisions of the community. Given this im-
portance of voting, it is not surprising that electoral patterns and behavior
became a major topic of interest for political commentators and social scien-
tists. Arguably, understanding and even predicting voting patterns is one of
the central competences for navigating the political sphere. There is hardly
any political action that won't be related to past or future elections by at
least some commentators. Unsurprisingly, the most intense phase of such
public attentions occurs right before and after any election day. When open-
ing a newspaper the day after any major election, one of the main questions
to be found will be Why did people vote the way they did? The question
of why people vote the way they do has attracted the attention of many dif-
ferent elds, history, psychology, philosophy, political science and lately also
computer science, using experimental, empirical and theoretical work.
Anthony Downs, in his seminal book [48], has focused on a slightly dier-
ent question: Why do people vote at all? In a large election, so the argument
of his paradox of voting, there is almost no chance that an individual action
will have any eect on the outcome. Thus, if any cost is associated with the
A version of this paper is currently under review. Parts of this chapter are based on
joint work with E. Pacuit, see [92] for a related article
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act of voting, the only rational choice1 for a voter is not to participate in
the election. However, there is a second approach, prominently put forward
by Georey Brennan and Loren Lomasky [32], that avoids the paradox of
voting. In many cases, so they argue, we choose some option not because
it maximizes our immediate expected outcomes, but because it is ethically
correct, fair, polite, or coheres in some other way with some ideals we follow
or want to follow. That is, we derive our utility not from the immediate
outcomes of our actions, but from the fact that the actions or utterances
themselves are in accord with certain principles we value.2 Brennan and Lo-
masky argue that this reasoning particularly applies to voting considerations
in political elections. Many decisions in the political realm reect value judg-
ments, for instance by depending upon a particular conception of fairness,
siding with some particular camp or being sensitive to other ethical consid-
erations. Consequentially, so Brennan and Lomasky, a typical voter derives
her utility straight from the act of voting for a certain alternative, and thus
the paradox of voting does not arise. Rather than considering the dierent
possible outcomes, the only requirement of rationality for an expressive voter
is to truthfully report her preferred alternative.
The main dierence between these two approaches is the agents' ultimate
goals, i.e., their source of utility. Downs holds that voters draw their utility
from the outcome of an election, while Brennan and Lomasky argue that
the agents derive their utility already from expressing their preferences. To
introduce a bit of terminology, we refer to the rst type of voting behavior,
considering the outcome of an election, as instrumental voting, while call-
ing the second type of voting behavior, attaching utilities to statements of
preferences, expressive voting.
Both of these theories are primarily normative, informing a rational voter
what she should ideally do. They do, however, have some descriptive backing.
Brennan and Lomasky show [32, pp. 40-46] that actual voting behavior is best
explained by a superposition of instrumental and expressive considerations,
where the weights given to the two accounts depend upon various factors such
as, for instance, the stakes involved or how close the election is expected to
1In the sense that taking into account the cost of the act of voting, the expected utility
of voting for a preferred candidate (or set of candidates) will be negative.
2Of course, all these options do maximize expected utility in a broader sense. However
as Sen in [143] or Nozick's discussion of sunk cost [123] show, these actions can only be
maximizing if we attach utility to the fact of adhering to certain norms and principles.
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be. Crucially, the two accounts will, in general, give divergent advice, about
whom to vote for, but also about whether or not to participate in the election
at all. To give a prominent example, strategic voting, misrepresenting one's
true preferences for tactical reasons, is a major topic in instrumental voting
[138], whereas an expressive analysis will always advice voters to represent
their preferences truthfully. Given that voters will resort to both types of
considerations, expressive as well as instrumental, a suitable approach for
analyzing voting situations or comparing dierent electoral systems is to
start by analyzing these from both standpoints, in order to later compare
and combine these ndings.
While instrumental accounts of voting have been thoroughly explored
within the (formal) literature on voting, the expressive side has received con-
siderably less attention yet. In this chapter, we will explore a formal model
for expressive voting. Notably, there are two recent papers on expressive
voting that we will refer to in our analysis. In both, the electoral decision
is based on an agenda of topics the voters care about. This agenda can
reect anything of importance for the voters, ranging from a general liberal-
conservative distinction to particular topics such as whether or not to bail
out the car industry or to go to war in Syria. Candidates or parties merely
serve as proxies for the dierent attitudes towards the agenda items they
stand for. A candidate is associated with her position on each of the agenda
items and the voters evaluate the candidates by these positions.
In the rst paper, [6], Enriqueta Aragones, Itzhak Gilboa and Andrew
Weiss discuss the question on whether to vote or not from an expressive
standpoint. In their approach, abstentions are not caused by any factors
external to the election. Rather, abstaining expresses the fact that, given
all available alternatives, an empty ballot sheet best expresses the voter's
preferences. Aragones et al. discuss dierent voting systems, in particular
majority rule and approval voting, with respect to their ability to prevent
an expressive voter from abstaining. That is, they study the potential of
each system to oer some option that is more attractive than submitting an
empty ballot sheet.
In the second paper, [46], Walter Dean and Rohit Parikh study the dy-
namics of expressive voting. In their account, candidates have not yet pub-
licly committed to a unique position on the agenda. Rather, they are ponder-
ing when, how and whether to commit on the remaining topics, depending
on the voters preference and their attitude towards uncertainty. The decision
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about whether or not to commit on any given topic will, in general, depend
upon factors such as competing candidates, the distribution of voter prefer-
ences, but also how benevolent voters are in lling out informational gaps or
how they revise their belief in light of newly incoming evidence. In particular
the last topic relates the analysis of voting behavior to existing debates in
belief revision and the appropriate rules thereof.
The goal of this chapter is to explore and discuss a formal framework of
expressive voting, based on an agenda of topics. We will be mainly inter-
ested in two aspects, participation and dynamics. The rst of these topics,
participation, frequently arises in the comparison of dierent voting systems.
The choice between dierent voting systems, such as plurality vote or ap-
proval voting, is guided by a variety of aspects, including their simplicity,
their propensity to create stable outcomes,3 their adequacy or their propen-
sity to foster electoral participation. For this chapter, we will restrict our
attention to the latter of these, that is, we are interested in analyzing the
phenomenon of abstentions within expressive voting. Our second topic of
interest, next to participation, is the dynamic patterns occurring within vot-
ing behavior. Voters' preferences and opinions are not carved in stone, but
they gradually develop over time, taking into account political and economic
developments, but also reacting to public debates or campaigning eorts of
the dierent sides. Here, we are interested in how far such dynamic patterns
can be represented within a formal framework for expressive voting.
To be a bit more precise, we will make three main contributions in this
chapter, to be found in sections 5.3, 5.5 and 5.6 respectively. The latter
two of these refer to the two aspects identied above, participation and dy-
namics. The rst is an internal critique of the framework of Aragones et
al. The core idea of our framework rests on their model presented in [6]
that we are highly sympathetic towards. We hold, however, that it has a
crucial conceptual shortcoming in its treatment of approval voting. Our rst
contribution will be to identify that shortcoming in section 5.3 and oer an
alternative semantics of approval voting in the subsequent section 5.4 that
does not fall to the same criticism. To strengthen our approach, we will show
that it is compatible with three dierent choice rules the agents might en-
tertain. Our second contribution then, to be found in section 5.5, is related
to the participation in elections. Expanding on previous work by [6], we will
3This criterion is especially relevant for parliamentary elections where the resulting
parliament has to agree upon an ideally stable government.
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study the occurrence of abstentions in three dierent voting systems, plural-
ity vote, approval voting and range voting. Considering the extreme cases
of completely strategically positioned parties on the one hand and randomly
distributed parties on the other, we will show that the latter two voting
systems, approval and range voting, are exponentially better than plurality
voting in avoiding abstentions. Finally, our third contribution in section 5.6
is related to the dynamics of electoral campaigns. Beyond their positions
on the individual topics, the decisions of individual voters crucially depend
upon which topics they focus on when casting their vote. If public debate
is centered around the economy, many voters will think of the economically
relevant agenda items when making their decision. Conversely, if foreign pol-
icy receives a lot of public attention, voters will heavily rely on their stances
towards the European debt crisis or going to war in making their decision.
Consequentially, dierent interest groups will aim to amend public focus in
their respective interests. In section 5.6 we present a conceptual framework
that allows to model focus and changes in focus brought about by public
events. Further, we will explore some of the diculties and subtleties aris-
ing when parties try to inuence public focus in their own interest. Finally,
we oer a conclusion and some directions of future work in section 5.7. All
proofs and calculations are in the appendix.
5.2 The Model
In this section we present our basic model for elections. This model is bor-
rowed from [6], hence we will refer to it as the AGW-model. The central
object of study is the agenda of topics or issues of concern for the upcoming
election, denoted by I = {1 . . . n}. We assume the agenda items to be propo-
sitions, such as There should be stricter gun control or European states
should vouch for each other in the debt crisis, that the individual parties
and candidates can either endorse or oppose to various degrees. Second, we
denote the set of parties or candidates by T = {1 . . .m}. Each party j ∈ T is
characterized by its positions on the various issues of concern I = {1, . . . , n}.
To this end, each party j ∈ T is associated with a vector pj ∈ [−1; 1]n giving
j's positions on each of the issues. The intended reading is that pji ∈ [−1; 1]
is the degree to which candidate j supports issue i, where +1 stands for total
support and −1 for total opposition to the topic in question. Just as in [6], we
assume that parties have extreme positions on all topics, that is pji ∈ {−1; 1}.
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Briey, there are two dierent justications for this assumption. First, [6]
argue that political discourse moves parties to extreme positions. In an at-
tempt to position themselves on the political scale and to stand out from their
opponents they will nally have to commit to a clear position on each topic.
Second, parties are identied with the policies they would enact, if elected.
We assumed the individual agenda items to be propositional, thus these items
can only be enacted or non-enacted. Of course, a party could breach some
of their promises and act dierently to what they claimed prior to the elec-
tion day. Yet, any policy implemented will either enact some agenda item
i or not, there is no space for a middle ground. Thus, there is no space for
graded judgments, but parties will eventually have to decide for or against
implementing any particular item on the agenda. As for parties, also each
voter is represented by a vector v ∈ [−1; 1]n, representing her position on
the various topics. Note that we do allow voters to have positions anywhere
in [−1; 1] in order to allow for uncertainty about the right course of action
or to display varying degrees of interest in the dierent topics.4 The only
case we exclude are universally disinterested voters, thus we assume v 6= 0.
For notational convenience, we will use p with decorations to denote parties
or candidates, where v with all its variants denotes voters. Bold letters will
always refer to vectors, while their entries are denoted in italics, for example
v = (v1 . . . vn).
Last, we dene a ballot, i.e., the possible votes a voter can cast. For
our purposes, we represent each ballot by a vector x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Rm+ ,
where the zero vector 0 ∈ Rm+ denotes abstention. More precisely, each vot-
ing system consists of a set of admissible ballots F ⊂ Rm+ together with an
aggregation rule for these feasible values. The two voting methods considered
in AGW are:
4The rationale behind this denition is the following: Let's assume that a voter is given
by two vectors, u ∈ [0; 1]n and b ∈ [0; 1]n. The rst of these, u, denotes the importance
the voter attaches to each topic; the second ,b, her beliefs about the right action. Thus
if bi = 1 or bi = 0 the agent is certain that the proposition representing agenda item
i needs to be made true or wrong respectively, whereas bi = 0.5 stands for maximal
uncertainty. If we assume that each agent gets a payo of ui or −ui if proposition i later
turns out to be the right policy or not, the expected value of implementing policy t is
exactly (2bt − 1)ut ∈ [−1; 1]. Thus, we could assume a voter's position v ∈ [−1; 1]n to
reect the vector 〈(2b1 − 1)u1, . . . (2bn − 1)un〉, the product of her uncertainty and her
attachment of relative importance to the topics.
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Plurality rule: Each voter selects a single candidate, and the candi-
date with the most votes is declared the winner. Thus, the feasible
ballots are FM = {0} ∪ {ej}j≤m, where ej is the vector with 1 in the
jth position and 0 everywhere else, denoting that the voter supports
candidate pj.
Approval Voting: Voters select any subset J of the candidates they
approve of. Again, the candidate receiving most approval wins the
election. Thus, the set of ballots are
FA =
{





where the ej are again the vectors having a 1 as jth component and
a 0 everywhere else. With other words, xJ is the vector with a 1 for
every party the voter approves of and a zero everywhere else.
Obviously there are more ballots available to voters under approval voting
than plurality rule (i.e., FM ⊆ FA), thus within expressive voting abstentions
should be less frequent than in the former framework.
Next, we, need to determine how an expressive voter should choose among
the possible ballots. Rather than determining some particular utility-function
u : F → R, we give a condition that every reasonable payo function should
satisfy and that is sucient to determine the voter's choice. This principle is
that a voter will prefer a party that is closer to her own position to a party
that is further away. To make this precise, we measure distances in [−1; 1]n
in the euclidean distance: dist(x, y) =
√∑
(xi − yi)2, or equivalently in the
2-norm | · |2, which leads [6] to dene the following choice rules:
Under plurality rule, the voter v votes for the candidate that is closest
to her or abstains if the empty ballot 0 is closer than any of the
candidates. With other words, she chooses the ballot xm ∈ FM which
is closest to her own standpoint in the euclidean distance. Formally
speaking, this can be expressed in the following sum:









to pj if v votes for pj and 0 if v abstains. For approval voting, we need to
extend the above rule to approval ballots. In particular, we need to specify
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p1 = (−1,−1,−1) p3 = (1,−1,−1)








Table 5.1: In approval voting the approval set {2, 4, 5} gets represented by
the arithmetic mean of its members.
how the voters compare dierent approval sets. To this end [6] represent
every approval set xJ with its arithmetic mean5 1|J |
∑
j∈J p
j, see table 5.1 for
illustration. This leads to the following decision rule:
Under approval voting, the voter v chooses the ballot xa ∈ FA which
is closest to her own standpoint in the euclidean distance, or formally







We end this paragraph with a brief overview of the main results of [6].
Their analysis is centered around the question: When do people vote? Note
that in our framework a voter only abstains if the corresponding position
vector 0 is closer to her than any other possible ballot. That is, abstentions
are not caused by external cost, as in Down's analysis, but by the fact that
the voter fails to nd any alternative that is more appealing. The central
results of [6] compare the two voting systems with respect to their potential of
generating a high degree of electoral involvement, measured by the number
of abstentions. Since the possible ballots in approval voting form a strict
5To facilitate our presentation, we set 1|∅|
∑
j∈∅ p
j := 0, thus the empty approval set is
represented by the zero-vector.
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superset of the ballots in plurality voting, we can expect an increased electoral
participation within approval voting. This intuition is made precise in the
following theorems:
Theorem 5.1 (Theorem 1 of [6]). i) Under approval voting 4 strategically
positioned parties are enough to ensure that no voter abstains
ii) Under plurality vote, the number of parties necessary to ensure that no
voter abstains is exponential in the number n of agenda items.
Theorem 5.2 (Theorem 2 of [6]). Assume the agenda exists of n topics and
we randomly place n parties on this agenda (i.e., for every party we have a
fair lottery of the 2n possible positions). As n → ∞, the probability that a
voter abstains in this setting goes to 1 under plurality rule and to 0 under
approval voting.
5.3 Criticism of the AGW Approach
In this section, we identify two conceptual shortcomings of the AGW treat-
ment of approval voting. These shortcomings will then motivate our alter-
native account, presented in the following section. First, we note that voting
systems such as plurality vote or approval voting can be used in various
settings. The dierent voting systems can be used in single winner elec-
tions, such as the French or American presidential elections or they could be
applied to the French or German Parliamentary elections, that is, many win-
ner elections in which the winners that make it to parliament subsequently
have to enter coalitions if they want to be part of government.6 In their
paper, AGW were silent about any intended interpretation. We will show
two things here. First, that the general framework developed in [6] deci-
sively rests on intuitions from single winner elections and, second, that the
account of approval voting outlined in the last section additionally assumes
certain features of multi-winner elections that are irreconcilable with these
single-winner elements.
As a second shortcoming, we will identify an internal consistency require-
ment for expressive voting, violated by the AGW approach. This requirement
6Yet other systems, for instance the rst past the post system used in British parlia-
mentary elections, are situated between these two extremes. We hold that for the aspects
relevant for our analysis, they are closer to multi-winner systems such as the German or
French parliamentary elections.
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refers to the very special case in which the entire electorate happens to share
the same position about every item on the agenda. We show that even under
such ideal conditions, the above rule for approval voting cannot guarantee
that the voters are comfortable with the outcome. Even worse, we show that
under these ideal conditions applied to a single winner election, the AGW
approach can bring the least preferred candidate into oce.
For our rst criticism, we will show that the treatment of approval voting
presented in the previous chapter rests on incoherent assumptions about the
nature of the voting situation. On the one hand, we will demonstrate that
some of the central assumptions made for the general framework implicitly
need to assume the election to be based on a single-winner scenario. On the
other hand, we will show that the semantics assumed for approval voting
rests on some intuitions coming from multi-winner elections. We will deal
with these points in reverse order, starting with the particular semantics for
approval voting and then continuing with the assumptions underlying the
general framework.
We start our discussion of approval voting by analyzing the AGW pro-
posal in a bit more detail. Their decision rule suggests that a voter should
vote for that subset J0 of candidates for which the corresponding arithmetic
mean x0 = 1|J0|
∑
j∈J0 e








That is, in order to determine her approval of some nonempty set I of candi-
dates, the voter calculates the straight average of the parties' stances. Or to
put it dierently: She composes a virtual coalition of the dierent parties in
which every member receives the same weight. In order to consider virtual
coalitions, the voter needs to reason about the election with a multi-winner
mindset. The entire concept of forming coalitions with all related consider-
ations such as neutralizing opposing opinions and interests and rearming
joint interests is borrowed from a multi-winner setting. These considerations
are alien to single winner elections and it would be at least strange to assume
that voters would refer to them while reasoning about single winner settings.
Thus, in order to justify the choice of decision rule for approval voting, we
need to assume that the voting system is applied to a multi-winner election.
This argument receives further backing by the example given at the end of
this section, showing that the proposed analysis can lead to the worst possible
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results in a single winner setting.
On the other hand, we assumed, in line with AGW, that parties take
extreme positions on every subject. This assumption is crucial for some of
the central results in [6], in particular their proof of Theorem 2 cited above.
We have oered two independent arguments for this assumption. To recall,
our rst argument was that, once in power, a party has to either implement
a policy or its converse, thus there is no room for a graded representation of
approval. Second, this is the main argument of [6], we argued that the cam-
paigning and political discourse preceding an election will move the parties
to extreme positions. The rst argument obviously depends on a single-
winner reading of elections, since only then the single winner, rather than
some confederate or coalition partner, will have to decide on every single
topic. So what about the second argument? Upon observing almost any
coalition government of the last 50 years, we learn that the position of a
coalition is not decided by applying one xed averaging mechanism to ev-
ery position. Rather, every coalition partner has some core interests that
he is unwilling to compromise even to the slightest extent. In other areas,
the parties are more willing to reconsider or even sacrice their own stance,
hoping to thereby gain support on other topics more important to them. In
established multi-winner systems, all these considerations will be familiar to
voters and candidates. Candidates will thus not move to extreme positions,
but maintain some space for negotiations and indicate which topics are cen-
tral to them and which are not. And voters, knowing this, will of course
anticipate the dierential stances of various coalitions. Thus, the assump-
tion of fully opinionated parties is incompatible with multi-winner practices.
In other words, the underlying model silently assumes that elections have
a single winner, which is incompatible with the decision rule for approval
voting that requires multi-winner election to have any traction. This nishes
our rst argument.
While the previous argument showed that the model rests on incoherent
intuitions about the voting system, our second argument shows that approval
voting might trigger paradoxical approval patterns for individual voters. Re-
call that expressive voting is completely blind towards any possible outcome
of an election. Rather, expressive voters do obtain their utility straight from
the act of submitting their ballot, independent of the resulting outcomes.
However, if we do not wish to produce a formal model for hypocrites, we
need to introduce some consistency requirements between expressed consent








Table 5.2: Voter v's position is (exactly) the arithmetic mean of the two
most extreme parties
and electoral outcomes. We take the following as an uncontroversial desider-
atum.
In elections where all voters share exactly the same preferences, and
thus submit the same ballots, any single voter would approve of the
resulting outcome.
We show that the AGW semantics for approval voting violates this criterion.
To be more specic, we will show that in their setting, approval voting as de-
ned above can bring some least desirable candidate into power. To capture
the gist behind the following example 5.3, assume a situation where there
is a set of moderate parties and two opposing extremist parties. It might
so happen that the position of a moderate voter v is exactly the average
between two extremist parties - even though every moderate party is closer
to her than each of the extremists. See table 5.2 for an illustration. Under an
AGW-style semantics of approval voting, v would have to approve of exactly
the two extremist parties. Now if every voter had the same preference as
v, all votes would go to the two extremist parties, and thus one of the two
would get into oce. By our assumptions this is the outcome v dislikes most
among all possible outcomes.
Since we represent parties by their fully opinionated positions on particu-
lar topics, rather than by degrees of extremism, we cannot directly translate
the above story into a formal counterexample. The following example mimics
the main features of the above setting.
Example 5.3: Assume the agenda consists of 9 issues t1 . . . t9. The rst
four items concern the economy, taxes, environmental issues and the social









to t1 . . . t4. The other 5 topics concern dicult decisions
in foreign policy where v nds it hard to choose sides, so she assigns them a
weight of zero. The two extremist parties are e+ assigning 1 to every topic
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and e− assigning −1 to every topic. Every other party pi assigns weights
1,−1, 1,−1 to the rst four topics and 1 to all remaining topics. Then the
setup is as claimed above, i.e., all moderate parties pi are closer to v than
both e+ and e−, but {e+, e−} is the approval set chosen by v. We relegate
the straightforward calculations to the appendix.
So far, we have identied two major problems of the AGW account of
approval voting: inconsistency in the background assumptions and a violation
of a coherency desideratum for voters. In the following chapter, we will
present an alternative choice rule for approval voting that avoids both of
these shortcomings. We will also show that our approach can naturally be
extended to a third voting rule, range voting.
5.4 Our Model
In this section, we oer an alternative framework for approval voting. We
will show that this framework naturally squares with the above decision rule
for plurality vote, while avoiding the two pitfalls identied in the previous
section. Crucially, approval voting and plurality vote invoke dierent choice
strategies. Plurality vote requires the voter to optimize, that is identify the
best among the parties and either vote for that party or abstain if that is
more attractive. Approval voting, on the other hand, is built around the
notion of satiscing. The central task for a voter in an approval election is
to identify some minimal requirements she has towards the potential can-
didates. The voter will then approve of every party that meets or exceeds
these requirements. Naturally, these minimal requirements will depend on
the individual agenda items and the degrees of importance attached to these.
In this section, we will identify three dierent ways in which voters could for-
mulate their minimal requirements, expected payo, geometrical proximity
and a grading system, and show that these all lead to the same formalism.
To introduce our framework, recall that a voter's position on some topic
ti is given by a number vi ∈ [−1; 1], where −1 stands for total opposition
and 1 for absolute consent. We can decompose the voter's attitude into
vi = sign(vi) · |vi|
where the sign7 sign(vi) indicates whether v is inclined in favor or against ti
7As usual, sign(x) is 1 if x ≥ 0 and −1 else.
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while the absolute value |vi| measures the degree of commitment8 v attaches
to topic i. For our model, we assume that this commitment |vi| is related
to the payo that v can obtain on this agenda item. More specically we
assume that, by voting for some party p, our voter v gets a payo |vi| on
item i if v and p share the same inclination about topic i, that is both are
in favor or both against. Else, the voter gets a payo of −|vi| from voting
for p. In other words, the payo is described by the following formula
|vi| i vi · pi ≥ 0
−|vi| i vi · pi < 0.
Since we have assumed that pi ∈ {−1; 1}, these two conditions can be
combined into one rule: The payo a voter v gets by voting for party p on
topic i is vi · pi. Thus, the total payo u(v,p) a voter v gets by voting for
party p, that is the sum over all the individual payos on the dierent topics,
is described by the standard scalar product as
u(v,p) = v · p =
∑
vipi.
Thus, exploiting again that p ∈ {−1; 1}, the maximal payo a voter could get





Finally, in order to state our decision rule for approval voting, we need the
voter's approval threshold, stating how much a candidate can deviate from
the optimum before loosing approval. To do so, we x an approval coecient
k ∈ [−1; 1]. The lower this coecient, the more tolerant a voter is towards
deviations from her optimal position. We can thus formulate the following
decision rule:
Approval Voting: Let v be a voter with approval coecient k ∈
[−1; 1]. Then v approves of all parties p that satisfy
p · v =
∑
pivi ≥ k ·
∑
|vi|. (5.1)
8Here, the commitment may again reect the importance v attaches to that topic as
well as her uncertainty about the right course of action. See footnote 4 for more details.
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Before exploring the mathematical properties of this framework, we take
a moment to analyze this denition a bit further and oer some remarks.
First, note the subtle dependency on the approval coecient k. For the
extreme value of k = 1, the candidate will only approve of an optimal party
sharing her inclination on every topic. If there is no such party, the voter
will submit an empty approval set, i.e., abstain. Conversely, a voter with
an approval coecient of −1 will indiscriminately approve of every party,
no matter what that party claims, wants or does. Finally, a middle value
of k = 0 corresponds to a fairly tolerant voter, approving of every party
that agrees with her more often than it disagrees. For most of the following
applications we will thus assume that k ≥ 0.
Next, we examine two alternative intuitions of how a voter could choose
which parties to approve of, the rst resting on a grading system, the second
on geometrical proximity. As it turns out, both of these alternatives are
equivalent to our choice rule. We take this as an argument for the naturalness
of our denition. The rst alternative choice rule is given in terms of a grading
system, resting on percentual agreement. An agent chooses a percentual
threshold t ∈ [0; 100] and approves of every party that agrees with her on
at least t percent of the topics. Since the voter has dierent degrees of
commitment to the various agenda items, this percentual agreement needs
to be weighted with the agent's commitments |vi|. Thus, the corresponding
rule is:
Approval Voting 1st Alternative: Let v be a voter with percentual









As the following, straightforward, lemma shows, this decision rule is
equivalent to our original decision rule.
Lemma 5.4. A voter v approves of some party p with approval coecient
k ∈ [−1; 1] if and only if she approves of p in the alternative denition with
percentual threshold t = 100 · 1+k
2
.
The second alternative we consider is of a geometric nature. Recall that
we represent voters and parties through their positions on the agenda items,
that is, as a vector in Rn. So why not dene the voter's approval decision




Table 5.3: The approval cone of voter v (shaded).
through geometric proximity? Arguably, an adequate measure for proximity
is the angle between two position vectors, showing how far these two diverge
in their political opinions.9 The maximal angle of 180◦ between a voter v
and some party p means that pi · vi ≤ 0 for every i, that is v and p disagree
about every single topic. Conversely a relatively small angle between a party
and a voter corresponds to a high degree of agreement between the voter's
inclination and the party position, see table 5.3. Again, we need to x a
threshold angle α for formulating the corresponding decision rule. For some
given threshold angle α, let C(v, α) be the cone of all vectors y in Rn − {0}
such that the angle between v and y is at most α.
Approval voting 2nd alternative Let v be a voter with threshold angle
α ∈ [0; 180]. Then v approves of all parties p that satisfy
p ∈ C(v, α).
Again, this alternative is closely related to our original decision rule. This
time, however, the exact relationship between the approval coecient k and
the threshold angle α depends upon the exact position of voter v. Our
correspondence is:
9To elaborate a bit further on why we take the angle between two vectors and not, for
instance, their length: Recall that a change in length of some vector v, that is, replacing
v by λv for some λ > 0, simply denotes a change in political commitment while leaving
the general position intact. On the other hand, a non-zero angle between two voters v ad
v′ implies that the two disagree about the relative importance attributed to the various
topics or even about the right course of action about some agenda item i.
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Lemma 5.5. Let v be a voter and let k be as in the denition of approval
voting. Then there is some angle α depending upon n, k and v such that for
each party p holds
p ∈ C(v, α)⇔ p · v ≥ k · |v|1.
Furthermore, the angle α satises arccos(k) ≤ α ≤ arccos( k√
n
).
Thus, for any possible voter v, the three dierent possible interpretations
of approval coecients are equivalent to each other. Before proceeding to
some general results, we revisit the worries about the AGW denition of
approval voting raised in the last section. To recall, our rst worry was that
the AGW account of approval voting introduced intuitions from multi-winner
elections into a general framework that rests upon a single winner reading.
The second worry was that the AGW decision rule violates the minimal
consistency condition that a voter should approve of the outcome of any
election where all voters act exactly like her. For the present approach, we
address both worries simultaneously. In our decision rule, the voter evaluates
each party individually as to whether or not it is worthy of approval. In this
evaluation, no reference to other parties is made. Hence the decision rule
does not rely on any element, intuition or mechanism from multi-winner
elections and our decision rule avoids the rst criticism. Almost the same
argument applies to our second worry. The approval set of an agent only
contains parties the voter approves of individually. If every voter happened
to submit the same approval set as v, the winner would be some member of
this approval set, and thus a party v approves of.
Finally, as a slight generalization of our framework, we introduce a third
class of voting systems that we wish to include in our analysis. We will show
that this class of voting systems can be treated with tools similar to the
ones developed for approval voting. Range voting refers to an entire family
of voting system. The underlying idea behind all of these is that voters are
asked to grade candidates within some given scale of grades. The systems
then dier in how they determine the winner of an election.10 For our present
purposes we can safely ignore this problem, since the payo of a voter is
already determined by the ballot she submits, independent of any outcome
of the election. In order to dene our account of range voting, we rst x a
10For instance if the grade scale is numerical, some systems rank candidates according
to their median values, others use average grades instead.
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set of grades g1, . . . , gn with g1 being the worst grade and gn the best. Also,
we need to x a set of grade requirements −1 = t1 ≤ . . . ≤ tn ∈ [−1; 1] for
these grades. Then we can dene our denition rule for range voting as:
Range voting Let v be a voter and let −1 = t1 ≤ . . . ≤ tn ∈ [−1; 1] be
her grade requirements. Then the grade some candidate p receives is
given by
grade(v,p) := max {i|v · p ≥ ti|v|1}
Also here, some remarks are in place. First, note that approval voting
is a special case of range voting with only two possible grades, approval
and disapproval. Thus, the set of candidates some voter approves of under
approval voting is exactly the set that she grades with approval, the higher
of the two possible grades. The following, straightforward lemma shows that
this analogy is compatible with our formal decision rules for range voting
and approval voting.
Lemma 5.6. Assume there are two grades g1 and g2 and let v be a voter with
grade requirements −1 = t1 < t2. Then v grades any candidate p with the
maximum grade g2 if and only if she approves of v with approval coecient
k = t2.
Finally, we note that the two alternative interpretations for approval vot-
ing we have presented, percentual agreement and geometrical proximity, can
be extended to range voting, using analoga of Lemmas 5.4 and 5.5 respec-
tively. In the rst case, percentual approval, this gets us even closer to
grading as known from school contexts. For each grade step, a certain per-
centage of agreement between a voter and a party is necessary. In other
words, the party neeeds to score a certain number of points on the political
agreement scale of that voter. More interestingly, the second alternative ac-
count, geometric proximity, translates grade requirements into geometrical
objects. Instead of a single approval cone, each set of grade requirements
−1 = t1 ≤ . . . ≤ tn translates into a sequence of ever narrower cones around
the voter v.
C(v, α1) ⊇ . . . ⊇ C(v, αn).
Here, the indices of the cones stand for dierent grades, that is C(v, αi)
depicts the area a party needs to fall in for receiving grade i or higher. The
actual grade some party receives is thus the index of the narrowest cone it is
contained in or, equivalently, the number of dierent cones it falls in.
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5.5 Results
In this section, we will explore the dierent voting systems presented in the
previous section and their propensity to foster a high electoral turnout. We
begin our discussion by clarifying the relationship between approval voting
and plurality vote. As we have argued above, the two voting instruments
appeal to two dierent reasoning strategies, maximizing and satiscing, that
is identifying an optimal solution or setting an approval threshold and going
with all solutions above that threshold. Despite this dierence in reasoning
modes, there are some coherence conditions connecting both accounts. It
might happen that, under approval voting, some voter nds exactly one
party to be acceptable. Thus, the ballot she submits, putting forward only
one party, could also occur under plurality vote. It seems reasonable to
demand that under plurality vote she would vote for the same party. That
is, given that v submits a single party ballot, this ballot should be the same
under approval voting and plurality rule. Of course, the implicit statements
contained in her ballot are dierent in the two voting systems: In one case v
merely expresses that her candidate p is the best party, while in the approval
case she additionally utters that all other parties are unacceptable to her.
We merely demand that the party identied as best be the same in both
cases. The following lemma shows that this indeed holds true, save for the
possibility of abstentions.
Lemma 5.7. Let v be a voter. Assume that under approval voting v approves
of the set {p̃} while under plurality vote she votes for p′. Then p = p̃.
Having introduced our formalism and the dierent voting rules, it is time
to come back to our initial question: When do people vote?. Within the
expressive framework we are working in, the rst tentative answer to this
question is easy. People vote if they nd some possible ballot they prefer
over abstaining. But when is that the case? Or more concretely: How likely
is it that some voter nds a ballot she prefers over abstaining? Our results
will fall in two groups, roughly corresponding to Theorems 1 and 2 of [6].
The rst class of results asks about the minimal number of parties needed to
avoid abstentions. Writing a party program is most often a strategic exer-
cise. Parties have to balance various interest groups among their supporters,
while also keeping an eye on the wishes and desires of the general electorate.
Further, the chances of winning an election will also depend on the compet-
ing candidates. In some cases, it might be more promising to be the only
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party catering to a small fraction of the electorate rather than competing
with four other parties about a larger group of voters. In the most extreme
case, studied in [102] , the dierent parties reposition themselves constantly
in order to maximize electoral support. For the present purpose, we are a
bit more cautious, being only interested in a strategically chosen but static
party position. For a new party, it might be a promising strategy to avoid
competition and focus on those voters that are not yet attracted by any
of the existing candidates. Thus, a reasonable question to ask is how many
strategically positioned parties are needed to guarantee that every voter nds
some candidate she prefers over abstaining. For plurality vote, this question
has been answered by Theorem 1 of [6], cited above. The number of parties
necessary to ensure that no voter abstains under plurality vote is exponential
in the number n of agenda items.
In the case of approval voting, the answer to this question will depend
upon the tolerance of the voters. Naturally, the more demanding voters are,
that is, the higher their approval threshold, the more candidates are needed
in order to ensure that every voter nds a suitable candidate to approve of.
Theorem 5.8. i) If k ≤ 0 two parties are enough to ensure that every voter
approves of at least one party.
ii) If k > 0 the number of parties needed to ensure that no (possible) voter
abstains is exponential in the number of topics.
iii) Assume there are at least three topics on the agenda. If voters are in-
nitesimally more demanding than k = 0, approving only of those parties
that, given the voters' weights, share strictly more than half of their position,
i.e., p ·v > 0, then exactly n+1 parties are needed to ensure that every voter
approves of at least one party.
Next, we consider the opposite extreme. Consider for a moment a com-
pletely idealistic candidate that has only decided to run in the elections to
see her own position represented. Such a candidate will obviously not refer
to tactical considerations about her competitors or the distribution of voters.
She will simply report her true opinions about all the agenda items. Such
candidates may be healthy for the political system, however they are bad
news for avoiding abstentions. No matter how many of these candidates are
available, we cannot guarantee that every voter will nd some candidate that
is more attractive than abstaining. However, we can give probabilistic esti-
mates how likely it is that a random voter is attracted by at least one of these
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candidates. As the number of topics on the agenda grows, it becomes more
and more likely that some group of people is dissatised by all the existing
candidates and hence decides to form their own party. We will thus assume
for our analysis that an election with n dierent topics on the agenda attracts
n such randomly distributed parties.11 Under these conditions, let P (n) de-
note the probability that some voter does not abstain in an election based on
an n-topic agenda. Again, the case of plurality vote has been analyzed in [6]
in Theorem 2, cited above: Under plurality vote we have limn→∞ P (n) = 0.
In the case of approval voting, the chance that some randomly chosen
party is appealing to some generic voter v will depend upon the tolerance
of v. Naturally, a voter with a high approval coecient k is more likely to
abstain in such a situation than somebody with lower standards of approval.
Thus, we extend our above denition of P (n) to P (n, k), denoting the prob-
ability that a random voter with approval coecient k does not abstain in
an n-topic situation. We have the following result:
Theorem 5.9. For k ≤ 0 we have limn→∞ P (n, k) = 1. On the other hand
for k ∈ (0; 1] the converse holds: limn→∞ P (n, k) = 0
For this result, a word of caution is in place. The skeptic result that
a suciently demanding voter will almost surely abstain if the agenda is
big enough, i.e., limn→∞ P (n, k) = 0, is only a worst case result, depending
on the exact interest of the voter. Naturally, a universally interested voter,
having opinions on most of the agenda items, is harder to accidentally satisfy
than somebody who is only interested in a small selection of the agenda.
In the extreme case, a voter is primarily focused on a single topic, that is
v ≈ ±ei. Such a voter will almost surely nd some party she approves, i.e.,
limn→∞ P (n, k) = 1 independent of her approval coecient k.
Finally, we come back to range voting, the last voting mechanism we have
introduced. In range voting, voters are asked to grade all parties within a
given grade scale. Thus, there is nothing such as abstaining or submitting
an empty ballot and we need to reformulate our original question. So let's
assume a voter is motivated to engage in range voting just if she nds some
relevant dierences to be expressed in terms of grades. That is, we ask for
the conditions under which our voter nds two parties that receive dierent
grades. Just as in the case of approval voting, this will depend upon the
11That is, we draw each party's position from a uniform distribution over the 2n possible
positions.
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exact grade requirements she has. For the case of strategically positioned
parties we get:
Theorem 5.10. Assume that every voter has some i with ti = 0 and that
there are at least three topics on the agenda. Then n+ 1 parties are enough
to ensure that every (possible) voter nds two parties she grades dierently.
Conversely, if there is no such index i with ti = 0, the number of parties
needed to ensure that every possible voter nds two parties she wishes to
grade dierently grows exponentially in n.
Second, we consider again the case of randomly distributed parties. We
will use the same setting as for approval voting, that is we consider the case
of n randomly distributed parties in an election ranging over an agenda with
n topics. As above, our results will depend on the exact grade requirements
used by the voter. For any set t = t1 . . . tn of grade requirements, let P (n, t)
denote the probability that, given n randomly distributed parties on an n-
topic agenda, a voter with grade requirements t will nd two parties that she
wishes to grade dierently.
Theorem 5.11. If there is some i with ti = 0 then limn→∞ P (n, t) = 1. On
the other hand, if there is no such i then limn→∞ P (n, t) = 0.
With other words, the probability that v nds two random parties she
wishes to grade dierently crucially depends on whether she gives dierent
grades to those parties coinciding with her opinion on at least half of the
topics and those who do not. As a last remark, note that the same word of
caution as for approval voting applies. Theorem 5.11 studies a worst case
scenario that mainly applies to universally interested voters. Again, a less
universal voter, primarily interested in one or two agenda items, will satisfy
limn→∞ P (n, t) = 1 independently of which grade requirements she uses.
5.6 Focus and Dynamics
The analysis of expressive voting we have presented so far is completely
atemporal. In this section, we will add a dynamic element to our analysis
by studying various changes in the electoral preference. Up and until now,
we have focused on the single, decisive moment in which a voter submits her
ballot. But this is, of course, not all there is to an election. The actual poll
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is preceded by a long and sometimes tedious period of campaigning during
which each party tries to convince the electorate of their advantages. Within
this period, voters form their opinions on whom to vote for. While gradually
learning about the political landscape, the voters will sometimes update their
beliefs about which candidate is best. We identify three dierent reasons that
could trigger a change in some voter's preference order. First, a voter may
obtain some new information about the standpoint of some candidate on a
particular topic she cares about. Second, the voter might change her own
position, either by changing her mind on some particular topic or by updating
the relative importance she attributes to the individual topics. And third,
during the several weeks of campaigning, some entirely new topic may appear
on the agenda inuencing the voter's preference orders. In their attempt
to maximize electoral support, the dierent parties might appeal to all of
these three mechanisms. They might, rst, change their own position, or be
intentionally opaque about some of their stances. Second, parties may, of
course, try to convince voters of their stances towards some agenda items or,
at least, try to direct the voters attention into a favorable direction. And
third, candidates can try to place some entirely new topic on the agenda.
In this section, we explore several extensions of our model to pre-electoral
dynamics and their strategic potential. We mainly concentrate on the rst
two of the above mechanisms, parties strategically relocating themselves on
the agenda as well as their attempt to change the voters' interests. The
rst part of this section deals with strategizing parties, deliberating whether
and how to determine or change their own positions in order to maximize
electoral support. This case has been dealt with by Walter Dean and Rohit
Parikh in [46], using a logical framework. Our main aim in the rst part of
this section is to unify the two models and demonstrate how their framework
can be translated into our approach. In the second part of this section, we
will study changes in the preference of voters. In many cases, the attention
of voters is not distributed equally among all agenda items, but some topics
are more in focus having a bigger impact on the voter's decision making. The
main contribution of this section will be to outline a formal framework for
focus and the evolution of focus over time. Finally, we will inquire into some
topics and subtleties arising when dierent parties and candidates try to
change the voters' focus strategically in order to maximize electoral support.
While inquiring into parties and voters changing their positions or pref-
erences, we will always assume that the underlying landscape, the agenda
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of topics itself, remains constant. That is, we will not deal with new topics
entering the agenda, the third reason for preference change identied above.
However, we wish to emphasize that this would not pose a major problem to
our account. As the following lemma shows, some voter's decision remains
the same, whether a topic receives a weight of 0 or whether that topic is re-
moved from the agenda altogether. Conversely, adding a topic to the agenda
is technically equivalent to assuming that is has always been there with a
weight of zero.
Lemma 5.12. Under approval voting, let K ⊆ {1 . . . n} be a subset of the
agenda items. For any party p let pK be the restriction of p to K and likewise







In the rst part of this section, we focus on the strategic position and
repositioning of dierent parties. Which possible utterance is best suited for
fostering electoral success depends on a variety of features. Of course, the
voting system will play a role, as will the positions of voters and competing
candidates. Walter Dean and Rohit Parikh identify two additional aspects
relevant for picking an optimal utterance. First, the choice depends on how
voters will update their information in light of newly learned evidence. This
question relates to the theory of information change and related tools such
as, for instance, AGM belief revision function [3]. The second important
feature of a voter is how she evaluates her information about a candidate.
Dean and Parikh consider three dierent types of voters. Optimistic voters
interpret all remaining uncertainty in favor of a candidate, while pessimistic
voters hold all uncertainty against the candidate. Finally, expected value
voters represent a party by the expected value of the uncertainty set. To
make this intuition precise, suppose that I is a set of information a voter
has about some party p. For x ∈ {−1; 1}n we write x |= I to denote the
fact that all the information contained in I is consistent with the position
of p being x. Further, let uv(x) be the degree of approval a voter v would
have towards a party with position x, thus uv(x) = v · x. Then,12 Dean and
Parikh dene the following voter types:
12The presentation is adapted to our framework. In the original paper, Dean and Parikh
allow for any utility function based on the agenda items individually.
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(optimistic voter) soptv (I) = max{uv(x) | x |= I}
(pessimistic voter) spesv (I) = min {uv(x) | x |= I}




These voter types determine when a voter v will vote for some candidate
in the dierent voting schemes. Under approval voting with some approval
coecient k, an optimistic voter with information I about some party p will
thus approve of p i soptv (I) ≥ k · |v|1, a pessimistic voter will approve of p
i spesv (I) ≥ k · |v|1 and, likewise, an expected value voter will approve of p if
sevv (I) ≥ k · |v|1. Just as in the case of approval voting, it can be instructive
to gain a geometric understanding of voter's uncertainty and its relation to
the electoral decision. For this end, let x1 . . .xn ∈ {−1; 1} be the set of party
positions that are consistent with the current knowledge some voter v has
about p, that is, {x1 . . . xn} = {x | x |= I}. Furthermore, we denote the set
of all the intermediate positions between the (necessarily extreme) stands
x1 . . .xn by ∆, that is ∆ ⊆ [−1; 1]n is the convex hull of {x1 . . .xn}. Then
we get the following geometric equivalent of the above decision rule:
Lemma 5.13. Let α be the approval angle corresponding to voter v. Then:
i) An optimistic voter approves of p i ∆ ∩ C(v, α) 6= ∅
ii) A cautious voter approves of p i ∆ ⊆ C(v, α)
iii) An expected value voter approves of p i c ∈ C(v, α), where c is the
gravitational center of ∆.
Thus, we have shown that the logical approach chosen by [46] can be
incorporated into our framework and that their decision rule for lling un-
certainty ts in naturally with all the three dierent approaches agents could
have for choosing their approval threshold.
Having studied the strategic positioning of parties, we now leave the
framework of [46] and return to the voters' side. During the period of elec-
toral campaigning, voters' standpoints on the agenda are not carved in stone.
Just to the contrary, individual voters constantly update their positions, re-
acting to all kind of incoming information. First of all, the voter may learn
about some external events, recent developments in world politics or newly
published economic data that impact her belief about what constitutes the
best course of action. Second, she might also change her standpoint as a
result of some deliberative process, discussions among her peers, following
the news or simply pondering about her own values. Independent of the
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reasons for doing so, any change in the voters' preferences might naturally
impact the electoral outcome. Hence a strategically acting party might try
to inuence voters' positions in their own interest. Of course, some voters
may be hard to inuence and the candidates will only have limited control
over the various external events that could change the voters' positions. Yet,
there are at least two dierent ways in which the candidates could go. First,
a party can actively try to persuade voters of its position, hoping that some
disagreeing voters gradually change standpoint on that topic. This process,
however, is cumbersome, slow and rare in occurrence. There is a second
strategy that looks more promising. In making their electoral decision, few
voters will refer to the entire spectrum provided by the agenda. Most voters
will rather focus on the two or three prominent topics they regard as most
pressing for the near future. Which topic it is that voters focus on, however,
may change several times during an election campaign. Public focus is not
a very stable phenomenon, a fact that the dierent candidates might try to
exploit. In general, the individual candidates will attempt to steer public
attention towards topics where they have favorable opinions, trying to stay
clear of areas where they could easily put o too many voters. In the follow-
ing, we will study the inuence of public focus and its dynamics. To start,
consider the following example:
During the 2011 German state elections in Baden-Württemberg, it ap-
peared that the governing Christian Conservatives would easily remain in
power. The party's position on nuclear energy did not quite match the ma-
jority opinion, but most voters were focused on dierent issues. Then, on
March 11, a tsunami hit the Japanese province of Tohoku, causing a major
nuclear incident at the Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant. Suddenly, nuclear
energy was on everyone's mind. This had a drastic eect on the elections: Af-
ter nearly 60 years of governing, the Christian Conservatives were swept out
of oce by a Green Left coalition (which strongly opposed nuclear energy).
We can model the German 2011 state election scenario using the frame-
work discussed in the previous section. The set of issues is I = {i1, i2, i3, i4}
with13
13Some people claim that a signicant number of voters originally based their decision
on a fth issue i5: This party has been in oce for the last 60 years". We do not wish
to comment on this claim here. We note, however, that our framework is rich enough to
incorporate such considerations.
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i1: We must support the car industry.
i2: We should be conservative about public spending.
i3: We ought to continue nuclear energy.
i4: Do not increase funding for education.
In this framework, the Conservatives would be represented by a vector 〈1, 1, 1, 1〉,
while their two main opponents had a −1 on p3 and also on some of the other
items. Say that the Social Democrats are represented by 〈1,−1,−1,−1〉 and
the Greens by 〈−1, 1,−1,−1〉.
A typical voter from the Southwest emphasizes industry and/or edu-
cation but displays only a relatively small concern about nuclear energy.
For instance, the following two proles represent typical voters in this area:
v1 = (0.8, 0.9,−0.3, 0.4) or v2 = (0.4, 0.8,−0.3, 0.9). Under normal circum-
stances, this would lead to a crushing victory for the Christian Conservatives,
using any of the voting methods discussed in the previous section. However,
as stated above, the Fukushima Power Plant incident changed the voters'
focus.
Arguably, a change in focus will, in general, not change the voter's at-
titude towards some agenda item i, i.e., the sign of the particular position.
Focus change corresponds to a momentary redistribution of attention or im-
portance attributed to the various topics, measured by the length |vi|. A
change in attitude, i.e., in sign(vi) on the other hand would require some
signicant engagement with that particular topic, brought about by dierent
mechanisms than a mere change in focus that we do not want to discuss
here. Consequentially, a focus change will only aect the length |vi| of some
topic vector, while leaving sign(vi) intact. We think of a change in focus as a
linear transformation of the space of positions for each voter. This suggests
the following denition:
Denition 5.14 (Focus Matrix). A focus matrix is a diagonal matrix
A ∈ [0, 1]n×n (i.e., for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, if i 6= j, then Aij = 0). Voter
v's position after a focus change with A, denoted vA, is calculated in the
standard way using matrix multiplication. /
The following is a possible focus change matrix triggered by the Fukushima









Clearly, this will make nuclear energy the focus of attention for all voters.
After applying this focus change to the two voters mentioned above, the
resulting position vectors are vAFuku1 = (0.04, 0.045,−0.3, 0.02) and v
AFuku
2 =
(0.02, 0.04,−0.3, 0.045). Such voters would end up supporting either the
Social Democrats or the Green party.
The above example shows that redirecting the voters' focus is a powerful
tool that can drastically change the outcome of an election. And indeed, as
any political pundit will report, much of the rhetoric during an election is
aimed at trying to focus the attention of voters on certain sets of issues. The
genesis of public attention, however, is a complex matter. As our last example
showed, focus is inuenced by the general situation and external events the
agents cannot inuence. But it is also shaped by news coverage, the content
of electoral campaigns and other factors that are at least partially under the
control of parties or sympathizing groups. What makes the analysis of focus
even more complex is that it does not suce to study the dierent focusing
attempts individually. The various messages from dierent interest groups
interact in a complex way, potentially leading to unexpected and unintended
results. We conclude this section with a number of examples to illustrate the
subtleties involved in inuencing the focus of a group of voters.
Example 5.15: Suppose that there are two parties T = {d, r} competing
in a two-topic election (i.e., I = {i1, i2}). The two parties have completely
opposing views on both topics, say pd = (1, 1) and pr = (−1,−1). Suppose
that almost half of the voters are clearly in favor of the second candidate, pr.
The rest of the voters are relatively undecided, not feeling that either of the
parties is particularly close to their views. This example shows that there is
a way to focus the voters so that the rst candidate, d, is the winner.
To make things more concrete, suppose that there are three voters, de-
scribed by: v1 = (−1,−0.8), v2 = (−1, 0.7) and v3 = (1,−0.62). Clearly,
d will lose the election given these voters. However, d can win a plurality
election by changing the voters' focus using the following matrix:






However, it does not suce to direct voters attention to only one of the two
issues. If voters focused on either of these topics alone, r would still win,
having the support of v1 and, depending on the topic, either v2 or v3. Thus,
a strategic focus campaign might not only need to identify the right focus
set, but also balance the attention attributed to dierent topics.
Example 5.16: Suppose that there are three candidates T = {d,m, r} and
six issues I = {i1, . . . , i6}. Assume that d is in favor of all the topics, pd =
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1), and r opposes all the topics, pr = (−1,−1,−1,−1,−1,−1).
The candidates' campaign stas have determined that d maximizes its share
of votes if the voters focus on i1, i2 and i3, while r receives the maximum
support when the voters are focused on i4, i5 and i6. In both cases, the
maximum support among the voters is enough to win the election using
plurality rule. In planning their campaigns, the candidates might try to
guide public attention to the dierent focus sets {i1, i2, i3} and {i4, i5, i6}
respectively. However, this may lead to a situation in which a third candidate
m wins a plurality vote. Thus, the simultaneous attempt of two parties to
inuence focus might benet a third party, even without that party engaging
in any tactical endeavors at all. To give this example an extra twist: It is
possible that, had party d foreseen r's focusing eorts, d could have won
the election by omitting topic i1 from her focus campaign. Hence, it is
not sucient to study focus changing events individually, but it is equally
important to consider other competing eorts and their interaction.
To ll in the remaining details, suppose that m supports only issues i3
and i6 (pm = (−1,−1, 1,−1,−1, 1). There are three voters with v1 = v2 =
(−0.25, 0.3, 1,−0.1,−0.1,−0.1) and v3 = (1,−1, 0.9, 1, 1, 1). Now, it is not
hard to see that this model satises all the properties claimed. That is,
1. In an election in which the voters are focused primarily on the sets i1, i2
and i3, party d would win.
2. In an election in which the voters focus only on i2 and i3, party d would
still win, but with less votes than if voters focused on all of i1, i2 and
i3. Thus, only the latter set maximizes support.
3. In an election in which the voters are focused primarily on i4, i5 and i6,
party r would win.
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4. In an election in which the voters are evenly focused on all the issues
i1, . . . , i6, m would win. However, if none of the voters focuses on i1,
then d would win the election.
5.7 Discussion and Outlook
The theory of expressive voting is an attractive alternative to the instrumen-
tal analysis of voting behavior. Not least, because expressive accounts oer
a solution towards problems left open by the instrumental account such as
the question of why people vote. As the reader might rightly remark, neither
alternative alone can provide a satisfactory account of much voting behavior
we observe. Rather, any real voter will encompass instrumental and expres-
sive considerations and potentially many other reasons simultaneously. Yet,
we hold that a thorough analysis of expressive voting is an important step
on the pathway towards an integrated understanding of voting behavior.
In this chapter, we have presented and explored a formal framework for
expressive voting based upon an agenda of items. Both voters and parties
position themselves on this agenda, and voters evaluate the dierent parties
by their positions. In our analysis, we focus on two aspects of voting, par-
ticipation and dynamics. The rst of these aspects, participation, is related
to Downs' paradox of voting, the questions why voters vote at all. Within
our framework, we have analyzed three dierent voting systems, plurality
vote, approval voting and range voting with respect to the likelihood of ab-
stentions. The central result of section 5.5 is that the latter two systems,
approval and range voting, are exponentially better in promoting a high de-
gree of participation than the rst system, plurality vote. For the second
aspect, dynamics, we have studied changes in the voter's preference prole
over time. More specically, we have concentrated on focus as a major rea-
son for preference change. In their electoral decision, many voters are heavily
guided by two or three topics that appear especially prominent to them. If
the topics in focus change, some voters' decisions on whom to vote may
change accordingly. Our central result in section 5.6 was to outline a formal
framework for focus change through focus changing matrices and to identify
some of the subtleties and diculties connected to strategically manipulating
the voters' focus. For instance, it might not be enough to focus on individ-
ual topics and omit others, but a well-chosen strategic focusing action might
need to address several topics at once while balancing the relative attention
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they receive. Or, to give a second example, strategic inuences on focus by
several parties may interact in unexpected ways and potentially lead to com-
pletely unexpected and unwanted outcomes. Finally, a third contribution of
this chapter is to integrate and expand two existing pieces of research on this
eld. While our basic formal framework is taken from the rst of these, [6],
we have identied a crucial shortcoming in their treatment of approval voting
and subsequently presented a dierent treatment avoiding this criticism. The
second paper, [46], is a logical model of parties strategizing their position in
order to maximize support. There, we have shown that this model can be
translated naturally to our account.
We conclude by briey discussing two directions of future research. As we
have shown in section 5.3, the model presented here rests on the assumption
that elections produce a single winner. This covers many important cases
such as various presidential elections. There is, however, a second class of
elections, parliamentary elections, that produce an entire class of winners,
the parliament that in turn will need to form a government. A rst direction
of future research would thus be to extend the present model to multi-winner
elections. We conjecture that much of this work can be done by relaxing our
conditions on the positioning of parties. However details have to be worked
out on both, a conceptual and a formal level. In particular, it is not yet
completely clear how relaxing our conditions would impact on the results
presented in section 5.5. Our second direction of future research is related
to the strategic potential of candidates prior to elections. So far, we have
concentrated on exploring the strategic tools parties have to maximize their
support, for instance by adapting their own position. The actual potential
a party has for credibly altering her position or inuencing public focus will
depend upon its political or social capital, including factors such as visibility,
reputation and track record. We thus hold that an integrated model of
pre-voting dynamics should be sensitive to the individual parties' resources.
A resource sensitive model may be closely related to yet another potential
direction of future research, subjective models of the political realm. The
attribution of political capital to the dierent parties may, in general, dier
from voter to voter. Thus a resource sensitive model may require some of
our tools to be agent relative. For instance, subjective focus change matrices
could track the focus of individual agents, while dierent ways of interpreting
the announcements of candidates may lead to subjective theories of what a
party stands for.
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5.8 Appendix: Proofs
We start by showing that example 5.3 satises all properties claims. In par-
ticular we have to show that i) dist(v,p) < dist(v, e±) and ii) that {e+, e−}
is the coalition approved by v.
For i) observe that




























+ 5 for ∗ ∈ {+,−}
thus e± are indeed the most extremist parties.











To see that this is the closest coalition we rst show that any coalition C





For any such coalition the last ve entries of C are all at least 1
3
(with the
minimum reached if C consists of exactly three entries, one of them being




. A similar argument shows that for C ′ = {e+,p}
holds dist(C ′,v) ≥
√

















thus nishing the proof.
Proof of Lemma 5.5. For x, y ∈ Rn the angle α between x and y is de-






x2i denotes the euclidean length. On the other hand in-

























The last claim follows from the inequality
|x|2 ≤ |x|1 ≤
√
n|x|2
for all x ∈ Rn. 
Proof of Lemma 5.7. Recall that under approval voting, v approves of
p∗ i v ·p′ ≥ k · |v|1, where k is v's approval coecient. Since p′ is the only











On the other hand, the fact that p̃ is the winner under plurality vote is



















Recall that pi ∈ {−1; 1} for each topic i ∈ N . Fix a voter v. For any party
p let Up ⊆ {1 . . . N} be dened by:
i ∈ Up ⇔ vi · pi < 0.



























14Recall that T is the set of parties.
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Before we can prove theorems 5.8 and 5.9 we need the following lemma:



















Proof. For notational convenience we assume n to be even. First we show
that for any natural number i ∈ [0, n
2m
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Now it is easy to see that each of the quotients in the last formula is larger
than 1 + 1
2m
, thus the entire product is larger than (1 + 1
2m
)n and 5.4 holds.














































where the last inequality holds since α < 1
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Proof of Theorem 5.8. For i) observe that p1 := (1, 1, . . . 1) and p2 :=
−p1 have the property that for any voter v at least one of the two statements
p1 · v ≥ 0 and p2 · v ≥ 0 holds. Thus each voter approves of at least one of
these two parties.
ii). Let V := {−1; 1}n be the set of voters who have extreme positions on
every single topic. We will show that the number of parties needed to ensure
that every member of V votes is exponential in n. Fix some natural number
1
m
≤ k. Since the number of parties some voter v approves of is decreasing
in k it suces to show the theorem with k = 1
m
. Observe that for any party
p and any voter v ∈ V holds:
v · p ≥ 1
m
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Since for any party p and any l ∈ N
















many members of V. Since |V| = 2n this implies that the number of parties


















it is exponential in n. Since 2n parties are enough to ensure that everybody
votes, the number of parties needed cannot be worse than exponential.
The proof of iii) consists of two parts. First, we show that at least n+1 parties
are needed in order to ensure that every voter nds a party she approves of.
Assume to the contrary that p1 . . .pn are enough to attract every possible
voter. Recall that, by the voting rule used for iii), a voter v approves of
a party p i v · p > 0. For i < n dene Xi to be the n − 1 dimensional
hypersurface dened by
Xi = {x ∈ [−1; 1]n|x · pi = 0}.
Thus X := X1 ∩ . . . ∩ Xn−1 is a vector space of dimension at least 1 and
therefore Y = X ∩ {x ∈ [−1; 1]n|x · pn ≤ 0} 6= {0}. Pick some non-zero
v ∈ Y . Then v·pi = 0 for i < n and v·pn ≤ 0, thus the voter v would abstain
in an election with candidates p1 . . .pn, contradicting our assumption.
Next, we show that n + 1 parties are sucient to attract all voters if there
are at least n ≥ 3 topics. We start by showing the following general claim:
Claim: Let v1 . . .vn+1 ∈ Rn be a set of vectors such that any n of these
vectors are linearly independent. Then, after potentially replacing some vi




{y ∈ Rn|y · xi ≤ 0} = 0.
To prove this claim let vn+1 =
∑
i≤n λivi be the unique representation of
vn+1 in the basis v1 . . .vn. By our assumption all λi are non-zero and by
replacing some vi by −vi we can assume that all λi are negative. Next we
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consider the space Xi := {y ∈ Rn|y · vi = 0} for each i ≤ n. Since v1 . . .vn
form a basis of Rn, it follows for every j ≤ n that the space
⋂i 6=j
i≤nXi has
dimension 1. Using the assumption about the vi again, we can pick for every
j ≤ n some xj ∈
⋂i 6=j
i≤nXi with xj · vj > 0. By our assumption about the
vi, the x1 . . .xn form again a basis of Rn. Now, let z ∈ Rn be any non-zero
vector and let z =
∑
βixi be its representation in the new basis. Then, if
any βj is larger than 0, we have






βivi · xj = βj vj · xj > 0.
If all βj are smaller or equal than 0, we have










βiλi vi · xi > 0
where the last equation holds because all λi are smaller than 0. In any case
we have z 6∈ X which nishes the proof of our claim. To nish our proof of
iii), note that the set V consisting of the vector (1 . . . 1) and the n vectors
having exactly one −1 and all other entries 1 satisfy the conditions of the
above claim. Since each x ∈ V as well as every −x for x in V is an admissible
party position, this completes our proof. 
Proof of Theorem 5.9. Fix a voter v. Observe that for k = 0 and any
party p at least one of the following two holds: v ·p ≤ 0·|v|1 or v ·p ≥ 0·|v|1.
Let P = {−1; 1}n be the set of all possible parties





Since picking a random party is the same as randomly drawing a party from
P , the chance that a random party p satises p · x ≥ 0 is at least one half.
Thus the chance that v approves of none of n random parties is at most 1
2
n,
thus P (n, n, 0)→ 1. Obviously, this implies P (n, k)→ 1 for any k ≤ 0.
Since P (n, k) is monotonous in k, it suces to show that P (n, n, 1
m
)→ 0 for
any natural number m. Let v = (1, 1, . . .) be a voter who fully approves of
all topics and let m ∈ N. Observe that for any party p holds:
v · p ≥ 1
m







138 CHAPTER 5. EXPRESSIVE VOTING
Thus for the uniform distribution P over P we have















As above lemma 5.17 yields that
















)n. It is a general fact that (1−kxn)n →
1 for any x ∈ (0, 1) and k ∈ R, thus P (n, n, 1
m
)→ 0 as claimed.

Proof of Theorem 5.10. Fix a voter v and let i such that ti = 0. The
third part of theorem 5.8 applied to voter −v shows that n + 1 parties are
enough to guarantee that some party gets graded at most i− 1. Equally, the
same theorem applied to v herself shows that the same n + 1 parties also
guarantee that some candidate gets grade i or higher. Finally assume that
there is no i with ti = 0 and let j be maximal such that tj−1 < 0. Then the
second part of Theorem 5.8 applied to v and −v shows that exponentially
many parties are needed in order to ensure that some party gets a grade
unequal to j − 1. 
Proof of Theorem 5.11. First assume that there is some i such that ti =
0. Then, by theorem 5.9, the probability that at least one out of n random
parties gets grade at least i goes to 1. Applying 5.9 to −v we see that also
the probability that a party gets grade at most i−1 goes to 1. In particular,
the probability for two parties receiving dierent grade assignments goes to
1, this proves the rst part. For the second part assume that there is no
such i. Let i0 be such that ti < 0 for all i ≤ i0 and ti > 0 for all i > i0.
Then applying 5.9 with k = ti0 (if dened) yields that the probability that
no party gets grade larger than i0 goes towards 0. Applying 5.9 to −v yields
that also the probability for parties getting a grade below i0 goes to zero,
thus the probability of all parties getting the same grade i0 goes towards 1.

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Proof of Lemma 5.12. Observe that in 5.1 all summands indexed by some









Proof of lemma 5.13. We prove i) and ii) simultaneously. Observe that
the function up from [−1; 1]n to R, sending x to x ·p, is a linear function. By
a well known theorem (see for instance [98, Theorem nn]), linear functions
on polytopes assume their extrema on some vertex of that polytope. Since
C(v, α) is, by lemma 5.5, exactly the set of all x with x · v ≥ |v|1, we have
∆ ∩ C(v, α) 6= ∅ ⇔ max{uv(x) | x |= I} = soptv (I) ≥ k · |v|1
∆ ⊆ C(v, α) ⇔ min {uv(x) | x |= I} = spesv (I) ≥ k · |v|1.
For iii) note that an expected value voter approves of p i sevv (I) ≥ k·|v|1.
Further recall that the gravitational center of ∆ is 1
n
∑
i≤n xi. We then have




|{x1 . . . xn}|
≥ k |v|1
⇔ v · 1
|{x1 . . . xn}|
∑
xi
xi · v ≥ k |v|1
⇔ c ∈ C(v, α).

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Chapter 6
The Dynamics of Generalized
Trust
6.1 Introduction
Social capital is a leading concept in the research on overcoming collective
action problems. Generalized trust is the touchstone of this concept as it
captures the mechanism on the micro-level that drives people to cooperate
with each other. A recent series of publications has identied a variety of
social and individual benets that arise from a high level of trust. These
range from the performance of political institutions [135, 136] to economic
capabilities of states [94, 95] to individual benets such as health and a better
quality of life [85, 88]. Motivated by these positive eects, we nd a growing
interest in the determinants of trust during the past years. Recent research
has identied a variety of factors relevant for the emergence of trust includ-
ing institutional factors, but also various cultural, societal and individual
variables [84, 97]. We would like to add the idea that trust is not a stable
phenomenon, but the result of an ongoing complex dynamic process. For
understanding this process, it is not only important which factors contribute
towards the emergence or destruction of trust, but also how they do so. In
particular, the process underlying the emergence of trust is self-reinforcing,
that is trust creates trust.
A multitude of empirical studies have shown the impact of factors such
as the level of mobility [63, 134], the cultural background [62, 63, 70] and
network structures [33, 132] on the emergence of trust. Instead of conducting
This chapter is based on joint work with J. Marx. See [90] for a related article.
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yet another case study and adding new empirical evidence to these ndings,
we have taken these empirical results as a starting point for developing a
multi-agent NetLogo simulation. In this chapter, we present the results ob-
tained from our simulation, based on some of the above mentioned factors
and mechanisms. On a more conceptual level, we see two major advantages
in applying computer simulation to the emergence and dynamics of trust:
• First, a computer simulation helps to handle methodological problems
inherent in our research. What might seem tautological - trust creat-
ing trust, that is: one factor reenforcing itself - and what might cause
methodological problems in an empirical study can easily be cracked
with the help of computer simulations. In order to deal with the tau-
tology, we have developed our multi-agent NetLogo simulation in such
a way as to endogenize trust. Computer simulations, unlike empirical
studies, allow to determine at what point in time an individual has
acquired trust proper, and when her behavior merely reects second or
third level trust, copying successful strategies of others. Building on
a rational choice framework, we try to capture the causal mechanisms
underlying the dynamics of trust.
• Second, we are interested in the quality of our theoretical knowledge of
trust. We seek to understand the mechanisms that lead to a lower or
higher level of trust in societies. Therefore we build our simulations on
well established theories of the determinants of trust. If our simulation
reacts to these variables in the way rational choice theory leads us to
expect, we could take this as a validation of the underlying theories
of trust. Vice versa, we could interpret unexpected results as a signal
that the underlying theories on the emergence of trust are incomplete or
misleading. In this sense simulations can help to evaluate the coherence
and completeness of complex social theories.
In our simulation, we focus on the mechanisms responsible for the develop-
ment of generalized trust. We are particularly interested in the interrelation-
ship between agents and their immediate environment, how that environment
reacts to the agents' willingness to place trust and vice versa. In particular,
we will argue that the local neighborhood surrounding the individual agents
is an underestimated factor in the creation and dynamics of trust within the
population as a whole.
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This chapter is structured as follows. We rst clarify our concept of
trust, based on a rational choice perspective. We then develop our basic
dynamic model of trust used for our subsequent simulations. The model is
built upon a population of agents playing trust games under the premise of
uncertainty. In doing so, the agents have to decide whether their interaction
partners are trustworthy or not. More precisely, they have to learn about the
expected payo of placing trust. In a second step, we elaborate our model,
adding several context conditions that are believed to aect the general trust
level: Mobility, network structures, and spatial inhomogeneities. We show
that some claimed eects of these variables, well supported by empirical data,
cannot be completely reproduced in our simulation. On the contrary, some of
our ndings are in straight opposition to predictions from the literature. For
instance, we nd a negative impact of low mobility on the individual level of
trust where the literature would predict a positive impact. At the same time,
we identify a strong eect of the direct neighborhood the agents are embedded
in, a factor yet underrepresented in current theories. By randomizing the
neighborhood of the agent and keeping all other variables constant, we can
demonstrate the high impact of this factor on the variance of trust. We
nally conclude by discussing the relevance of our results.
6.2 Trust as an Expectation
Trust is a multifaceted concept. In this paper, we focus on a narrow deni-
tion of trust as an expectation that can be held by rational agents.1 More
concretely, trust is considered to be an agent's expectation that her coun-
terpart will act cooperatively in certain strategic situations. A high level of
trust is essential for solving the cooperation problems that arise in situations
of strategic interdependence. Such situations can be characterized by the fol-
lowing conditions: A resource is shifted from actor A, the trustor, to actor B,
the trustee. The trustor's reason for this shift of resources is the expectation
to gain from that interaction. However, in shifting resources, actor A makes
herself vulnerable. Her utility diminishes if the trustee does not repay her
initial investment. Trust games involve a crucial temporal asymmetry. The
trustor pays prior to learning about the trustee's response and the latter, in
turn, does not need to decide on her behavior until the trustor has moved.
1See for example [151, 152] for other conceptions.
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Table 6.1: Trust Game: The utilities satisfy Atr > Ano > Adef for the trustor






def for the trustee. Trustees in the left branch
will exploit trust while trustees in the right branch have a dominant strategy
of cooperation.
If the trustee proves trustworthy, both parties receive a positive payo. If
the trustee turns out to be untrustworthy, only the trustee benets while
the trustor ends up with the worst possible payo. Thus, engaging in trust
games is a conscious decision under risk. The trustor invests voluntarily and
without guaranteed success. Of course, a rational trustor will only engage
in a trust game if she expects the opponent to be trustworthy. But, given
the temporal structure of the game, there is no guarantee that the trustee
acts as expected. The trustor might assess her opponent's trustworthiness
incorrectly, trusting an defector or refusing to play with a trustee that would
have cooperated. To accommodate this risk of incorrect assessments, we will
dene trust as a graded variable (cf. [41, p.91-116]), describing how likely
the trustor judges her counterpart to be trustworthy. Within the frame-
work of bounded rational choice theory, this situation can be represented
as a trust game in extensive form with incomplete information [34]. Here,
the trustor's uncertainty about the trustee's trustworthiness is represented
as uncertainty about her payo structure, see Table 6.1.2 In this model, the
2The payos in table 6.1 reect the all-out utilities governing the agents' choice. The
material structure of a trust game (cf. [18]) is usually assumed to be as in the left side of
6.2. TRUST AS AN EXPECTATION 145
uncertainty about the motivations of the trustee is expressed as a draw by
nature: With a certain probability p, A's counterpart is not trustworthy, i.e.,
A will interact with a partner with a dominant strategy of defecting. 1 − p
is the corresponding likelihood of playing with a trustworthy player, having
cooperation as her dominant strategy.3
The central task for the trustor is thus to estimate the likelihood of be-
ing paired with a trustworthy trustee. She will agree to place trust in her
counterpart if and only if she experts her to be cooperative. In this chapter,
we are interested in the determinants of trust: Under which conditions will
our agents develop the expectation that other agents are trustworthy? When
will they expect others to defect?
Current literature on social capital [136, 153] distinguishes a thick and
a thin notion of trust. The thick notion of trust, on the one hand, refers
to personalized attitudes and expectations towards well known, individual
others. This thick notion of trust is grounded in a well established social
relation between the actors, based on acquaintance, joint past experience,
institutional frames or expectations of future interaction. For instance, [122]
presents a related simulation on the emergence of thick trust. The thin
notion of trust, on the other hand, refers to the general attitude towards
strangers, anonymous and hitherto unknown members of society that we
might not expect to ever see again. Faced with situations of thin trust,
agents base their behavior on prevailing social norms, past experience in
similar situations, demeanor, appearance or, more general, membership in
certain social groups [21]. It is this second notion of thin or general trust
that reects the aggregated social capital of a society we are interested in.
In our simulation, we focus on several factors relevant for the evolution and
emergence of thin trust.
Previous research has revealed several determinants of trust. First, the
stability of the social context should allow agents to learn the utility of trust
by iterated interactions [41, p.91-116]. Second, the level of trust initially
existing within a society should, of course, have an impact on the long term
stability and emergence of trust. This initial trust level is classically under-
table 6.1 having (no-trust,abuse) as unique Nash equilibrium.
3Cooperative preferences of the trustee can be motivated by several factors as for
example social norms, sanctions, reputation or anticipation of future interactions. For our
current purposes, the reasons underlying the trustee's behavior are irrelevant. The only
thing we need for this simulation is that there are two types of trustees with dierent
dominant strategies.
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stood as a form of cultural heritage, passed on to next generation by means
of socialization. Dierences in such cultural heritage could, of course, ex-
plain why some populations display a high level of trust and others do not
[136]. Finally, networks and, more generally, social cohesion are perceived as
a source of trust [110]. Accordingly, we expect mobility to have a negative
impact on the trust-level whereas isolating spatial structures and networks
should have a positive eect. We would further expect a close relation be-
tween the percentage of defecting agents and the overall trust level at the
end of our simulations. Naturally, that average trust level at the end of a
simulation should be closely connected to the real percentage of defecting
agents in the population.
6.3 The Model
We take these bounded rationality considerations as a starting point for our
simulation. Our model is based on a population of agents dynamically mov-
ing within a larger society, constantly faced with the decision on whether
or not to trust a stranger. These agents thus need to determine whether
it pays o to trust some anonymous member of society that one has never
seen before. They do so by gradually learning the expected payo of oer-
ing trust to others, by continuously engaging in trust games. Crucially, all
agents will assume both roles sometimes acting as trustors and sometimes
as trustees. We need to determine the agents' behavior in either role and
their corresponding choice mechanisms. We start with the easier of these
cases, the agents' behavior as trustees. We take such behavior to be guided
by some deeper mechanism such as a social norm [19, 20] some concern for
reputation, or the fear of legal prosecution. Crucially, all these factors evolve
on a much larger time scale than the beliefs relevant for the rational decision
whether to trust, thus we can safely assume them to be constant over time.
On the other hand, trustors are guided by the rational choice approach de-
scribed above. A trustor engages in trust games as long as she expects them
to be advantageous for her, on average. Thus, she seeks to learn about the
expected payo of oering trust, or to put it dierently: She sets out to
inquire about the level of trustworthiness present in the given society. We
want to emphasize here that there is no interaction between the two roles,
an agent's behavior as trustor is completely detached from her actions as a
trustee.
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Formally, we represent every member A of a society as a twofold agent,
encoding both her behavior as a trustor and a trustee. Since we take the
trustee's behavior to be invariable over time, we can represent it by a simple
binary parameter trustee, with the values 1 (A always cooperates as a trustee)
and 0 (A always defects). On the other hand, A's behavior as trustor is
completely determined by her expectation of whether trustees cooperate or
not. For this purpose, A is equipped with a variable trust memory tracking
her expectation of a generic trustee being trustworthy or not. As the name
suggests, that expectation is primarily based on the agent's past experience.
The value of trust memory is updated with every new piece of information
A gathers, that is, with every trust game she is involved in, be it as a trustor
or a trustee. We model this update with a weighted average between the
old expectation and the newly acquired information. Our mechanism is in
line with the paradigm of Bayesian Sensor Integration, see for instance [87,
p.10] for details and a discussion of alternative updating rules. To be more
precise, we let the variable trust memory range from 0 to 10, where 0 is the
expectation that the trustees will defect for sure while 10 is the expectation
that every trustee will cooperate, no matter what. For updating the trust
memory, we need to x the weight β ∈ [0; 1], called increment, the agent
attributes to newly acquired information. Updating on a newly incoming
piece of information E is then dened as a weighted average between the
old trust memory and the newly incoming information E, where the latter
receives weight increment :
trust memorynew = (1− β) · trust memoryold + β · E. (∗)
We allow for two dierent ways in which actor A can make new observations
E. First, when acting as a trustor, she has direct access to a new piece of
evidence about the behavior of trustees: If the current trustee cooperates,
the trustor receives a positive feedback (E = 10). A defecting trustee, on
the other hand, triggers a negative feedback (E = 0). However, there is also
a second order way of obtaining information about the behavior of trustees:
When assuming the role of a trustee, an agent can observe whether the
corresponding trustor places trust in her or not. Taking that trustor to be a
rational agent, playing her best strategy, this conveys some indirect or social
clue about the expected behavior of other trustees. In the current model,
we treat this indirect way of learning on par with the direct information
collected as a trustor. Thus the possible observations are E = 10 if the
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trustor is willing to place trust and E = 0 if she refuses to do so. Later, we
will inquire into the relationship between direct and indirect information by
varying the relative weights attributed to the dierent types of information.
Next, we need to describe the trustor's choice rule, based on her collected
information. Following our rational choice approach, agents place trust in
others if the expected return of doing so outweighs the expected return of
not doing so. The Harsanyi transformation of the trust game (see Table 6.1)
reduces this expected utility calculation to the simple question of how likely
it is that the opponent is trustworthy. In our model, the expectation on
trustworthiness is guided by the agent's past observations, recorded in the
trust memory register. Our agents are equipped with a simple decision rule,
determining their trustor behavior as a function of their trust memory. The
decision rule we use in this paper is the threshold rule:
Play trust if trust memory ≥ 5, else do not play.
The exact threshold in the above rule reects a variety of dierent considera-
tions. Castelfranchi and Falcone [36, 37, 56] describe trust as a multifaceted
attitude, resting on a variety of parameters such as the actual monetary
stakes, the trustor's aversion towards misplacing trust, her assessment of
the trustee's capacity to perform relevant tasks and, of course, her actual
trustworthiness, her willingness to perform the task attributed to her. All of
these factors impact, in some way, on the trustor's utility assignments. For
the sake of simplicity, we assume the rst three of these to be constant over
time, making the trustor's trust memory, her expectation about the trustee's
trustworthiness, the only variable parameter in her decision whether to place
trust. Thus, an agent will agree to place trust if her trust memory exceeds a
certain threshold, else she will refuse to accept the trustor's role. The exact
value of that threshold reects, of course, the exact values of the various
other, xed parameters: the monetary stakes, the trustor's aversion towards
having her trust exploited and so forth.
The main focus of our model is not to form expectations about the behav-
ior of some particular individuals, but to learn about the expected payo of
placing trust in some generic, hitherto unknown individuals. Therefore, our
basic model does not contain any individualized learning mechanisms. It is
only in a second step, a mild extension of our model, that we investigate the
eect of a minor learning mechanism about the trustworthiness of individual
others. In this extended model, every agent can keep track of individuals
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that have proven to be exceptionally trustworthy. In situations where the
trustor can choose between various trustees, she will then preferably interact
with these trustworthy agents, if any of them are available.
In order to prevent small-world eects, that is agents repeatedly interact-
ing with the same partners, we assume a relatively large grid of 51×51 elds,
populated with 1500 randomly distributed agents. The various parameters
of the agents and the initial distribution are described below. To increase the
homogeneity of the model, agents crossing the right edge of the grid reap-
pear at the left edge and vice versa  the same holds for the top and bottom
edge. Each round of simulation consists of a rst phase in which the agents
interact with each other, followed by a second phase, in which they move
around. In the interaction phase, the agents randomly pick some individual
that is not yet engaged in any trust game in their immediate vicinity, their
van-Neumann neighborhood. If no such partner is available, the agent stays
unpartnered and does not engage in a trust game in that round. Thus, every
agent can only be part of at most one pair, acting there as either trustor or
trustee. After all pairs played a trust game as described above, all agents,
including the non-partnered, move n steps in a random direction, where the
moving speed n is controlled by the input parameter mobility. Each spot can
only be occupied by one agent at a time. If an agent steps on an already
occupied eld, she will repeat the moving routine until she nds a free spot.
This procedure is iterated 1000 times before the nal measures, the average
trust memory and the nal percentage of trusting agents are extracted.4
Before describing the relevant parameters of the model, we should point
out a crucial asymmetry of the mechanism laid out above. While trusting
agents, i.e., agents with a trust memory larger than 5, happily collect in-
formation round after round, the pessimistic agents are in a less promising
state of mind. By refusing to accept the trustor's role in a trust game they
deprive themselves of the possibility to collect further direct evidence about
the expected utility of trust. The only chance these agents have to adjust
their trust memories and to eventually leave their pessimistic states is to as-
sume the role of a trustee and to therein obtain new information through the
corresponding trustor. Pessimists thus have to encounter a trusting agent,
accepting the role of a trustor and thereby conveying a new, positive piece
4We have identied certain stable congurations that our simulations do not leave
again once they are reached. In case such a stable situation was reached we stopped the
simulation early and took the nal measures.
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of evidence, in order to become trusting again.
We are interested in the inuence of four particular parameters on the
emergence and maintenance of general trust. These are, rst, the actual
percentage of trust-abusers or defectors among all agents, instantiated by the
variable percentage of defectors. These trust abusing agents are randomly
chosen among all available agents at the beginning of each simulation run.
We expect this variable to have a high inuence on the emergence of trust,
since the percentage of defectors reects the actual value of the parameter
the agents intend to learn about. However, given that our interactions have
a local character, density uctuations in the distribution of defectors might
have a signicant eect on the learning process.
The second variable we are interested in is a global parameter, the start-
ing trust degree, encoding the agents' prior beliefs about the cooperativity
of others. The starting trust degree is given by a number in the interval
[0; 10]. The initial trust memory of each agent is then picked from a normal
distribution with standard variation of 2 around that starting trust degree.
As agents interact in the model, these priors will be gradually updated and
overwritten by actual experience of the agents. We therefore expect only
a moderate inuence of the starting trust degree on the nal state. How-
ever, if the starting trust degree is too low, agents will refrain from accepting
the trustor role in the rst place, thereby never being able to learn about
the actual state of the world. Furthermore, observing other agents also not
accepting the trustor role will instantiate an informational cascade. Seeing
these other agents refuse to engage in trust games is taken as additional evi-
dence against trusting others, thus reinforcing one's own negative priors. We
therefore expect the game to converge towards a state of total distrust, once
the starting trust degree falls below a certain threshold.
The third variable of interest is the agents' mobility, a positive number
encoding the distance agents move each round. While the partner for the
trust game is always chosen from a local neighborhood of the agent, the speed
with which agents move between games can vary. This variance is given by
the factor mobility, describing the velocity of the diusion process in society.
Arguably there is a crucial dierence between a mobility of zero and any
dynamic case, characterized by a positive mobility. The rst case mirrors
immobile agents learning about the static, small vicinity surrounding them.
The attitudes of such agents may evolve dynamically, but their surrounding
neighborhood remains constant over time. In the present model, we focus
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on the second, dynamic case, that is, we require agents to move a positive
distance each round. Our expectation is that little mobility will at least tem-
porarily give rise to local dierences in the level of trust, since agents are
moving slowly enough to allow for localized trustful or distrustful regions.
Higher levels mobility, on the other hand, should prevent these regional pat-
terns from arising. Classic predictions from the literature [134] postulate a
negative relationship between mobility and average trust memory and expect
a close connection between low mobility and a high level of trust.
Finally, the fourth value of interest, is the weight β governing the agent's
updating mechanisms. We encode this weight by the factor increment, in
the interval [0; 1]. This increment represents the amount of epistemic weight
agents attribute to newly acquired information, compared to their previously
held believes. Arguably, the role of this weight factor is most intricate. An
all too minimal level of β results in agents remaining in their initial state of
belief, hardly reacting to their environment at all. On the other hand, a too
high level of β might indicate that agents distrust their own past information,
therefore attributing a high weight to recent and incoming evidence. A high
level of increment will thus make the agents' beliefs unstable by putting
much weight on the stream of incoming information with all its noise and
local uctuation. To put it dierently, a high level of increment makes the
agents all too vulnerable to momentary frustration: Two or three consecutive
negative experiences might already suce to convert even the most optimistic
agent with an initial trust memory close to 10, into a pessimist with a trust
memory below 5, a state hard to escape as we have argued above. Thus, best
results are to be expected for intermediate values of β. Empirical studies have
shown the values attributed to newly incoming information to lie anywhere
between 3% and 10%, (see [4, p.154] p.154, or [17]). For most of our results
we will thus average over the dierent values of increment between three and
ten percent to wage against phenomena resting on any particular value.
Finally, we will present several extensions of the model, accommodating
various realistic assumptions. First, we introduce a very limited memory
capacity: While most of our daily interactions slip our attention quickly,
certain important experiences leave a more permanent impression, especially
those that are reinforced by several encounters within a short time span. To
model this, we introduce the following iterative learning scheme: If an agent
A encounters the same partner twice within a short lapse of time, at the
most 9 other positive interactions in between, and this partner turns out to
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be trustworthy, A learns about the nature of this particular partner and adds
the latter to her personal list of trustworthy agents. This learning is done by
building up a unilateral network tie to that partner. Now, whenever A is to
pick a trustee, she preferably picks a partner from that list, if available. We
expect the introduction of this ability to increase the chance of being paired
up with a trustworthy agent, and thus to foster the emergence of general
trust.
Second, we introduce certain geometric inhomogeneities: impenetrable
walls or enclosed areas with bottleneck access. These spatial elements of
the grid create closed local units that are almost uncoupled from the rest
of the population, allowing them to develop their own, local traditions and
expectations. Local inhomogeneities can, in principle, represent any type of
mobility connements to individual agents, be it class distinctions, economic
dierences or actual geographical obstacles.
Third and nally, we are interested in the impacts of external shocks
on the base model and its various extensions: Events such as rumors, mis-
perceptions or particularly prominent showcase examples, propagated and
reiterated through the media, can inuence the general trust expectation
above and beyond the agents' rst hand experiences. Here, we are interested
in the question of whether such small disruptions are evened out in the long
run, or whether they might have a lasting eect on the emergence and de-
struction of trust. Further, we are interested in which factors and conditions
make a society vulnerable or resilient to such short-term shocks.
6.4 Results
In setting up our simulation, we are primarily interested in two types of
results, understanding the local dynamics of trust over a limited amount
of rounds and understanding the limit behavior of the system and how that
depends on the various input parameters. We will primarily use two measures
to track the emergence of trust within a society. The rst of these is the share
of trusting agents at the end of each simulation. Following our decision,
these are exactly those agents with a trust memory of at least 5, thus we are
interested in the measure percent trusting, dened by
percent trusting =




Our rst result is that, in the long run, our model always converges towards
the extreme values 0 or 1 of share trusting. Prima facie, this is not implausi-
ble. All agents are interested in the same question, whether the actual share
of trustworthy agents is high enough to justify trusting unknown others, thus
it is not surprising that they all eventually converge towards the same result.
However, we attribute the high degree of uniformity in this convergence par-
tially to the social part of our learning mechanism, guided by second order
information: The trustee learns about the trustor's behavior and infers from
there to the trustor's informational state. Once the value of percent trusting
is suciently close to either 0 or 1, i.e. almost all trustors share the same
trust attitude, the second order information received is so uniformly nega-
tive (resp. positive) that it drives the state of society further towards that
respective extreme. Thus, the two states of universal trust and universal
distrust could be understood as stable behavioral equilibria in the iterated
trust games performed within our society. Once a simulation has reached
one of these stable equilibria, we will call it trusting or distrusting respec-
tively. We are, however, not only interested in how our simulation converges
to these equilibria, but also which equilibrium the simulation approaches in
the rst place. That is, we are interested in how often the dierent simula-
tions converge towards a state of universal trust and, more generally, in the
exact dependency of this equilibrium selection on the various input parame-
ters of the model. Thus, the second output measure we are interested in is
share trusting, the share of simulations that converge towards the trusting
equilibrium. Given a set of simulations S, this output measure is dened by
Share trusting =
Number of Trusting Simulations in S
Number of Simulations in S
.
It is exactly this study of equilibrium selection and equilibrium convergence
that computational models are most helpful in. While classic game theoretic
solution concepts have little to say about the way an equilibrium emerges,
our simulation does not only oer a reproduction of the game theoretical
results, but it also gives a plausible reconstruction of the way these equilibria
develop.
6.4.1 The Basic Model
We start our examination with two basic results that serve to validate our
model. Naturally, we expect the starting trust degree, the cultural heritage
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Table 6.2: Impact of starting trust degree



























determining the initial trust expectation of agents, to be positively correlated
with the emergence of trust, while the share of trust abusing agents should
have a negative inuence. Our model does validate these two predictions.
All other variables held constant, we nd a positive correlation between the
value of starting-trust and the likelihood of a simulation converging towards
the trusting equilibrium described above. As can be seen in table 6.2, a
higher level of initial trust degree makes it more likely that all agents will
expect others to be trustworthy at the end of the simulation. In this basic
form, our simulation displays the structural behavior predicted by rational
choice theory. We take this as a rst validation that our simulation is an
adequate implementation of the game theoretic model.
Equally, we nd a negative correlation between the percentage of de-
fectors and the probability of a simulation converging towards the trusting
equilibrium (see table 6.3). Again, this is in line with the predictions of game
theory and we take it as a validation of our model. Both these eects are
stable towards changes in the remaining parameters and easy to reproduce.
We thus hold that our basic simulation is an adequate implementation of the
game theoretic model on trust.
For subsequent experiments, we identied a region where the results of
the simulations are not yet determined by any of these two variables alone. In
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Table 6.3: Impact of percentage of defectors

























the following, we will study the inuence of four dierent parameters on the
emergence of trust. In particular, we will use our simulation to examine the
validity of the corresponding predictions about these four parameters. The
rst step is to examine the eect of mobility on the average trust degree.
Next, we vary the weight attributed to newly incoming information. In a
third step we allow agents to construct networks as a very limited way to
keep track of trustworthy partners. We then proceed as a fourth and last
step by introducing spatial restrictions to our grid that limit the mobility
of our agents. Finally, as an extension, we examine the vulnerability of our
model to external shocks on the trust memory.
6.4.2 The Enhanced Model
The following analysis is based on a total sample space of 61440 single simula-
tions with dierent settings, two for every combination of parameters within
the range studied. Half of the simulations included networks. The param-
eters were chosen such that the experiment is not determined by either the
starting trust degree or the percentage of defectors alone, but by an interplay
of these two together with the other parameters of the model. Unless noted
otherwise, the results presented in subsequent sections are based on the set
of basic simulations without networks or spatial restrictions, averaging over
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Table 6.4: Eects of Mobility


















dierent values of initial trust level, percentage of defectors and increment.
Mobility
In recent theories on social capital, the factor mobility is believed to have
a negative impact on the general level of social trust. The current state of
research would argue that social norms and general trust tend to be stronger
in smaller contexts (Putnam 1995). Mobility is sometimes even identied as
the central characteristics of modern society responsible for the decline of
social trust. All the more surprising are our ndings: In the present model,
the factor mobility correlates positively with the emergence of general trust.
As can be seen in table 6.4, a mobility of 1 is detrimental to the emergence
of trust, while higher levels of mobility do not have any traceable impact.5
Our general data, presented in tables 6.2 and 6.3, allows for a more ne
grained analysis of this phenomenon and under which conditions it appears.
As it turns out, the inuence of mobility is categorically weaker than the
rst two parameters, starting trust degree and the percentage of defectors.
Said negative inuence of a low mobility only appears when the simulation
5Within larger grids, similar but weaker eects can also be generated for a mobility
level of 2. Thus, we take this phenomenon to be caused by the interplay of eld size and
mobility rather than the second factor alone.
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Table 6.5: Eects of Mobility on Dissimilarity




















is not already determined by any of the other two parameters alone. The
major impact of a low mobility is at moderate starting trust degrees of 5 or
6. For higher levels of initial trust, the model is already too heavily bent
towards an all-trusting state to allow for a signicant impact of mobility. A
similar analysis holds true for the impact of percent-defectors, as can be seen
in table 6.3. Here, a low and medium percentage of defectors already loads
the dice too heavily towards an all-trusting state, whereas the highest impact
of mobility appears at a suciently high level of defectors.
We claim that this dierence between a mobility of 1 and higher levels of
mobility can be traced back to a local clustering eect. At a mobility of one,
local clusters of trust and distrust occur, as illustrated in gure 6.1, while
higher levels of mobility contribute towards a more isotropic distribution of
trust and distrust. To continue our argument, we proceed as follows: We
rst show that the emergence of trust is inversely correlated to the existence
of local clusters before arguing how a local clustering can contribute to the
emergence of distrust. To show that clusters primarily occur at a mobility of
1 and, much less so, at a mobility of 2, we calculate the index of dissimilarity
between trusting and distrusting agents, measuring how unevenly these two
types are distributed across the entire eld. For the current purpose, we mea-
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sure dissimilarity with the modied Bray-Curtis Index of Similarity,6 based
upon a subdivision of the eld in 3×3 square districts of equal size. Table 6.5
shows the index of dissimilarity taken after 50 and 100 simulation rounds for
dierent values of mobility. Our ndings show a rise of the clustering index
at the beginning of our simulation. This observation is remarkable since we
did not implement any mechanism directly supporting the clustering of the
agents.7 This clustering is instead an endogenous eect of our model that is
not reducible to any special variable.
Finally, we argue how a local clustering could favor the emergence of dis-
trust. More precisely, we show that clusters of distrust spread out, gradually
infecting the trusting regions around them as illustrated in gure 6.1. The
reason for this, briey, is that distrust is more stable than trust. We identify
two related explanations for this stability of distrust. First, we argue that
the strength of the respective beliefs will be much higher in a distrusting
cluster than in the corresponding trusting cluster. Thus, once trusting and
distrusting clusters clash, the distrusting agents will be more resilient in their
beliefs, making it more likely for them to convert others than vice versa. To
see this, we note that once a group of agents converged to a general state
of distrust, agents refuse to engage in any further trust situations. Thus,
the only new information available to such agents is the uniformly negative
second order information trustees extract from the fact that no other trustor
is willing to place any trust. Therefore, the general trust memory in such
a cluster will gradually decline towards 0, the absolute minimum. Within a
cluster of trusting agents, on the other hand, the individual actors continue
to collect new rst order information about the average level of trustworthi-
6Let M be a map divided into a set I of dierent sectors and let p and q be two
populations on that map. For each sector i ∈ I let pi and qi be the number of p and q
agents respectively living in that sector. Then the modied Bray Curtis index of similarity





∣∣∣∣∣ pi∑j∈I pj − qi∑j∈I qj
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Thus, the modied Bray Curtis index measures the classical Bray Curtis dissimilarity [31]





7Such mechanisms are quite common in agent-based-simulations, cf for example the
segregation model of Thomas Schelling [139]. In this model agents remain at their place of
living as long as a certain criterion (having a certain amount of neighbors that are similar
to themselves) is met and move elsewhere if not. Even under moderate input parameters,
the simulation produces a highly segregated output model.
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Figure 6.1: Expanding Cluster of Distrust (black) under mobility = 1
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ness. The second order information inside such trusting clusters will be as
uniformly positive as it is negative in distrusting clusters. However, this sec-
ond order information is mixed with the same agents' rst order experience,
which is sometimes positive and sometimes negative, depending on the part-
ner's trustee type. In particular, receiving both types of information, agents
within the trusting cluster will never converge to the maximal trust level of
10. In particular we expect the strength of beliefs to be weaker inside the
trusting cluster than in a distrusting cluster. As argued above, this asymme-
try aects the interplay of trusting and distrusting agents occurring at the
border areas between the respective clusters. Being less extreme in their be-
liefs makes trusting agents also less resilient towards changing their attitude
towards trust. It is more likely for a trusting agent to become distrusting
than vice versa, resulting in a gradual growth of the distrusting cluster.
The second reason we give for the stability of distrust is related to the
agents' learning speed. We will show that trusting agents update their be-
liefs more often than distrusting agents. Thus, since every change in trusting
behavior is triggered by some informational change, it is also more likely that
a trusting agent changes her trusting behavior than a distrusting agent. To
go a bit more into detail, the newly collected information of some agents will
be usually mixed, containing pieces of positive and negative evidence. This
phenomenon is especially prominent at the border areas between trusting
and distrusting clusters, where both the rst and second order information
can be positive or negative depending on whether the corresponding partner
is trustworthy (respectively trusting) or not. The volatile stream of incoming
data has a certain chance of containing short segments of uniformly positive
or negative information, the main reason for agents to switch their types.
However, note that trusting agents collect double as much information8 as
distrusting agents in the same time interval. The former collect new infor-
mation in the roles of trustors and trustees, while the latter only use their
trustee role to update their informational state. Thus,9 the chance of a trust-
8Recall that all agents have an equal chance of being the rst or second party in a trust
game. It is only inside such a trust game that distrusting agents prefer to play no trust
(see table 6.1), preventing them from learning about the trustee's behavior. Every agent
can only be engaged in at most one trust game at a time, thus being distrusting does not
increase the chance of being picked as a trustee.
9Of course, the chance of a trusting agent switching her state will depend upon the
exact number of trustworthy agents present. If this number exceeds a certain threshold,
trust might actually become more stable than distrust.
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ing agent switching her state in any given time interval is higher than the
chance of a distrusting agent doing so, simply because the trusting agent
collects more information and has thus a higher chance of being subjected
to a short stream of uniformly negative information necessary for a change
in trusting behavior. Hence, there is a higher chance of some trusting agent
becoming distrusting than vice versa, thus causing the distrusting population
to grow gradually.
Increment
Next, we turn our attention towards the factor increment, the relative impor-
tance agents attribute to their more recent information. Our agents estimate
the expected payo of trust through a continued adaptive learning process.
In this process, each piece of incoming information is incorporated into the
agents' trust expectation through a weighted average as depicted in formula
(∗). The factor increment describes the weight attached to the newly incom-
ing information, the higher the factor increment the more evidential weight
an agent puts on her most recent encounters. This parameter is of a dierent
nature than that of the other parameters examined, since it is not directly or
indirectly determined by social conditions alone, but hard wired into the hu-
man learning mechanism. Empirical estimates of increment in the literature
lie anywhere between 3 and 10%, see[17] for an overview.
As it turns out, the parameter increment does have a relevant impact on
the amount of simulations converging towards universal trust. Within the
range of increment studied, there is a negative relation between increment
and the probability of a simulation running towards the trusting equilib-
rium. Lower increments make agents less dependent on their more recent
information and focus more on the bigger picture of their collected infor-
mation. Arguably, this focus on the bigger picture fosters the creation and
stability of trust, as long as there is, in fact, a sucient amount of trustworthy
agents.
We explain this again by the asymmetry between trusting and distrusting
agents described above. Even in a society with fairly high degrees of trust-
worthiness, an unfortunate sequence of trust-abusing encounters can move
an originally trusting agent into distrust, a state hard to escape from. The
higher the value of increment, that is the more weight an agent puts on her
most recent encounters, the less consecutive negative information is needed
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Table 6.6: The Eect of increment on the Emergence of Trust



















to thwart some agent's trusting behavior. To illustrate this with some num-
bers, a highly trusting agent with a trust memory of 9.4 and an increment of
5 requires 13 consecutive negative experiences before loosing her willingness
to place trust. The same agent, but with an increment of 10 would already
be frustrated by a short stream of 6 negative encounters. Notably, the qual-
itative outcomes of our simulations do not hinge on the precise values of
increment. While the dierent values of that parameter do generate dierent
quantitative outcomes, the qualitative relationship between the remaining
parameters remains invariant. We take this as a further validation of our
simulation, showing that our qualitative results are robust towards smaller
changes in the parameter increment. For the rest of this chapter, we hedge
against the impact of any particular values of increment by averaging over
the integer values of increment in the interval between 3 and 10%.
Second Order Learning
In our basic model we treat the rst and second order learning mechanisms
on par. That is, our agents attribute equal weights to the direct, rst order
experience about other trustees and to their second order experience, gained
as trustees. Of course, this need not be the case. For instance, some trustor
that is skeptic towards the motivations or competence of others might wish
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Table 6.7: Impact of Second Order Learning




















to attribute less importance to her second order information. Or, conversely,
some agent newly arriving at alien surroundings might assume locals to be
better informed than herself and thus primarily try to learn by mimicking
their behavior. Such an agent would, presumably, attribute a higher weight
to her second order information, the observed behavior of others, than to the
gradually incoming stream of her own rst hand experiences. Similarly, some
agent who does not want to stick her head out, but behave in line with the
majority, would attribute a higher weight to her second order experiences,
tracking the majority behavior. Here, we are generally interested in the
impact second order information has on the emergence of trust. In particular,
we want to show again that the qualitative outcomes of our simulation are
robust towards minor changes in the relationship between rst and second
order information. To this end we introduce the parameter second order
factor into our model, measuring how much more or less importance the
agents attribute to their second order information, relative to their rst order
evidence. Treating rst and second order learning on par, as we do in our
initial model, corresponds to a second order factor of γ = 1. On the one
extreme a second order factor of γ = 0 indicates that no second order learning
is taking place at all, while a second order factor of 2 corresponds to agents
attributing double as much weight to social clues than to their own rst
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hand experience. Formally this results in new updating rules for how the
agents incorporate new information. For the case of rst order learning,
the information an agent collects as trustor, we maintain the update rule
displayed in equation (∗). Second order information, collected as a trustee,
is incorporated by the formula
trust memorynew = (1− β · γ) · trust memoryold + β · γ · E
where β denotes the usual increment while γ stands for the second order
factor. The exact value of the second order factor may reect epistemic
considerations, taking others to be more or less knowledgeable, as well as
non-epistemic considerations such as a desire for uniformity. Notably, any
epistemic conclusion to be drawn from second order information rests on
two implicit assumptions about the source of information. The second order
information does not give direct access to the trustor's past experience of
trustworthiness, but merely to her willingness to place trust in others. Ob-
viously, this information looses its value if that trustor herself had little or
no information to base her beliefs on. Thus, the rst assumption we need to
make is that the source of second order information is herself knowledgeable.
But more is true: Obviously, a trustor that always places trust in others, no
matter what, or that uses some altogether dierent decision rule is of not
much worth as a source of information. Thus the second implicit assumption
underlying social learning is that the observed trustee applies some reason-
able decision rule, similar enough to the one of the learner. In situations
where it is unclear whether these two assumptions are satised, for instance
in highly diverse or inhomogeneous societies, agents might be cautions to-
wards their second order information, resulting in a reduced second order
factor.
As argued above, the pure rst-order mechanism has a bias towards dis-
trust, since it can convert trusting agents into distrusting ones but not vice
versa. The second order mechanism, on the other hand, moves the overall
trust expectation towards the current majority opinion. If there are more
trusting than distrusting agents, the majority of trustees will make the pos-
itive experience of being trusted and thus collect a positive feedback. Con-
versely, if there are less trusting than distrusting agents, the second order
experience will be negative on average. All our simulations start with an
excess of trusting agents, thus we expect a positive impact of the second
order factor on the emergence of trust. As can be seen in table 6.7, this is
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indeed true, a higher second order factor contributes towards the emergence
of trust. However, just as with increment, it is more important to us that the
dierent values of second order learning do not aect the structural interplay
between the remaining parameters. This holds true as long as the second
order factor is not overly low, thus validating our choice of γ = 1 as a good
representative value in the initial model.
Networks
In our basic model, agents are not embedded in any social context, nor do
they have any sort of personalized learning mechanism. This unrealistic as-
sumption is now mitigated by the implementation of networks. We allow
agents to build up social ties with other agents after making positive expe-
riences. If a trustor encounters the same trustworthy partner twice within a
short period of time, that is with at most 9 positive interactions in between,
the trustor creates a network tie to this trustee. We see this mechanism not
as the emergence of some sort of social groups, but as a more detailed way
of learning about the surrounding environment. In particular, networks are
unilateral, thus the trustee will not learn that she has entered any network.
Trustors will resort to their trust network10 when asked to pick between dif-
ferent trustees. If agents have to choose between dierent trustees, they will
preferably opt for agents in their trust network. Thus, increasing the chance
of being paired up with trustworthy partners, we expect trust networks to
have a strongly positive eect on the emergence of trust. However, we could
not produce any such eect in our simulations. Adding networks alone did
not have any signicant eect on the emergence of trust. The results pre-
sented in the next sections, however, will reveal some eects of networks
in combination with other factors such as geographical inhomogeneities or
external shocks.
Spatial Structure
As a last adaptation of our basic trust simulation we implemented spatial re-
strictions into our simulation. The baseline simulations have been conducted
on a total isotropic space, depicting a homogeneous society without any re-
strictions on the agents movements. To relax this restriction, we incorporate
10The list of agents as network members can contain at most 20 members.
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Figure 6.2: Example of a Spatial Restrictions (black)
some spatial structure into the grid, creating protected pockets and conned
areas with bottleneck access, as illustrated in gure 6.2. Importantly, we will
still assume the underlying society to be connected,11 thus any square can,
in principle, be reached by any agent.
Crucially, spatial restrictions have a major impact on the convergence
behavior of our simulations. It is no longer true that all simulations converge
towards a state of universal trust or distrust. Rather, spatial restrictions
facilitate the emergence of local equilibria, that is local clusters of trust or
distrust that emerge independently from the rest of society.
Overall, we nd a negative impact of spatial restrictions on the emergence
of trust. A further analysis, combining spatial restrictions with networks,
shows a slightly positive eect of the latter on the general trust level. How-
ever, all of the eects described are rather miniscule compared to the overall
number of simulations. A closer analysis reveals spatial structures to have a
signicant eect only under low values of mobility.
11Recall that agents falling of at the right edge of the grid reappear at the left edge and
similarly for top and bottom.
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Table 6.8: Spatial Structures and Mobility





















Trust and Trustworthiness, a Puzzle
Finally, we report a puzzling observation about our simulation. Many the-
oretical frameworks postulate a correlation between an agent's behavior as
trustor and trustee. Models such as [57] claim that an increased trust in
others fosters one's own propensity to be trustworthy and, vice versa, being
trustworthy is correlated with higher expectations towards others. Crucially,
no such mechanism was implemented in our model. Just to the contrary, each
agent's trustee type is xed throughout the entire simulation while the be-
havior as trustor is guided by past experience exclusively. Nor did we model
any retaliation mechanism that other trustors could use against trust abusing
agents. Our basic simulation did not include any learning mechanism, thus
all trustors will be treated equally regardless of their behavior as trustees.
Yet, our simulation shows a signicant correlation between the agents' trustee
types and their expectation about the trustworthiness of others. Given this
complete independence between the two roles, we would expect the agents'
trust memories, tracking their past experience, to be independent of their
trustee type. That is, we would assume it to be as likely as not that the
average trust memory of all trustworthy agents is higher than the average
trust memory of untrustworthy agents. As can be seen in table 6.9, this does
not hold true, but trustworthy agents will have a higher trust expectation
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Table 6.9: Correlation between Trust Memory and Trustee Type













































than their untrustworthy peers in far over half of the simulations. The eect
is strongest at low mobility levels, with trustworthy agents outperforming
trust abusers in up to 75% of all simulations. Admittedly, we do not have a
convincing explanation for this phenomenon yet. We conjecture that being
trustworthy and thus producing positive feedback as a trustee increases the
chance of being surrounded by trusting agents and thus indirectly increases
the likelihood of receiving positive second order information when acting as
a trustee. This conjecture is, however, far from being well tested and we
regard this phenomenon as an open puzzle.
Taken together, these results are disillusioning: A multitude of factors
that were identied in the literature as being benecial for the emergence of
trust either have no inuence or even an eect contrary to what is predicted
by the literature, as is the case with spatial restrictions, mobility and net-
works. In our simulation trust develops best in a society without any spatial
or social restrictions and with a high level of mobility.
External Shocks
Sometimes external events impact on the agents perception of society. Some
prominent event, picked up and repeated by the media, might have a stronger
eect on some agent's perception of trustworthiness than even an entire se-
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Table 6.10: Networks and Shock Vulnerability

























ries of private encounters. But also spreading rumors or cleverly designed
media campaigns could impact on the agents' propensity to trust others. We
will refer to all these events as shocks, singular events impacting the agents'
propensity to trust that are not based on any direct experience. In principle,
such shocks could go in either direction, raising or lowering the general will-
ingness to engage in trust. In the present simulation, we focus on negative
shocks only, short term events that thwart the agents' expectation of trust-
worthiness. After 200 rounds of simulation, we introduce an external shock
that diminishes each agent's trust memory by a random amount between 0
and 5 points.
We are not so much interested in the short term impact of such shocks as
in their long term eects. Our main topic of interest is when and how such
shocks can have lasting eects on the long term behavior of a society. That
is, we want to know when such negative shocks can convert some simulation
that is underway towards the trusting equilibrium into a state of universal
distrust. And, of course, we are also interested in which factors could make
societies vulnerable or resilient to long term eects of informational shocks.
Here, we are primarily interested in the role of social networks as a tool that
could help a society to recover from an informational shock and to return to
its status quo ante.
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As it turns out, the relationship between networks and vulnerability to
external shocks is intricate: At low levels of mobility, the existence of net-
works reduces the vulnerability towards external shocks signicantly. For
instance at a low mobility rate of 1, only 30.5% of all simulations without
networks converge towards the trusting equilibrium. Allowing agents to form
network ties increases this share to 34.5% of all simulations. However, this
pattern reverses as the agents become more mobile. For medium levels of
mobility, the existence of networks increases the vulnerability of a society
to shocks, see table 6.10 for details. Similar results hold in the presence of
spatial restrictions. There too, networks in combination with a low level of
mobility have a strongly positive eect on the resilience to external shocks,
while the eect of spatial restrictions alone is weaker and ambiguous.
6.5 Conclusion and Outlook
Generalized trust is a driving factor for the economic and political success
of societies. The factors and determinants relevant for a high level of trust
have, by now, been the subject of a vast body of empirical and theoretical
research. However, social theories usually have problems in capturing the
procedural character of social life. Computer simulations can help to ll this
blind spot by reproducing and exploring the dynamical processes underlying
various social phenomena. In this chapter, we have presented a computer
simulation on the dynamics of generalized trust. Our agent based model rests
on two pillars. The rst pillar is a rational choice framework, describing the
decision to trust others as a rational decision under uncertainty. The second
pillar is a body of empirical and theoretical work on trust, identifying various
parameters and mechanisms we incorporated in our simulation.
The primary aim of this simulation was to nd conditions and parameters
that foster the creation of trust. The research literature identies four vari-
ables as important for the emergence or disappearance of trust. These are
the mobility of the agents, spatial structures in a given society that might or
might not foster social bonds, social networks and the agents' prior expecta-
tions gained through previous interactions or acquired in their socialization
process.
Our simulation allowed us to disentangle these factors and study each
factor individually with respect to its role in the emergence of trust. In
order to set up our simulation, we had to identify further relevant factors
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about society and the mental makeup of the agents often overlooked in the
literature. These factors are the actual share of trust abusing agents within
a society, but also the learning mechanism employed by the individual agents
as well as their perception of other agents' goals and competences.
In our model, these input factors served as driving forces behind the dy-
namics of trust. As a rst result, we showed that our baseline model reacts
to the two central factors, the agents' initial trust expectation as well as the
actual share of trustworthy agents, in the way rational choice theory leads
us to expect. We take this as a validation of our general model. In the ex-
tended model, we obtained surprising results concerning the roles of mobility,
networks and geographical heterogeneity for social trust. We interpret these
unexpected results as evidence that our theoretical knowledge on the deter-
minants on trust in a dynamic perspective is incomplete and misleading. In
particular for the factor mobility, our ndings are almost opposite to what
is predicted in the literature. These results suggest that the corresponding
empirical results might hinge on some hidden variables that are yet to be
revealed, such as dierences in the actual level of trustworthiness or some
crossover between thick and thin notions of trust. On a more conceptual
level, our results show that the use of simulations adds a helpful dimension
in understanding trust and other social phenomena. In future extensions, we
wish to complete this picture by incorporating further relevant inuence fac-
tors and mechanisms. In particular, we aim to endogenize and dynamify the
behavioral rules guiding the actions of trustees. There, we aim to explore and
evaluate dierent proposed explanations for and mechanisms of the trustees'
behavior, ranging from social norms to a game theoretic perspective on legal
prosecution.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
To conclude this thesis, I want to oer some general remarks on the how, what,
and why of using formal tools in philosophy. Being a concluding chapter, my
main aim here is not to oer novel insights into these questions, but to equip
the reader with some framing remarks that should help to assess the content
presented in the previous chapters.1 Most of the things said here will be
old news to people working in the respective elds, yet they are rarely made
explicit. I feel that addressing these topics explicitly can help the reader to
see how the work presented in the previous chapters could relate to other
debates in the respective areas.
To begin with, let us x some notation. I will use the words formal
or formalization for any application of formal methods to the replication,
representation, discussion or treatment of a given target system. This target
system can, in principle, be about anything, a philosophical argument, some
piece of human behavior or even a formal or semi-formal theory itself. To be
a bit more precise, the term formalization has two readings, a narrow and a
wide one. The wide scope refers to any activities related to the replication,
representation, discussion or treatment of a target system with formal tools.
These activities involve the actual translation into a formal framework, but
also choosing and developing an appropriate formal system, preparing the
target system for formalization or discussing and justifying the various steps
involved. In contrast, the narrow scope reading of formalization refers only to
the rst of these steps, the actual representation of a target system within a
formal framework. Since we are interested in the entire process surrounding
1For a more general introduction on the dierent roles that formal or scientic methods
can play in philosophy and their potential benets see [105].
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formalizations, we will primarily use formalization in the rst, wide scope
reading, unless specied otherwise.
Before continuing, we should remark de that the debate about formaliza-
tion in philosophy shares many features with classic debates about models
in science, see for instance [65, 117, 164]. While we will come back to this
topic in section 7.3, I should emphasize that these debates depart in at least
two relevant aspects from what I am interested in here. First, not every
application of formal tools in philosphy, some would say, is, or is related to,
a model, at least not in the sense of [163, 164]. And it goes without saying
that also the converse holds true: Not every model in philosophy is formal
in nature. Second, unlike some of the literature on models, I am not only
interested in the outcome of formalizations, be it a model or not, but also in
the process leading there including e.g., planning a model, formulating the
modeling goals or choosing a formal framework. Chapter 3, for instance, is
not directly aimed at constructing a model, but at exploring and comparing
dierent logical frameworks one could use for models of informational states.
There is no unique way of going formal. Just to the contrary, the litera-
ture on formal philosophy contains an entire zoo of formal frameworks such
as game theory, epistemic logic, Bayesian models or computer simulations
to name but a few. Each of these frameworks has its special strength and
weaknesses making it t for some particular applications but not for others.
And of course, several of the frameworks may be used to address the same
target system. In some cases, interactive belief dynamics for instance, dier-
ent frameworks may produce competing accounts of the same target system.
In other cases, several frameworks need to join forces to address some tar-
get system adequately, with, for instance, logical models incorporating some
probabilistic insights [39].
For this conclusion, I will concentrate on three particularly prominent
formal frameworks from our previous case studies: logical and probabilistic
tools and computer simulations. We take these to be good representatives of
the wide range of formal methods in the literature. Notably, these dierent
frameworks relate to dierent target systems, they represent dierent levels
of interest, dierent modeling intuitions and dierent ways to their target
systems. We will present the strengths and weaknesses of these frameworks
individually, but also their potential interaction.
The structure of this concluding chapter is as follows: We will start by
discussing a variety of functions that formal models could satisfy before in-
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troducing the individual framework families. After discussing the dierent
techniques individually with respect to their what, how and why, we will
address the potential interaction of these techniques. We nally present a
spotlight section on the dierent roles of dynamics patterns in formal models
before concluding.
7.1 Why formalization?
Before diving into the what and how of formalization, we should spend a brief
moment on the why. What drives the increasing popularity of formal tools?
What are the promises, hopes or benets attached to using formal models
in philosophy and related elds? In the following, I present three major
types of benets motivating formal programs, clarication, verication and
exploration. In the following we present a list of possible benets from
formalizations. Not all of them will we present in every application of formal
methods. At times, several of these goals could or will be pursued in parallel,
at others, they will conict with each other.
In the rst case, formalizations aim at clarifying various aspects of the
target system. This aspect, clarication, is pursued in dierent ways along
the various steps of the formal process. I will present three distinct ways in
which formal models can increase clarity about the target system, explica-
tion, highlighting and revealing. For the rst of these, note that most formal
frameworks are phrased in a well dened and highly precise manner. Thus,
formalization can serve, or help, to substitute some notions and concepts
with highly precise formal concepts, thereby reducing ambiguity about the
target system. This rst aspect is closely related to explication in the car-
napian sense [35, 105], that is, the replacing of some inexact, pre-theoretical
concept with a more exact one. Second, formalization can help to clarify
a target system by highlighting or focusing on some relevant structural pat-
terns. Through highlighting certain parts while relegating or omitting others,
formalizations allow the modeler to study selected aspects of a target system
in isolation and greater detail. Ideally, a well chosen formal model represents
some situation in a fashion that facilitates recognizing and understanding
patterns and structural relationship within the target system. This second
way is loosely connected to idealizations in modeling which we will come back
to later in this chapter. Let me give a prominent example: Translating some
social situations such as the prisoners dilemma to its underlying game matrix
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not only removes many aspects of the situation such as the social relation-
ship between the players or their informational and emotional states. Game
matrices also make it particularly easy to grasp the strategic structure of the
situation, for example by identifying dominant moves or strategies. But, this
is the third aspect, the clarifying function of formalization may even start
before the actual translation into a formal system. Already the attempt to
formalize some target system can be informative about some of its features.
One aspect of a formalization is to represent the target system in a usually
highly precise formal framework. Composing such a representation forces the
modeler to ll in any gaps or ambiguities present in, for instance, the infor-
mally given social theory she is interested in. Sometimes, especially in the
social sciences, the corresponding gaps might not even be known prior to the
formal endeavor. It is only in preparing the target system for formalization
that these gaps are revealed.
The second purpose formalizations can have, besides clarifying, is to be
corrective or controlling. A typical philosophic argument is presented in some
informal, everyday language. But is it really conclusive, or does it rest on
some hidden assumption, so familiar that we wouldn't notice? Social scien-
tists explain macroscopic behavioral patterns through underlying motivations
of the individuals. Are the mechanisms and motivations identied really suf-
cient to explain the explanandum? These questions can be addressed with
the help of formal representations. There are at least two ways in which for-
malizations can help in controlling some informal theoretical model. First,
formal models are highly explicit about their underlying assumptions and
preconditions. Thus, a formal model allows to easily keep track of the as-
sumptions a target systems makes or needs to make for deriving a certain
conclusion. In the same vein, formal models can help at identifying mini-
mal sets of assumptions necessary for deriving a certain conclusion. Second,
formalizations can help in assessing the validity of various inferences in or
about a target system. Formal tools allow to study general patterns of valid
or invalid inference, as is done in propositional logic. But formal models can
also be used to replicate individual inferential or dynamical processes. In
particular in the social sciences, many target systems deal with social pat-
terns gradually arising within some temporal system. Computer simulations
allow to replicate the underlying dynamic processes of such systems, allowing
to test whether some assumed causal or probabilistic relationship between
input mechanisms and output phenomena does hold.
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The third function of formalizations is explorative or creative. The use of
formal tools is not restricted to a mere representation of some target system.
Just to the contrary, many formal frameworks are equipped with a number of
methods and techniques inviting to explore a given model even further. These
methods or techniques come in many dierent avors. Some frameworks,
such as game theory, merely represent the target system in a manner easily
accessible for further analysis. Other formalizations, in particular those using
mathematical tools, are accompanied by a large fundus of structural insights
in the form of lemmas and theorems or inference tricks. Yet other systems,
in particular those using computers, explore the target system by solving the
underlying equations, but also by oering complex graphical representations.
All these techniques can, in many cases, provide additional insights into
the target system that would not have been reached without them. Some
authors, especially in the literature on economic models [67, 149], compare
this explorative use to experiments in the natural sciences. In setting up a
formal model, just as in setting up an experiment, a scientists isolates some
factors and conditions she wants to know more about [64]. The explorative
use of formal models then provides new information about the interplay of
these factors and conditions just as conducting the experiment generates a
new set of data about a system.
Here is an example to illustrate this point. In 1950, Kenneth Arrow
[8] published his famous impossibility theorem about preference aggregation
that would later be used by others to cast serious doubt on the possibility
of eliciting a general will [137]. Arrow showed that a certain set of innocent
looking, highly desirable properties about voting rules is jointly inconsistent.
This result would have been close to impossible to discover without the help
of formal methods  both for its surprising and counterintuitive character as
well as for the complexity of reasoning necessary for deriving it.
Note that the understanding, conrmation or exploration gained from
some formal model, once established, persists independently of this formal-
ization. That is, once a particular argument has been established as valid,
it can be safely applied by anybody, independently of any knowledge or un-
derstanding of the underlying formal tool. To give a concrete example, the
Condorcet Jury Theorem, stating that the majority opinion of a group is
extremely likely to be accurate if the group is only large enough, has be-
come folklore in social epistemology and parts of political philosophy. Yet,
most people actively applying this result would be unable to produce a for-
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mal proof. On a related note, also our model in chapter 4 is interested in
judgment aggregation. We aim to identify a certain set of conditions under
which our dierential aggregation rule outperforms straight averaging. In
order to apply this mechanism, all that a decision maker needs to know are
rough estimates of the dierent experts' competences. No other knowledge
of the formal framework and no understanding of the proofs is required to
apply the method successfully. But, of course, there is the usual caveat for
any type of tools. Not knowing how they function precisely, in this case not
understanding the assumptions or the intuitions behind some proofs, will
increase the risk of misapplying or misusing them.
Throughout her career, each scientist or philosopher develops a toolbox
of useful methods and experiences, containing, inter alia, conceptual frame-
works, formal techniques, argumentational patterns, computer programs,
theorems and many other things. When faced with some new situation or
eld of inquiry, the scientist can resort to her toolbox, freely applying and
combining any techniques she nds useful for solving this problem. Formal-
izations, as we have just shown, can inuence such a toolbox in various ways.
First and foremost, formal methods can simply constitute some of the instru-
ments contained in such a toolbox. But even beyond this, formal methods
can impact a scientist's toolbox in various, indirect ways. Formalizations can
increase the trust towards some of the tools, clarify the exact conditions of
application for others, yet newly create third ones.
7.2 Formal paradigms
The list of desiderata for a formal model is long. It should represent all
the relevant aspects and mechanisms of the target system while being as
clear and simple as possible. And it should ideally be accompanied by some
method for exploring the target system and gaining additional insights. This
method can be a calculus, some human or automated reasoning system or
additional visualization tools. Of course, the exact choice of framework de-
pends upon the target system, but also on the interest of the modeler. In this
conclusion we focus on three main families of frameworks widely used in con-
temporary formal philosophy and the social sciences: Logic and probabilistic
tools and computer simulations. We will further oer some remarks on game
theory as a particularly widespread modeling framework in philosophy and
the behavioral sciences.
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The rst two are sometimes also referred to as qualitative vs. quantitative
models. All these frameworks have been used in the ve case studies earlier
in this thesis. We start by presenting the three frameworks to be targeted
here.
The rst framework, logic, is the hardest to dene. Even within the logic
community, there is little agreement of what logic exactly is. Some restrict
logic to the study of correct reasoning patterns, while others would even
propose a much wider reading than the one presented here. In the following,
I outline a rough characterization of logic as a modeling tool. Logic focuses
on broad structural regularities within some target system. Typically, logical
models concentrate on one particular aspect of a target system, for instance
the informational states of agents in interaction or the truth and falsity of
individual propositions. Even further, logical models choose one or more
degrees of abstraction in which they want to represent that aspect. A logical
model about belief, for instance, may only be occupied with what the agents
believe. It is not interested in why the agents hold their beliefs nor how
strongly they do so.
The prime vehicle of a logical model is a logic, consisting of a formal lan-
guage for representing the properties of interest together with some account
of their structural patterns. So let us have a look at these two dening parts
of a logic and how they can be represented.
The rst of these two, the language of a logic, is a set of formal expres-
sions such as a → b or ϕ to describe the target system. A particularly
prominent type of language, especially for modeling social interaction, are
modal languages as used in chapters 2 and 3. Modal languages enrich the
classical propositional language with a set of modal operators, each repre-
senting some selected aspect of the target system. Epistemic logic, to give
but one example, amend classical logic with monadic operators Ki, where
Kix expresses that agent i knows that x.
Next to its language, a logic also consists of a structural component de-
scribing the relationship between the individual formulas. It is this struc-
tural information that forms the core of a logic, encoding the properties of
the individual terms and operators as well as their interplay. These struc-
tural properties can be given in various ways, implicitly or explicitly, using
syntactic or semantic characterizations. The former of these, the syntactic
approach, presents a logic by identifying certain relationships between the in-
dividual formulas of the logic. This can be, for instance, done through axioms
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or axiom schemes, marking some formulas as always true, but also through
a calculus governing the derivation of formulas from each other. Semantic
characterizations on the other hand, dene the properties of the logic, in
terms of their intended applications. A semantic characterization gives some
representative set of models or situations for the logic. This set, together
with an interpretation function relating the logical language to the individ-
ual models, then denes the logic. Its structural relationships are precisely
those present in all of the designated models.
Depending upon the target system, logical formalizations can take various
shapes. In case of a complex theory, say about the aggregation of preferences,
an appropriate formalization may be an entire logic representing that the-
ory. If the target systems is something more concrete, a social situation or
a particular philosophic argument, a formalization can consist of a particu-
lar model (in the sense of model theory) of some appropriate logic, that is
some formal object interpreting the respective logical language. Most logical
frameworks used for the analysis of human interaction specify a standard
type of model, giving a blueprint for representing target situation, but also
allowing to reason semantically rather than syntactically about the logic in
question.
For the present purpose, I will use the term logical modeling broadly,
referring to any use of formal techniques aimed at, motivated by, employing
or working within a logical system. Logical formalization thus comprises the
construction and application of a particular logic, the choice and justication
of its axioms, but also the representation of some target situation as a model
of some logic.
The second framework, probabilistic models, refers to the representation
of a target situation with the means of probability theory. Probabilistic tools
are used for a wide range of applications including the strength of beliefs,
reasoning and perception in noisy environments or uncertainty about the
behavior or group membership of some individual other. Within our case
studies, we have applied probabilistic tools to represent degrees of exper-
tise (chapter 4), but also subjective expectations about interaction partners
(chapter 6). Probabilistic models represent certain features of the target
system with a probabilistic vocabulary, using terms such as simple and con-
ditional probabilities, mean values and variances. While implicitly assuming
that the target system is or can be described by some probability distri-
bution, many statistical models decide to remain silent about some of the
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details. They rather single out the parameters relevant for subsequent anal-
ysis, such as, say, the probabilistic dependency between individual variables
or the variance of the distribution. The choice of relevant parameters de-
pends upon the target system as well as on the aims to be pursued in the
formalization. To illustrate this, consider the case study on expert judgment
presented in chapter 4. While we assume that every expert can, in principle,
be represented by some particular probability distribution, we remain silent
about the exact distribution. We do not even specify a particular shape of
distribution such as for, instance, a normal or a beta distribution. All that
is relevant for our model are the rst and second moments, the mean and
variances of the dierent distributions and these are the only parameters ever
mentioned in our model.
A particular strong point of mathematical models is their inferential
capability. Modern day mathematics provides a highly ecient reasoning
framework through both, the set of mathematical theorems available as well
as widespread familiarity with the probabilistic framework. Representing
the target system in a probabilistic language gives access to this reasoning
framework for uncovering structural properties of the target system, reason-
ing about a particular model or a set of models and predicting their future
behavior.
Computational models, the third framework type, refer to any type of
formal framework using computation to represent, predict and reason about
the target system. I will use the term computational model in a broad sense,
referring not only to the actual computational component, but the entire pro-
cess related, including constructing or choosing a framework in question and
justifying the choices made (see [61]). Computational models add towards
the understanding of the what and the how of the target system, solving
formal problems inaccessible to analytical methods, but also providing nu-
merical or graphical representations of the target system. An important class
of computational models to be found in the humanities (and also the social
or natural sciences) are simulations [60, 61], tracking the temporal evolution
of some target system. Here computational models help to determine, un-
derstand, depict and even manipulate the temporal evolution of some target
system (see chapter 6). Other computational models do not immediately
track the evolution of a dynamic system, but provide solutions to relevant
mathematical problem that could not be obtained otherwise, for instance by
calculating the Nash equilibria of certain games [99].
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Before advancing to the next session let us spent some words on a further,
particularly prominent modeling tool, game theory. In this conclusion I will
slightly deviate from the standard use of the term game theory by treating
it as a predominantly conceptual rather than formal framework.
7.2.1 Game Theory
From its origins as a study of board games, game theory has developed into
a major conceptual framework for representing almost any type of goal di-
rected, interactive behavior be it in coordination, cooperation or competition.
Game theory has, over the last years, turned out to be an extremely versatile
tool. It has been successfully applied within a large variety of elds, philos-
ophy, economics, computer science, linguistics, addressing a broad range of
topics from the analysis of global political summits [133] to the evolutionary
emergence of bird cries [166].
Game theory is foremost a conceptual framework. It proposes a par-
ticular vocabulary for treating strategic interaction, involving terms such
as players, moves, strategies and payos. Various formalizations and
representations are based on this vocabulary, some using logical, other prob-
abilistic tools. It is only through formal representations that game theory
became as powerful a framework as it is. Tree representations and normal
forms facilitate the analysis of the strategic structure of dierent situations,
allowing to identify certain moves as rational or dominant, but also to identify
similarities between social situations. If two situations, no matter how dif-
ferent in their subject matter, have the same game representations, they are,
in a certain sense, structurally similar. The use of formal tools has helped
to formulate, but also to discover various concepts and strategies such as
dominance, equilibria or backward induction that heavily impacted our cur-
rent understanding of social interaction. Individual concepts such as Pareto
optimality have even escaped the technical surrounding in which they were
originally dened in and long since made it into ordinary language use.
The strategic structure is, of course, only one aspect of a game situation.
There are other relevant aspects, such as the social status of the players,
their risk attitudes or their informational states. To illustrate this, imagine
a striker shooting a penalty in a football game. For choosing between the
right and left corner of the goal he will not so much refer to the strategic
structure, but to his expectations about which corner the goalie will cover or
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how the latter would reason about him. For a more inclusive analysis of such
a situation and the resulting actions, game theoretic models need to be com-
plemented with formalizations of other relevant aspects. This is the starting
point of epistemic game theory, a relatively young program aimed at formal-
izing the interaction between the game structure and the players' epistemic
states. Epistemic game theory, just as classic game theory, can be repre-
sented with probabilistic [131] as well as logical [125] means. For instance,
our rst case study in chapter 2 presents a logical model of epistemic game
theory, aiming to additionally incorporate the dynamics of agents' beliefs.
7.3 Formalizations, Models and Validity
The term formalization does not refer to a single activity, but to an entire
set of processes, choosing a framework, preparing the target system for rep-
resentation, creating some particular representation, reasoning in or about
it and validating the model obtained. All of these steps may involve sub-
stantial choices and erce debate. The various choices may, in some cases,
reect dierent perspectives or interests of the modeler, but they may also
be relevant for later steps such as the justication or validation of a model.
In the following, we will inquire further into two central steps in the formal
processes, choosing an adequate formal framework and validating a model.
7.3.1 Choosing a framework
A central step in the formal endeavor is the selection of an adequate for-
mal framework. A sculptor setting out to carve a gure will have to decide
between dierent materials, say clay, stone or marble. Similarly, a formal
modeler trying to represent some situation will have to choose between dif-
ferent frameworks. This problem of choosing a framework was, for instance,
the underlying motivation behind chapter 3. There, we compared dier-
ent logical frameworks with respect to some properties a modeler might be
interested in.
Picking a framework shares many features with the selection of a scientic
theory. A formal framework, just as a scientic theory, makes some choice
about which features are treated as primitive and which as derived. But the
choice of framework, again just like a scientic theory, also imports certain
structural assumptions through its underlying axioms and denitions. For
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instance, by choosing to represent some given epistemic situation within an
S5 epistemic logic, we automatically buy into full positive and negative intro-
spection and common knowledge of the situation for all agents, see also the
discussion in chapter 3. In line with Kuhn's ndings about theory choice, also
the selection of formal framework is guided by many, potentially opposing
considerations. We will come back to this point in discussing logical models,
later in this section.
A particularly prominent use of formalizations is to create and explore
representational formal models, goal directed representations of some tar-
get system. Consequentially, the philosophic debate about scientic mod-
els has much to oer towards discussing and understanding formalizations
[60, 65, 117, 164]. An important example, relevant for the discussion of ad-
equacy or validity, is the distinction between abstractions and idealizations
[116, 147, 162], sometimes also described as Galilean resp. minimal ideal-
izations. A formal model, as most other types of models, strips of certain
parts and features of the target system, concentrating on others. The way in
which this stripping of happens varies substantially from case to case. Some
formalizations aim at what is dubbed an abstraction or Galilean idealiza-
tion, ideally only omitting aspects irrelevant to the pattern or mechanism in
question. Others are (minimal model) idealizations, intentionally misrepre-
senting or omitting some relevant factors or mechanisms. For understanding
complex situations, it can be easiest to study the mechanisms involved sepa-
rately, even if, in nature, they always appear conjointly. Similarly, it can be
instructive to study some highly idealized or distorted, yet conceptually or
mathematically tractable setting in order to identify or explore some possible
mechanisms, see [149]. To give a concrete example, in chapter 6 we presented
a computational model on the emergence of trust in societies. In this model,
agents learn about the value of trust only through their own rst-hand ex-
perience, discarding other factors, such as communication networks, gossip
or observing the behavior of others, that might be equally relevant for the
emergence of trust. The aim of this model is not to get a complete or realistic
picture on the emergence of trust, but to understand one of the mechanisms
involved in detail. Later, this understanding is to be combined with results
on other mechanisms such as belief dynamics through personal interaction or
the inuence of media towards an integrated understanding of the dynamics
of trust. In the following, I will discuss the formal paradigms studied, logical,
probabilistic and computational tools, closer with respect to the individual
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steps involved in the formal process and the relevant choices therein.
Among the most pressing problem in logical modeling, our rst frame-
work, is the choice of a suitable logic. Even if restricting oneself to already
existing frameworks, one might easily nd many dierent logics for the same
target system. In a recent study, Herzig [79] has identied no less than nine
dierent logical frameworks for the strategic interaction of several agents.
Comparing dierent logics, it turns out that some frameworks are close to
each other. A particular logic may, for instance, be a mere renement of
another or two logics may be interdenable, that is expressing the same
properties in dierent languages, taking dierent aspects as primitive. But it
can also happen that various logics focus on distinct parts of the same target
system, rendering them mutually incomparable.
The choice for a particular logic is guided by a variety of criteria. To name
just a few, these criteria can be simplicity, expressive power, succinctness,
scope, computational complexity, decidability and, of course, the faithfulness
or t. As in the case of Kuhnian theory choice, there is no designated way of
balancing these criteria. The ultimate decision is left to the modeler. Some
of these criteria are naturally compatible with each other, while others, such
as expressive power vs. complexity or realizability, almost inevitably pull in
dierent directions, as we have shown in chapter 3. The relative importance
attributed to the individual factors will depend upon the target system or
the modeler's taste, but also upon the intended applications. When picking
a logic for automated reasoning or software verication, computational com-
plexity will feature high on the list, while the creation of formal models for
philosophic clarication asks for succinctness and naturality in the operators
used.
While a discussion of these criteria transgresses the scope of this article,
one nal remark is in place about the dimension of t. An explanatory
use of modeling does not always strive for a faithful representation. Some
would even argue explanatory successful models will never be faithful [59, 64,
148], but they need to abstract away from various aspects of the situation
and focus only on some particular relevant properties. In this sense, the
dimension of t is, strictly speaking, not to be interpreted as a t to the entire
data or phenomenon, but as an adequate representation of these designated
properties. To give an example, simple belief logics only distinguish those
propositions an agents considers possible from those she doesn't. The fact
that such a framework fails to distinguish propositions the agents judges
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barely possible from almost certain truth does not constitute a failure of
t. The model is simply placed at a degree of abstraction that ignores this
dierence. A failure of t, in contrast, would occur if the target system
signicantly violated some axiom of belief logic such as positive introspection.
Probabilistic formalizations, our second framework, represent uncertainty
in or about the target system, graded beliefs, or actions with uncertain out-
come, within the language of probability theory. One of the diculties with
such mathematical models is that they can be, somehow, too precise. While
logical frameworks allow to stay at a safe degree of abstraction, probabilistic
models require the modeler, at least in principle, to be very precise about
various aspects of the target system. It is, however, behaviorally or con-
ceptually, dicult to distinguish between an agent holding some proposition
to be 63% probable and holding the same proposition 63,7% probable. Nor
should most arguments, one could argue, hinge on these precise numbers
rather than, say, the rough structural relations between the dierent beliefs.
Let me illustrate this further with an example. Consider the notorious
muddy children puzzle. An epistemic logician will address this situation
with a single model and argue that it covers the entire situation, see [118]. A
Bayesian, on the other hand, will not be done with one particular Bayesian
model, specifying priors for all agents involved. Rather, the Bayesian will
have to show that her solution of the puzzle holds for all initial beliefs the
children could reasonably entertain. To put it more generally, the modeler has
to show that the solution put forward holds for a set of worlds, big enough to
credibly contain the actual world [149]. To give a dierent example, consider
the framework we presented in chapter 4. We start with the assumption that
the individual degree of expertise is well dened, yet extremely dicult to
elicit. Thus, we are not interested in identifying the ideal weights for every
agents. Rather, we aim to nd a set of conditions on the individual weights
that still guarantee dierential judgments to outperform straight average.
These conditions should be weak enough that some decision maker with
limited information about the individual experts could still be positive that
his weight assignments satisfy them.
Our third framework, computational formalizations, represents, depicts
or explores a given target system with the use of a computer. Computational
models are particularly widespread in the study of social interaction as an
important tool to understand, test and explore various theoretical accounts.
Often, an informally given theory omits various factors loosely related to the
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target system. For instance, a theory about the emergence of trust presented
in chapter 6 might be silent about the exact learning algorithms agents use.
For a non-formalized theory, this counts as a advantage, a theory only be-
comes stronger if it does not rely on a particular background framework.
However, for a computational model this poses a problem. In order to im-
plement the theory, we need to x some learning rule. Consequentially, the
step of preparing a target system for formalization is particularly involved
for computational models. Each relevant aspect of the situation needs to be
specied in such a way that it can be implemented in a computer program.
Crucially the mechanisms used to ll the gaps of the original model are in
need of justication themselves. They may, in case, be borrowed from other
theoretical accounts about, say, learning rules or communication networks.
Consequentially, many simulations cannot test the particular target system
in isolation, but only in conjunction with the chosen background theories
used for lling these gaps.
The individual input mechanisms of a computational simulation need to
be formulated in a fashion accessible to a computer, using for instance, the
vocabulary of logic, probability theory or graph theory. Thus, computational
simulations, in a certain sense, supervene on some prior formalizations. They
do not, however, require homogeneity in the input frameworks. Within the
same simulation there might be a probabilistic mechanism for the individual's
beliefs, a logical mechanism for choosing an interaction partner and a graph
theoretic mechanism for social inuence.
Finally, we want to oer some remarks on the use of game theory. As
stated above, we understand game theory as a conceptual framework for ad-
dressing interactive strategic situations. For setting up a particular model,
this conceptual framework has to be combined with a formal framework,
logical, probabilistic or other. The exact choice of framework is guided by
various aspects of the situation [69]: The complexity of the problem, risk
attitudes and reasoning types of the agents or the quantity and quality of
available information. Representing a greedy investor in, say, a stock market,
who aims at maximizing her expected gains requires a dierent formaliza-
tion than a conservative investor occupied with reaching and maintaining a
certain status. In some situations the mere possibility of some outcome, say
bankruptcy or a car accident, is sucient to disqualify certain actions of the
agents. These cases require a dierent representation than others where more
ne grained information is needed for making a choice. Some of these cases
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call for a probabilistic treatment, others are best represented with logical
methods.
Probabilistic models require uncertainty about the game to be quanti-
able. This uncertainty can refer to necessary background information, but
also the distribution of player types or expected behavior of other agents.
It can even be benecial for the playing agent to create uncertainty about
her own behavior, using randomized strategies or blung in order to be less
predictable and maximize long term expected gains. Probabilistic studies
of games are primarily related to optimizing behavior, modeling agents as
maximizing their expected utility, but also characterizing societal outcomes
produced by the interaction of such agents.
Logical or qualitative models do not require the underlying uncertainty to
be quantiable. These models apply to situations of little information about
the underlying situation, but also to the analysis of cautious agents, reason-
ing about a particular goal state to maintain rather than maximizing their
expected gains. Logic or qualitative models are also used to track complex
reasoning chains with several inference steps about various agents. These
could be the iterated removal of dominated strategies, gradually discarding
all those moves that are guaranteed to fare worse than some other options
the agents have. Another case of iterated reasoning is backward induction,
evaluating a strategic situation by gradually inferring back from the set of
possible outcomes to the optimal moves and strategies to play.
7.3.2 Formalizations and Validity
Formalizations should, so the hope, inform us about the properties and be-
havior of their target system. Hence, we need to infer back from some formal
representation to its target system. We need to ensure thus, in order to val-
idate this inference, that the formalizations is similar enough to the target
system, see [68, 149]. There is a variety of approaches for assessing whether
a formal framework is good enough in that sense. First, some axioms and
assumptions underlying the construction can receive direct support. The
underlying axioms of a logical framework, for instance, may be supported
by some philosophical arguments, while some mechanisms of computational
models may be borrowed from a well established theoretical framework. Sec-
ond, a formal framework can be tested for its external consistency with ob-
servations or other theories [59, 68]. Probabilistic and computational models
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make predictions about target systems, that can, in some cases, be evalu-
ated against outside data. Take for example Monty Hall's paradox, a ercely
debated puzzle [142] about the optimal behavior in a game show. This his-
torically existing game show could, in principle be repeated often enough
to produce a set of data that every theoretical prediction has to stand up
against. Third and nally, formal frameworks may also turn out to be in-
ternally inconsistent. That is, they might produce puzzling, unwanted or
incoherent patterns such as the liar's paradox. Another example of this type
is our criticism of the approach by [6], presented in chapter 5, pointing out
an internal inconsistency in their treatment of approval voting.
Closely related to the validity of a formal tool is its scope. Not every
model is intended for every possible situation it could be applied to. Just to
the contrary, formal frameworks come with a set of explicit or implicit pre-
conditions restricting the domain of applicability [164]. Newtonian physics
has a high degree of predictive, manipulatory and explanatory success for
many applications, but only as long as the parameter values are within a
classical range. Similarly, qualitative models of belief are a successful tool
in modeling the informational dynamics of a police agent slowly acquiring
evidence about a criminal case. They completely fail in describing the same
agent guring out whether a certain coin she nds at the crime scene is fair
or not by tossing it over and over. Qualitative models of belief are neither
t for, nor aimed at representing the set of mental states relevant for repre-
senting the testing of scientic hypotheses. Similarly, the agent based model
presented in chapter 6 is specically tailored at the phenomenon of thin trust.
It is neither aimed at, nor suitable for an adequate representation of thick
trust.
But what if some model turns out to be inadequate or invalid? Let's
assume for a moment that we discover some problems with a formalization,
either some internal inconsistencies or a discrepancy with some data or ex-
pectations. In this case, there are at least three possible reactions. First,
we might take this discrepancy to be informative about the target system,
thereby challenging some prior beliefs or theories. Second, we might restrict
the scope of our formal framework to exclude the paradoxical application and
third and nally, we may decide to alter or discard the formal framework al-
together. Let me illustrate each of these cases with a concrete example.
For the rst case, learning about the target system, consider Schelling's fa-
mous segregation model. Within this model, Schelling showed that even a
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weak degree of preference for uniformity among the individual agents can
create a highly segregated society. Albeit highly idealized, this model was
not rejected as unrealistic, but changed our understanding of geographical
segregation drastically [149]. Similarly, the results on the inuence of mobil-
ity in chapter 6 inform us about the inuence of this factor on the underlying
mechanism, thereby revealing some shortcoming in current theories on the
determinants of trust. For the second case, restrictions of scope, we refer to
Sorites' paradox. Soritean reasoning derives highly undesired conclusion by
applying classical logic to vague terms such as being a heap or being tall.
Sorites is, in general, not taken to undermine the fact that classical logic
tracks the preservation of truth and falsity of statements. Rather, Sorites
is understood as revealing certain caveats in applying classical logic to a
combination of vague terms and high reasoning depths. Finally, examples
abound for the third case, counterexamples leading to discard certain for-
malizations. The development of deontic logic, for instance, has progressed
along a chain of challenges and counterexamples, each rejecting one or more
proposed logical frameworks. To pick a concrete example, Forrester's Para-
dox of gentle murder revealed the inadequacy of Standard Deontic Logic as
a framework for deontic reasoning in general, and for conditional obligations
in particular. The paradox contributed to the emergence and development of
alternative competing frameworks for deontic reasoning, such as non-normal
deontic logics and logics that do not validate modus ponens (see [5, 72]).
7.4 Interplay between the Paradigms.
In the last chapters, we have introduced three types of modeling frameworks,
logical and probabilistic tools and computational approaches. By now, we
have addressed these frameworks in isolation, focusing on their individual
properties and particularities. But how do the paradigms relate to each
other? Of course, the particular strengths and weaknesses of the individual
frameworks often gear them towards dierent target situations or modeling
interests. There is, however, a plethora of situations that attract the atten-
tion of more than one formal paradigm. In this case, there are, at least,
three dierent ways in which the dierent frameworks could relate to each
other. First, dierent models may complement each other, giving dierent
perspectives of the same target system. Second, they could compete against
each other, providing contradictory analyses or merely quarreling about the
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status of being the standard framework for certain applications. And third
and last, dierent frameworks may build on each other by importing building
blocks from other formalizations. Let us study these three possibilities a bit
further.
In the rst case, the dierent models act in parallel, each looking at the
target situation from a dierent angle. In some cases, the various formal-
izations merely dier in their coarsity. Dierent degrees of abstraction, so
the hope, reveal dierent structural properties relevant for understanding the
target system. To give a concrete example, there are logical and mathemat-
ical formulations of non-locality in quantum information [1] or of the rst
and higher order beliefs structures in games [52, 73]. In both cases the two
formalizations are completely compatible with each other. The logical for-
mulation simply presents a coarser perspective of the information captured
in the probabilistic model, thereby emphasizing dierent aspects of the sys-
tem. The transition from the ner to the coarser perspective is easily done
by simply omitting some of the information. Similarly, logical and prob-
abilistic methods study games in dierent degrees of coarsity. Also there,
the resulting analyses are, at some times compatible. For instance, those
moves maximizing the expected utility of an agent are always a subset of the
strategies surviving any iterated removal of dominated strategies
In other cases, the dierent formalizations assume genuinely dierent per-
spectives towards the target system. In this case, there is, in general, no
direct relationship between the dierent formalizations, even though they
study the same phenomenon. In the times of facebook, for instance, there is
an increased interest in the spreading of information on communication net-
works. Computational models, for once, simulate the entire dynamic process
to get a grasp of the belief dynamics and its limits [119]. On the other hand,
mathematical and logical models [39] identify conditions of the communica-
tion graph under which the same system converges to a stable equilibrium.
In our second case, dierent formal frameworks produce competing for-
malizations of the same target system. This competition may sometimes be
purely formal, say about being the standard paradigm for some application.
But the conict might also mirror some substantial disagreement, for instance
about some modeling choices or background theories. To give a concrete ex-
ample, the Bayesian program models beliefs as subjective probabilities, while
a logical analysis represents beliefs through truth-valuations on sentences or
sets of sentences. The relationship between these two has given rise to deep
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and lasting philosophical debates, for instance about the connection between
probabilistic belief and logical concepts such as conditionals [107] or, more
recently, the relationship between probabilistic and logical models of static
belief [104] and the dynamic correspondence between logical and probabilis-
tic belief revision rules [109]. Note that the debate displayed here is not so
much a conict between logical and mathematical tools, but the reection
of some substantial philosophic dispute about the nature of belief. Other
logical tools for instance, manage to avoid this conict with the Bayesian
paradigm. In particular, a more semantically motivated logical model, using
possible worlds, is perfectly compatible with probabilistic models of belief.2
In our third and last case, dierent frameworks are used interdependently,
one building on the results or another. Within a complex target system,
there is a variety of dierent factors and mechanisms at work. Naturally,
some of them might call for, say, a probabilistic model while others are best
t with a logical model. An agent will have a probabilistic degree of belief
whether it is going to rain tomorrow, but her actions are best described in
an all-or-nothing, logical fashion: She will go to the beach or she won't.
Furthermore, the individual parts of a complex system will, in general, not
be isolated, but they interact in several ways. Thus, also the corresponding
formalizations might need to interact in a similar or related way. To give a
concrete example, consider informational cascades, an informational feedback
phenomenon that can lead a group to a unanimous belief in some falsehood.
Cascades crucially depend upon the agent's belief updating mechanism which
is, for this purpose, best described with a probabilistic model. But it takes a
logical model, supervening on this probabilistic belief model, to show that no
degree of rationality can protect against cascades. Even completely rational
agents with common knowledge of the situation and each others' rationality,
may still run into a cascade that leads them to a uniformly false belief [10].
More broadly, most computational models depend upon prior formaliza-
tions of their respective input mechanisms. Computer simulations can track
the emergence of trust (chapter 6), but also political opinions [77], radicaliza-
2To give some more details: Every rational valued probability ascription to a nite
set of propositions is representable as a set of equiprobable possible worlds and can thus
be reasoned about in classical epistemic logic. It is folklore in epistemic logic that this
analogy extends to Bayesian conditionalization corresponding to public announcements (of
the formula conditioned on) and Jerey conditioning that can be replicated with product
update models (see chapter 2 for a denition). In the last case, the exact choice of product
update model will, however, need to depend upon the base model it is applied to.
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tion [15], or racial segregation [139] in a society. But the underlying learning
or decision rules are, of course, both formulated and defended in a logical
or probabilistic framework. Similarly, many of the theoretical discussions
in setting up and defending agent based simulations are phrased in game
theoretic terms, addressing the space of possible actions, the agent's goals,
beliefs and preferences, which strategies of the players to include and how
they should behave. These discussions nally results in identifying and de-
fending a certain fragment of the game theoretic framework to be used in the
actual implementation. Depending upon the scope of the simulation, this
fragment might be little more than some trivial consequence of the game
theoretic framework, some belief updating mechanism or a decision rule. For
instance, the simulation in chapter 6 breaks the complex considerations in-
volved in trusting others down to a single decision rule that translates the
agent's past experience into her current behavior.
7.5 Formalizations and Dynamics
Political scientists want to understand how societies build up and destroy
social capital, trust or shared norms. Social epistemology studies how pref-
erences and beliefs gradually develop in social interaction. Philosophers such
as Peirce or Levi and, later, the Bayesians assess the rationality of an epis-
temic agent through her reaction to incoming information. All these exam-
ples deal, directly or indirectly, with dynamic aspects of their target systems.
Across various elds, dynamic or cross-temporal aspects of various kinds have
become more and more central in recent research.
This emphasis on dynamical aspects reects in a variety of developments
in the formal realm, ranging from the emergence of computer simulations all
the way to the dynamic turn in modal logic, producing a plethora of logical
tools and frameworks related to various aspects of dynamic systems. In
particular the emergence of simulations proved vital for the study of dynamic
interaction. Much of our current understanding of social dynamics would not
have been possible without the appropriate formal tools, such as agent based
simulations.
The relationship between dynamics and formalization is manifold. Formal
models appear in various avors, using many dierent frameworks including
all three major framework types discussed here. In the end, the temporal
evolution of various systems becomes a target system in itself, to be addressed
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with formal tools from various perspectives. There are at least four dierent
ways in which formalizations can relate to dynamic aspects of a target system.
First, formal models can merely be suited for incorporating the eects of
dynamic events, allowing for the transition from some prior state to the
posterior after some event. But, this is the second case, formalization can also
focus on the representation of dynamic events and patterns themselves, rather
than solely representing their eects on a situation. Third, formalizations
can replicate the temporal evolution of dynamic systems. And fourth and
last, formalizations can be used to reason about the limit behavior of some
dynamic process and anticipate and explore dierent future routes the system
could take. Let us explore these alternatives in a bit more detail.
At some times, this is the rst case, a static representation of an agent's
belief set is to be combined with a formal tool that automatizes the transition
from one situation to the next, rather than having to compose a completely
new model upon every bit of information the agents receive. Preparing a
formalization for incoming changes comes at a price. Accommodating dy-
namic events poses new conditions and requirements that need to be taken
into account while picking a formal framework. Some incoming informa-
tion might contradict an agent's current beliefs, requiring her to have some
fallback states to resort to. Reacting adequately to such information will
require insight into the causal or probabilistic relationship between dierent
features of the world or information about the relative strength of certain
beliefs. These desiderata, sometimes dubbed the logic of change reect
in the development of various logical and mathematical frameworks such as
knowledge-belief models in logic [12] or Bayesian Networks for probabilistic
models [27].
In the second case, the rules, patterns and events governing the dynamic
process themselves are subject to formalization. Depending upon the choice
of target system, the dynamical patterns to be formalized can be actual
changes in actions or beliefs, but also normative theories on how agents
should ideally respond to incoming information. Formal frameworks related
to the patterns of belief revision include the AGM axioms [3] or Bayes and
Jerey updating in the probabilistic case. Other frameworks such as Bayesian
sensor integration focus on incorporating information from several partially
reliable and potentially contradictory sources at once, see [96] or the models
presented in chapters 4 and 6.
Yet other formalizations concentrate on individual updating events, treat-
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ing them as entities in their own right. To motivate this, imagine a politician
composing dierent speeches for her upcoming election campaign. She wants
to prepare various manuscripts, diering in style and content, to be prepared
for the dierent possible audience she may encounter until election day. Ev-
ery speech updates the beliefs and attitudes of the respective audience in
some way or another. In a certain sense, a political speech can hence be seen
as an dynamic event in its own right that can be applied to various possible
audience and occasion. That is, the candidate writing her speeches composes
an updating event without referring to any particular listener or any particu-
lar informational state. Treating updating events as individual entities allow
us to represent, compare and reason about dynamic events independent of
any actual state of nature. Formal tools to model these events are product
updates and public announcements in logic ([11] and chapter 2)or transition
matrices (see chapter 5) within mathematical modeling.
In the third, case formalizations are aimed at depicting, predicting and
understanding the entire dynamic process. This third aim is primarily pur-
sued by computational simulations which are designed to imitate the time-
evolution of a real system (Hartmann [75]). We focus on two roles served
by computational models, solution or exploration and visualization. While
dynamic systems are formulated in a mathematical or logical language, var-
ious aspects of dynamic systems are too complex for an analytic treatment.
Many dynamic accounts of group behavior are formulated in an agent based
language, describing the behavior of an individual agent at a single time step
(see chapter 6, but also [15, 77, 119]). When applied to several interact-
ing agents, these individual rules generate complex behavioral patterns, that
are close to impossible to anticipate let alone classify with analytical means.
By executing the underlying algorithm, computational models solve the for-
mal interactive system, they determine the long term behavior that emerges
from the chosen agentive and interaction rules. The second function served
by computational models is visualization. Computational tools enable dier-
ent perspectives on the target system. A simulation can produce numerical
output, representing certain aspects of the dynamic system. But computer
programs can also visualize the dynamic system, for instance by represent-
ing individual agents as functions or moving points on a map. Each such
perspective allows for dierent insights into the target system. For instance,
visually tracking the emergence of a multi-agent system on a two-dimensional
grid can inform about typical interactive patterns or iterating clusters that
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are hard or impossible to identify in the numerical output stream produced
by the simulation alone.
At yet other times, this is the fourth case, formalizations are to reason
about global or limit properties of the target system. When encountering
some new trend, say a newly created party, a technological standard or the
informational shocks studied in chapter 6, we might be interested whether
this trend will manage to acquire a stable and lasting level of support. Or, as
a second example, in dealing with a complex system or a computer program
we want to be sure that the program does not crash along the way. These
questions refer to global or limit properties of a dynamic system rather than
to particular events at individual time steps. The limit behavior of a sys-
tem can be anticipated through computer simulation, imitating the dynamic
process itself. At other times, formalizations identify adequate structural
properties of the underlying situation governing the convergence behavior
of some system such as Nash equilibria in strategic contexts [99] or general
properties of the communication graph underlying the adoption of certain
trends. [39]. Similarly, the stability of complex systems can be tested, inter
alia, through a logical analysis of some transition graph encoding the possible
runs of the system [58].
7.6 Final Remarks
In this concluding chapter, we have oered some general remarks about the
role of formal tools in philosophy. Our main motivation here was to provide
some framing for the ve main chapters in this thesis and to give some
indications on how they could relate to other formal and informal work in
their respective elds. In this discussion, we have concentrated on three
types of formal tools used in this thesis, logical and probabilistic models
and computer simulations. Of course, there are others and there are other
roles of formal tools than the ones presented here [105]. We do, however,
think that these remarks give a fair overview over some of the decisions and
considerations involved in the use of formal tools.
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